FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-25, *The Guerrilla - And How To Fight Him*, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This publication is a compilation of articles by a wide variety of authors about guerrilla warfare. It addresses historical guerrilla campaigns, strategies to be used against guerrillas, and other points of interest dealing with guerrilla warfare. These ideas on guerrilla warfare will give today's military professional an excellent basis for formulating an idea of the modern day threat.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVAN
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16 January 1962

Editorial Board
Marine Corps Gazette

Gentlemen:

General Shoup sent to me the January 1962 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, a special issue on guerrilla warfare. I read it from cover to cover and was most impressed by its contents. It was an entirely professional appraisal of a matter which demands our earnest attention, for this is the kind of circumstance we may be called upon to face in many parts of the world.

I urge all officers and men of the Marine Corps to read and digest this fine work, for I know this to be a matter of special concern to Marines -- that your professional training is pointed toward making every Marine a master of this art.

I commend you on this outstanding presentation of a vital subject.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Introduction

Two weapons today threaten freedom in our world. One—the 100-megaton hydrogen bomb—requires vast resources of technology, effort, and money. It is an ultimate weapon of civilized and scientific man. The other—a nail and piece of wood buried in a rice paddy—is deceptively simple, the weapon of a peasant.

In rare agreement, the two leaders of the only countries able so far to maneuver in space have directed the attention of their top advisers to that rice paddy. Other deterrents, say President Kennedy, leave the Communists no stronger form of war. History, says Chairman Khrushchev, must bring wars of “liberation,” a form of warfare that the “peace-loving” Soviets may support without inconsistency—according to Communist dogma.

A re-emphasized mission for the American fighting man is plain: Prepare to master the guerrilla. To beat the guerrilla on his own ground, the first essential is knowledge—knowledge about the enemy himself, his methods, strengths, weaknesses, tactics, and techniques. More than that, to beat the guerrilla means to fight not in the sharp black and white of formal combat, but in a gray, fuzzy obscurity where politics affect tactics and economics influence strategy. The soldier must fuse with the statesman, the private turn politician.

To win, the soldier must think and understand, and his odds will improve to the extent that he has done his homework before he arrives on the battlefield. Traditionally, military knowledge, and even formal doctrine, has been aired through the open pages of the professional military journals: Army, Air Force, Naval Institute Proceedings, Military Review, Air University Quarterly, Infantry, Armor—and the Marine Corps Gazette. Fortunately, in
this critical “decade of the guerrilla,” an even wider audience is available through commercially published books.

Such interest in military problems is recent, as the history of the Marine Corps Association attests. It was spurred into being on April 25, 1913, by a Marine with a vision: the late, great Commandant General John A. Lejeune. He was only a colonel then, but he saw clearly a great need for better military education, for professional thought, for firm national policies and supporting military doctrines. A professional journal, he believed, was a first step.

So the Gazette was founded and—somehow—supported by a minuscule Corps with 400 officers, few of them more than high-school graduates. In its pages, General Lejeune, aided by that rare visionary Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis, issued a message repeatedly: War with Japan would come, amphibious war; Marines must work now to forge an amphibious weapon, the Fleet Marine Forces. (Oddly enough, three decades of guerrilla war in Latin America constituted the major obstacle to implementation of this weapon.) The amphibious victories of World War II are now history, history written in part by unsung Marines who fitted together—often in the pages of the Gazette—the tiny, essential pieces that completed the mosaic of amphibious capability. The road to Tokyo had been mapped and charted in the 1920’s and paved in the 1930’s.

The same pattern has been true in unconventional warfare. The threat is clear in the 1960’s, but strong warnings were issued a decade and two decades ago. Fortunately for the free world, the military journals contain in their files a rich lode of study, analysis, and commentary which today’s students may quickly mine and refine.

Two years ago, early in 1960, the Gazette Editorial Board began intensive work on a special issue designed to dramatize the guerrilla threat so long obscured by nuclear clouds. This issue, which appeared in January, 1962, attracted notice and praise far beyond our modest hopes. For we well knew how much had been left out, excellent material that begged for renewed attention. But a tiny journal with a circulation of 25,000 must watch its budget, count its pages like diamonds. That is why we
are most grateful to Frederick A. Praeger for giving our authors this chance to reach their deservedly wider audience—and in a durable form.

Just who are these authors? Let us discuss one. The first note of warning about unconventional warfare was sounded in our pages by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC (Ret.), in 1941. Although he was then but a captain, his contribution was massive—the first translation of the writings of Mao Tse-tung, surely the keystone to any study of the guerrilla.

To that distinguished combat veteran and thinker, and to the other authors—Marines and friends of the Marines—who made this work possible, these pages are gratefully dedicated.

T. N. G.
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I

THE THEORY AND THE THREAT

MAO'S PRIMER ON GUERRILLA WAR
Translated by Brigadier General S. B. Griffith II, USMC (Ret.)

TIME, SPACE, AND WILL: THE POLITICO-MILITARY VIEWS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
E. L. Katzenbach, Jr.

INTERNAL WAR: THE NEW COMMUNIST TACTIC
Roger Hilsman

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY: A STUDY
Peter Paret and John W. Shy

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
W. W. Rostow

These authors need little introduction. General Griffith you have just met. We present here a digest of his translation of Mao. His complete translation, with a comprehensive new Introduction, is available in book form: Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

Dr. Katzenbach is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Education, a student of guerrilla war for many years, and a Marine Reserve colonel.

Mr. Hilsman is Director of Intelligence and Research for the Department of State. He has been a guerrilla himself, as he states in his article, originally a speech delivered August 1, 1961, to the Institute of World Affairs, in San Diego. He has written the Foreword for an important addition to guerrilla-warfare literature: People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

Dr. Paret and Dr. Shy are historians at Princeton University
with a special interest in current defense problems. Their views on unconventional war are fully developed in a recent book, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

Dr. Rostow's article was tailored from a widely acclaimed talk he gave when he was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President of the United States. He has since become Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council.
Mao’s Primer on Guerrilla War*

Translated by
Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character.

On the other hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.

There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people’s guerrilla war, who say: “Only regular troops can carry out guerrilla operations.” There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: “Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people.” There are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to

* This version was extracted by The New York Times, © 1961, from the full-length article printed by the Gazette in 1941 and now available in book form.
inhabitants of guerrilla zones, and their national consciousness awakened.

There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal.

In all armies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective.

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. A self-imposed discipline is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.

Further, in such an army the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much. This is particularly true in the case of guerrilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things, but there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war.

There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as "Three Rules and Eight Remarks."

Rules: All actions are subject to command; do not steal from the people; be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks: Replace the door [used as a bed in summer] when you leave the house; roll up the bedding in which you have slept; be courteous; be honest in your transactions; return what you borrow; replace what you break; do not bathe in the presence of women; do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the
The Theory and the Threat

fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of the enemy.

The primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases; last, to extend the war areas. Thus guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategical considerations.

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must primarily be based on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated.

If we cannot surround whole armies, we can at least partially destroy them; if we cannot kill the enemy troops, we can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change the relative strengths of the opposing forces.

Guerrillas can gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy’s insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories; because the enemy is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stu-
pidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness.

The leader must be like the fisherman who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current, or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with and control over his units.

When the situation is serious, the guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident.

After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places. When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted, trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities and lines of communication not strongly held. We may at least hold these for temporary (if not permanent) periods.

All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period the enemy must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with equal zeal the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished.

How are guerrilla units formed? In one case, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or bird guns, and thus a guerrilla unit begins.

In some places where the local government is not determined
or where its officers have all fled, the leaders among the masses call upon the people to resist and they respond. In circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, professors, other educators, local soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood.

There are those who say "I am a farmer" or "I am a student"; "I can discuss literature but not military arts." This is incorrect. There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you become military units. Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war.

[Still another] type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from the enemy. It is continually possible to produce disaffection in their ranks and we must increase our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after mutiny, they must be received into our ranks and organized. In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance.

Guerrilla organizations [can also be] formed from bands of bandits and brigands. Many bandit groups pose as guerrillas and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert them.

In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas.

All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into self-defense units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then both military and political training must be given them. Their responsibilities are: local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda.

When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these
units, armed with what weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus the self-defense units assist the combatant guerrillas.

They have other functions. They furnish stretcher-bearers to carry the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and porridge. Each member of these groups must have a weapon, even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that guerrillas are lightly armed attack groups that require simple equipment.

Guerrilla bands that originate with the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, bird guns, spears, big swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary weapons are added, and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed. After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the amount of equipment by capturing it from the enemy.

An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridges, hand grenades, and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend too much on an armory. The enemy is the principal source of their supply. For destruction of railway trackage, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and demolition units must be organized in each regiment.

If Western medicines are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.

Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices.

In addition, it is necessary to have field glasses, compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla unit will acquire these things.
Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung

E. L. Katzenbach, Jr.

"The main form of struggle is war, the main form of organization is the army," Mao Tse-tung, the dictator of Red China, once observed. He elaborated his dictum this way: "... without armed struggle there will be no place for the proletariat, there will be no place for the people, there will be no Communist Party, and there will be no victory in revolution."

This philosophy, which relates war and revolution so closely, is the end product of more than a quarter-century's firsthand experience with military matters. It is not a strip of intellectual tinsel which Mao had picked up from the classics of Communism. It represents his own most intimate view of and approach to the problem of revolution.

To be sure, his revolutionary forebears had a far greater interest in military affairs, particularly military theory, than have other revolutionaries at other times. The articles that Karl Marx and his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels wrote on the Crimean War for the old New York Tribune were attributed to General Winfield Scott—then, incidentally, running for the Presidency of these United States. Nor is there any doubt that the best contemporary writing on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was that done by Engels in the Pall Mall Gazette. The French Socialist Jean Jaurès wrote L'Armée Nouvelle, which still must be regarded as a classic of military literature. The Russian Lenin read and commented on Clausewitz, and Stalin has commented on Lenin and
Clausewitz. More recently, Khrushchev has leveled criticism at the military insights of Stalin—he said that Stalin did not even know how to read a military map—and this would seem to indicate that by his own lights Khrushchev considers himself a competent military critic. In short, whereas the citizenry of the Western world has had few students of military affairs among its responsible political figures—Alexander Hamilton and “Teddy” Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill are perhaps the most prominent of those exceptions that prove the rule—the intellectuals and the politicians of the Communist world, translating their basic concept of class war into meaningful action, have given what in another society might be called prayerful consideration to the study of military policy. Mao is the most distinguished of the Communists who have given military theory their concentrated and continuous attention.

Mao's military thinking is not part of a Party line. To be sure, he quotes from various Communist gospels, but he also quotes from Chinese military classics, particularly the work of Sun Tzu, with which he is thoroughly familiar. And from Clausewitz, whom he studied in Chinese translation as early as 1928, he borrows the usually quoted catch phrases. But, essentially, his theories of war are generalized from his own experiences as a revolutionary. The day-to-day crises formed the foundation of a doctrine that presently purports to be generally applicable and absolutely timeless. Thus, his first important military piece, *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains* (1928), deals with specific problems and hence is dated. *On the Protracted War*, which he wrote a decade later, deals with generalities, lays down a set of "immutable" laws and thereby presumably seeks to take the "if" out of warfare, and to make a science of an art.

There are fancier definitions, but basically military theory, unlike most others, has to do with making the best use of the available. In broad terms, military doctrine would seem to have some six components, three of which are tangible and three of which are not.

Of the tangibles, there is, first, the weapons system: the long-bow, the Swiss pike, the A-bomb, items on the long list of the instruments of war that have given a sole possessor a moment of
military supremacy. Second, there is the supply system, logistics in the broadest sense. Perhaps this is the area in which U.S. military genius has best expressed itself. Even such U.S. contributions as amphibious techniques have contributed no more than, for example, the fleet train, the Red Ball Express, the depot system—those techniques by which we helped fight and win a war on the outside lines of communications. And, third, there is manpower.

And then there are three intangibles: space, which is defined here as square mileage plus obstacles, minus a workable communications network; time; and will. It is to these three, space and time and will, that the industrial Western world has given least thought, and to which Mao has given most. The reason is simple enough, for these three factors, plus manpower, added up to the totality of his exploitable military potential. Weapons and supplies were narrowly restricted. His was a military force born in the most abject poverty. The problem toward which he directed his attention, therefore, was this: How can a nation that is not industrialized defeat a nation that is? In stating his conclusions, he said nothing which had not been stated in one way or another before, but he did rerank military necessities. He and his followers have achieved a degree of success, unfortunately, which forces as relatively ill equipped as these had not achieved during the whole of the nineteenth century, when Western arms carried Western culture into the far corners of the world.

Among the Communist Vietminh in Indochina, among the Huiiis in the Philippines and the insurgents in Malaya, Mao's writings were gospel. What Lenin did on the subject of imperialism and Marx on capitalism, Mao has done for anti-industrial warfare. That is why an understanding of Mao's military philosophy may be of rather more than casual interest.

Although Mao never states it quite this way, the basic premise of his theory is that political mobilization may be substituted for industrial mobilization with a successful military outcome. That is to say, his fundamental belief is that only those who will admit defeat can be defeated. So if the totality of a population can be made to resist surrender, this resistance can be turned into a war of attrition which will eventually and inevitably be victorious.
Or, conversely, when the populace admits defeat, the forces in the field might just as well surrender or withdraw.

Political mobilization, Mao wrote, "is the most fundamental condition for winning the war." He explained his thinking in the form of a simile: "The [people] may be likened to water and the [army] to the fish who inhabit it." "With the common people of the whole country mobilized, we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it . . ." Mao holds that military salvation flows from political conversion. But, note: Conversion takes time.

So Mao's military problem was how to organize space so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how to organize time so that it could be made to yield will, that quality which makes willingness to sacrifice the order of the day, and the ability to bear suffering cheerfully the highest social virtue. So Mao's real military problem was not that of getting the war over with, the question to which Western military thinkers have directed the greater part of their attention, but that of keeping it going.

Presumably, it is axiomatic that in war, as differentiated from sport, one never fights on the enemy's terms. The handicappers have no place on a planning staff, that is to say. What Mao evolved was a strategy which, as he saw it, played to the enemy weaknesses.

What made the war which the Italians fought against the Abyssinians in the mid-1930's so successful? Why was it that the British were so marvelously successful at Omdurman against the Sudanese? Most certainly, it was the plane, the bomb, artillery, and, above all, the machine gun. But, by the same token, why was it that the French had such difficulties with the Riffs in the 1930's and were so frequently defeated in Indochina in the late 1940's and early 1950's? Specifically, with respect to the Abyssinian War, and by deduction with respect to the others, the answer Mao gives is that success or lack of it varies directly with the degree to which the native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on the latter's terms. By and large, it would seem true that what made the machinery of
European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to
die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.

So the first problem to which Mao bent his mind was how to
avoid a military decision. This he knew he had to do, and this, he
thought, was something his enemy, whether Nationalists, or
Japanese, or others, could never withstand.

"The ten-year revolutionary war we have fought may be sur-
prising to other countries," Mao wrote in 1936, "but for us it is
only like the presentation, amplification, and preliminary exposit-
ion of the theme in an... essay with many exciting paragraphs
yet to follow." Time and again throughout his works on war
he returns to this same theme: "Our War of Resistance cannot be
quickly won and can only be a protracted war." Again, "as a
distant journey tests the strength of a horse and a long task proves
the character of a man," so [so] guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its
enormous power in the course of a long and ruthless war...."

Moreover, note that when Mao uses the term "war" he is not
speaking specifically of a war, but generally of the war. Just as
the millennium follows the last stage of revolution in the works
of Marx, so in Mao, the millennium of peace, when there will "no
longer be any wars," when there will be a "new world of perma-
nent peace and permanent light," dawns on the morrow of victory.
But the victory of which he is speaking lies in a world made safe
for Communism, in an age in which its enemies are crushed. He
believes that the willingness to compromise has a class basis, and
that therefore a compromise peace will by its very origins be
doomed to failure. Nor can there be any questions as to his views
on means. In Chinese history, there was a nobleman who in
courtly fashion turned over the initiative to the enemy. Of him,
Mao remarks, "We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no
use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness, and
morality in war."

Has this now-aging revolutionary, who now directs the lives
of more men than any other in the whole world, changed his
mind? Has success dimmed his view of a world that is Communist
controlled from pole to pole, of a war that must of necessity con-
tinue until his sort of world is a present reality?

War, given space, time, and the revolutionary will to exploit
them, has not only a clear and certain outcome, but clearly definable stages as well, in Mao’s military theology. Protracted war, he notes, *must* (and this is a point he makes dogmatically) pass through three stages. In the first, Mao is on what he calls the “strategic defensive.” The second is a period of stalemate, a period of preparation for the third, in which a shift to the offensive takes place. It is the first period about which Mao is most concerned.

What is a military objective? A hill, an industrial center, a rail line, an air base? Of course they are. But those U.S. observers who thought that the loss of such facilities spelled defeat were wrong. Only the destruction of the enemy’s *force in being* can bring an end to resistance. And *force in being* in a country such as China, where dependence on goods is minimal, can survive under unbelievable conditions. It depends on what an army thinks the stakes are.

Moreover, the more one side in any way can afford to surrender, the more the other must defend. Mao was willing to give, in this first stage of war, a great deal indeed. He makes almost a fetish of the desirability of retreat. “Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and abandon territory afterwards?” he asks rhetorically. Then rhetorically he answers with yet another question: “One eats first and then relieves oneself; does one eat in vain?”

But although defeats frequently make heroes, they do not encourage the spirit of resistance. Only victory, however small, can do this. The successful small action—the raid, the ambush, the assassination—this is the material from which militant enthusiasm is woven. But continuous victory at this level of military activity is not a matter of gallantry and glory, but of caution and self-restraint. Mao recognizes that during the strategic defensive, the very price of survival is caution.

Again and again he inveighs against the dangers of desperadoism, the process by which one gains glory by losing one’s shirt. Again and again he insists on the necessity of local superiority; five and even ten against one is his formula. Combining dispersion with concentration of force, the secret of victory in detail—this is the concept he is trying to put at the forefront of the minds
of those whom he seeks to teach what he calls the "laws" of war.

Mao makes the point implicitly in his writings that although guerrilla operations are the cosmic trap of military strategy, the muck, the quicksand in which a technologically superior military machine bogs down in time-consuming futility, they cannot in and of themselves win wars. Like mud, they can stave off defeat, but, like mud, they cannot bring victory.

Therefore, he insists that during this first period of war, the period that encompasses the strategic defensive, the army must, as it must in all stages of war, take an active political role. For, according to Mao, the army is not an instrument of the state, but the essence of it, its spirit, its life, and its hope:

When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.

The army is then to rout out the dissidents, to equip itself with mimeograph machines, and with "chalk cans and big brushes" for cartoon warfare. The army is therefore to be of itself a single huge, coordinated propaganda machine, the torch of revolution.

The first stage of war slips into the second because, as Mao himself remarks, the Communists have "retreated in space but advanced in time." The period of stalemate begins.

What, according to Mao’s theory, has been happening? In the first place, the "inevitability" of defeat has been wiped from the minds of the defeatists by the very fact that the war has been continued. Despair has given way to hope, the will to resist has been strengthened, and the will to win is beginning to dawn. Guerrilla units are turning into mobile units strengthened by the capture of enemy matériel, and the coordination between forces is being more skillfully managed. A series of local actions, even though each separate one results in the retirement of the attacking irregular forces, can be regarded as a strategic gain by the irregulars—provided that they preserve their ability to take the field again. By regularly disturbing the peace, they are destroying the local legitimacy of the established order. Inevitably, the distracted villagers will begin making contributions to the irregulars.
as insurance for their flocks and harvests. The irregulars will then have begun to collect taxes and will have taken the first steps toward becoming a respectable government. And the Communists' enemy has been given pause to wonder whether or not his own victory is certain, despite the unending capture of objective after objective.

Fundamental to all else, Mao says, is the belief that countries with legislative bodies simply cannot take a war of attrition, either financially or, over the long run, psychologically. Indeed, the very fact of a multiparty structure makes the commitment to a long war so politically suicidal as to be quite impossible. When the lines of the Communists' enemy are drawn out like strings of chewing gum, weak and sagging, when the financial burden increases from month to month, the outcry against the war will of itself weaken the ability of the troops in the field to fight. The war that Mao's theory contemplates is the cheapest for him and the most expensive for the enemy.

Take one example, and one chosen specifically to illustrate his theory under the circumstances most favorable to it, the raid the Communist Vietminh made on the state of Laos in Indochina in 1953.

The raid on Laos, like the war in Indochina itself, presented a farrago of paradoxes. It was a foot soldiers' blitzkrieg against immobilized, mechanized forces. Those countries which were most immediately threatened by it--Burma and Thailand, which border Laos on the west--were less disturbed by it than those which were far distant, i.e., France, the United Kingdom, and particularly the United States. No pitched battle was fought, little material damage was done, and little blood was spilled. Yet the results of this action, whether the whole of the intended result was achieved or not, were as far-reaching as if a major victory had been won. Seldom has so much been accomplished with so little.

Perhaps in the cold light of afterthought, the most curious aspect of the whole action was that from the beginning it made a mockery of the old saying "Nothing risked; nothing gained." Whatever the gain, no military investment of sizable propor-
tions was risked. This was quite as safe a venture, in a word, as the Chinese invasion of Tibet.

Yet after a three-week invasion, this is what the Communists had accomplished: (1) They had thrown terror into the French (military and civil authorities alike) in both Indochina and metropolitan France; (2) they had spread French defending forces in Indochina even thinner than previously; (3) they had produced renewed demands for a larger measure of political autonomy in both Laos and nearby Cambodia; (4) they had created a situation in which French spending in the area was raised by some $60 million; and (5) they had cost the United States some $460 million extra by way of foreign aid. This was, in short, the kind of action which Mao Tse-tung had advocated with such redundancy in his writings—although, to be sure, it was doubtless more successful than anything he had imagined. It was one of those raids that would turn Phase 2 of a protracted war into Phase 3.

The third phase of a protracted war is undistinguished except in one respect. In all of his writings Mao never loses sight of the fact that guerrilla action cannot win wars. This fact, he realizes, must never be forgotten. Only by combining units into larger units, by creating an organization, by inculcating discipline, in a word, by turning groups into armies, can the necessary avalanche of military force be built.

But what if there is no progression? Suppose someone bungles, suppose hatred overcomes wisdom and decisions are lost, what then?

The military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung is much more than it at first seems to be. His is an enormously persuasive piece of propaganda, for it all comes down to this proposition: If the leadership is capable, a war, as differentiated from an action, cannot be lost.

Although Mao makes the point that one must go through three phases in a prolonged war, he points out that there is not necessarily constant and inevitable progress. Indeed, it is the theory that retrogression is possible, that a war may slip back a stage, as well as that it will slip forward, that gives the doctrine the shimmer of infallibility which is its greatest attraction. Given patience
and will, the doctrine of Mao holds out victory as inevitable. Therein lies its cunning and its appeal.

Faith that the Communists have a monopoly on patience is what has made Mao's the iniquitous Communist law that it is. In Malaya, the Communists argued that the "anti-British national revolutionary war [would] be protracted, uphill, and violent," and that Mao Tse-tung's "concepts...[were] imperatives in the course of the struggle."

To what extent is such a faith justified? The answer is difficult. Mao never really states how important the rear base is to any operation. It is the presence of China at Indochina's door that has certainly counted in good measure for the success of Communist operations there as differentiated from the failures in the Philippines and in Malaya. And the hills of western China spelled for him the difference between defeat and the survival of that small spark from which victory has flamed.

Furthermore, the doctrine is applicable only to areas in which there is more than ample space. It would seem to me that, for Mao, Korea was the very worst spot in which to fight, and it would also seem to me that he knew it. He learned much about positional warfare there, however, and, being a man who throughout his works stresses the necessity of being extremely flexible, he doubtless made the most of the opportunity to learn a new mode of warfare.

But on the other hand, his own war in China, no matter how one modifies the fact in terms of all sorts of fortuitous events, did follow his precepts, and he did himself call the turn on all phases. Furthermore, the war the Vietminh fought in northern Indochina followed his teachings phase by phase despite the claims of Vietminh leaders that they improved on the doctrines. It was a war of ideas in a very real sense, and the fact that the French leaders never seemed to understand the nature of the war they were fighting cut down enormously their capacity to deal with it.

And, finally, there is no gainsaying that in a good part of Southeast Asia there is still space, and that for many Mao remains the great hero.

That Mao has taken so scornful a view of the power of weapons
and particularly of air power, that he has proved himself so willing in the past to give up those targets which modern technology is best equipped to destroy, and that he has proved so daring in the challenges, as at Dien Bien Phu, which he has laid down, would seem to indicate that he is still an adventurer, a cautious man, but an adventurer nevertheless. And this, in turn, would seem to indicate that the United States still needs those troops that will hold the ground on the ground.

Western strategic thought has considered the third stage of war, and the third stage only. We have fought wars of urban and industrial interdiction, while our own Asiatic opponents and the African opponents of our allies have patiently pursued a process of rural consolidation which has, in effect, given them an inviolable sanctuary from which they can attack and withdraw at will. What, therefore, would seem to be needed is a military instrument capable of invading and controlling this sanctuary, one that can maintain both law and order in rural villages and market areas.

Therefore, we need not only troops which can strike on the peripheries of the free world, but also troops which can be sent not merely to fight but also to maintain order. We need not only useful troops but usable troops—that is to say, troops which are politically expendable, the kind of troops who can do the job as it is needed without too great a political outcry in a nation like our own which so abhors war. The kind of troops a man like President Coolidge was willing to send to the Caribbean, to Nicaragua and Haiti would seem to be the kind which would fulfill this requirement.
Internal War:
The New Communist Tactic

Roger Hilsman

The Cold War with Communist Russia has been with us for sixteen years. And each year, the Communist tactics are more subtle and complex. In the 1940's, it was simple: the Soviet policy of expansion and the American policy of containment. The threat of direct Communist aggression remains, but new, more sophisticated tactics are added every year.

To most Americans, the basic danger over the past decade has been the threat of all-out thermonuclear war. The threat remains. It does and should demand our careful, constant attention.

Next, there has been the threat of "limited war"—old-fashioned, foot-slogging fighting on the ground—with artillery, machine guns, and grenades. This is the dirty, bitter business of direct, personal killing, as we knew it in Korea.

Limited wars and total war are closely linked. A limited war can be the escalator carrying the world right up to the mushroom clouds.

But even as we have pondered this connection—and have tried to prepare for both eventualities—the Communists have found what they regard as a new chink in our armor. The new tactic is internal war—using military force not across national boundaries but inside them. This newest concept is guerrilla war—or, to use a more accurate term, internal war.

It was this that President Kennedy had in mind when he said:

We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of Communism less apparent to
those who have so little. We face a challenge in our own hemi-

sphere.

Thus even while reheating the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev has
stressed this third approach of internal war again and again in re-
cent speeches. He sees the possibilities for internal wars in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America as the best way of using force to
expand the Communist empire with the least risk. He argues that
nuclear war is too disastrous even for Leninists. Apparently he
has begun to have his doubts about even limited war on the
Korean model.

We can take some credit for Khrushchev’s change of heart.
Our strategic force to deter nuclear war has paid its way. Our
efforts to build ground forces, our alliances, and our sacrifices
in Korea—the fact that we stood and fought—have all paid off.

In retrospect, we can be proud of all this, though our pride
should not lead to overconfidence. Moreover, we must beware
of thinking that these different tactics were separate or unrelated.

Even in the early stages of the Cold War, the Soviets manipu-
lated internal wars in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines,
India, Guatemala, and in vulnerable states in the Middle East.
The Soviet leaders, bred as they were in an atmosphere of urban-
based intrigue and revolutionary plotting, were pushed further
in their thinking by the success of Mao Tse-tung’s peasant-based
Chinese Communist revolution.

The result is that internal warfare has recently gained a new
prominence in Soviet dogma. What Khrushchev calls “wars of
liberation” or “just wars” are now considered the most promising
paths to further expansion. The theory enables Moscow and
Peking to manipulate for their own purposes the political, eco-
nomic, and social revolutionary fervor that is now sweeping
much of the underdeveloped world. Since many governments
are weak, since some are corrupt, since there is much injustice in
the world, and since the Communist conspirators are well trained
and supplied, it is usually fairly easy to start or take advantage
of an internal war and to claim that years of blood and terror are
in the people’s interest. Even when a government tries to under-
take reform and keep the peace—as in Venezuela or Colombia—
the Communists chant that the government is "repressive" and redouble their efforts.

A second development is the flexibility and sophistication in tactics of guerrilla terror and subversion. The Soviets continue to sponsor Communist rebellions overtly wherever possible. They also do their best to infiltrate nationalist movements against colonialism. They try especially hard to capture the extreme nationalists like Lumumba. They sponsor radical nationalism wherever they can find it, for the more violence there is in a country, the greater the Communists' opportunity.

If a democratic nationalist government is in power, Communists will advise that it separate itself from the West and permit the Communists to have "equal democratic rights"—that is, positions of power in the government, freedom to propagandize, and the right to officer regular forces or their own militia.

If a colonial or reactionary government is in power, the Communists direct efforts along the entire spectrum of subversion. They foster discontent in the cities, leading to demonstrations and strikes, perhaps to riots and mob action. Here their targets are student groups, labor unions, and Left-wing intellectuals. In the countryside, they establish guerrilla forces in inaccessible regions, move to peasant areas, and, through a judicious mixture—on the Chinese Communist and Castro Cuban patterns—of social reform, administration, and sheer terror, establish a base of political rule. Whenever possible, in both urban and rural sectors, they endeavor to create "people's militias" as a device for organizing mass support to supplement their full-time combatants. Thus they operate continuously to undermine an unfriendly government, and differ in their handling of popular nationalist regimes only in the degree of their effort to influence the government directly and infiltrate its power centers.

Let me repeat that this new Soviet emphasis on internal war does not mean that we can forget about the other, greater levels of war. Moscow's willingness to raise the Berlin issue indicates that their so-called "peaceful coexistence" does not rule out manufactured crises that run the risk of conventional or even nuclear war. In fact, they could not get away with internal war, except for the inhibitions imposed by these other two possibilities.
The Theory and the Threat

The great advantage of internal war is that it is less risky and less conspicuous than the more violent wars. It also involves techniques that the Communists feel they have mastered and we have not. We must also remember that Khrushchev is using his recently increased capacity to wage the more violent kinds of war to expand his freedom of maneuver in guerrilla war and to threaten escalation if we try to stop him.

In short, the so-called nuclear stalemate has not served to inhibit violence. If anything, it has enabled the Communists to resort to a wider variety of force. Their new strength in nuclear weapons makes them all the more tempted to adventure with internal war.

How can we help stop the Communists from destroying independent states from within? At President Kennedy’s direction—as outlined in his second “State of the Union” message—steps have been taken in several parts of the government to meet this threat. The people in the Pentagon and we in the State Department have devoted special attention to it.

Let me take up the question of how we stop the Communists from destroying independent states from within under three headings: military security; modernization and reform; and other political factors, especially those unique political factors undercutting a regime’s stability.

Here we must be very hardheaded—for there are several all-too-popular misconceptions.

In my judgment, it is nonsense to think that regular forces trained for conventional war can handle jungle guerrillas adequately. Yet in spite of some very hard lessons—Magsaysay in the Philippines, the British in Malaya, and the French in Indochina and Algeria—we have been slow to learn.

Regular forces are vital to resist external aggression. But we must not be deluded by the desire of local generals for “prestige hardware” or by the traditionalists’ belief that well-trained regulars can do anything.

Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks. But guerrilla warfare is something special. Conventional forces with heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster together, centralizing their power on terrain that allows rapid movement. They rely on
roads, consider strong points and cities as vital targets to defend, and so, when they do disperse, it is only to get tied down in static operations. In combat, rigid adherence to the principle of concentration keeps units at unwieldy battalion or even regimental levels, usually with erroneous stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy forces.

It is ironic that we Americans have to learn this military lesson again in the twentieth century. Have we forgotten that we were the ones who had to teach the British regulars “Indian fighting” back when we were still colonies? Have we forgotten that we taught the British regulars another kind of lesson in “Indian fighting” during our own revolution?

We Americans have also forgotten that it was we who fought one of the most successful counterguerrilla campaigns in history—in the Philippines back at the turn of the century. We learned some fundamental military lessons then, and it is time we remembered them.

After Aguinaldo’s army was defeated and Aguinaldo himself captured, some of the extremists took to the hills to become guerrillas. And they were not alone. For three hundred years the Spanish had been fighting a guerrilla war with bands of religious fanatics in the southern islands. And further south, in Mindanao, the Moros remained unconquered. All these roamed the jungles and mountains—raiding, ambushing, killing, and pillaging.

The army tried to fight the guerrillas, but with little success. The enemy faded into the jungle, and the unwieldy regular units were too burdened with equipment, too slow to follow. Regulars needed supply lines. They could not live off the country or do without ammunition trains or hospital corps.

The regulars tended to establish a fixed base from which they sallied out. Thus the guerrillas always knew where they were and when their guard was lax. The stage was set for surprise attacks and massacres.

In fact, one of these massacres was famous in the old army—second only to Custer’s Last Stand. It occurred at Balangiga on the island of Samar, and involved Company C of the Ninth Infantry, one of the finest regiments in the army. At 6:40 A.M., the men were lined up before the cook shack, on the side of the
parade ground opposite where their rifles were stacked. Suddenly
the jungle came alive as 450 guerrillas charged. The regulars of
Company C never had a chance. They fought barehanded. One
soldier killed several men with a baseball bat before he was over-
whelmed. The cook accounted for several more with a meat
cleaver. But soon it was all over. Twenty-four men escaped. The
rest were killed and mutilated.

Finally, the United States found the solution to the guerrilla
problem in the Philippines. We recruited native Filipinos—men
wise to jungle ways, men who knew the trails and mountains like
their own back yard. These were divided into small groups of
10, 15, 20, or 50 men, and over each group we put a trained
American officer—a bold and determined leader.

This was the famed Philippine Constabulary. The history of
their fabulous exploits is well worth reading. It is told—and very
well—in Vic Hurley's book, Jungle Patrol, published about thirty
years ago.

The trick was constant patrolling over every trail, and careful
attention to intelligence work. The jungle, nighttime, and sur-
prise attack are the guerrilla's weapons. The solution is to adopt
the same weapons to fight him.

During World War II, our OSS guerrilla battalion operated
behind the enemy lines in Burma. Nothing pleased us more in
those days than to have a regular Japanese force take out after us.
They operated in large unwieldy units that were easy to ambush.
Their movements were simple to follow through the mountains
and jungle. We felt that our own existence was well justified
when the Japanese had to take regular forces from front-line
fighting to chase a guerrilla unit. At one stage, my outfit—consist-
ing of four Americans and about 200 Burmese—kept a whole
Japanese regiment of 3,000 men marching and countermarching
over the mountains far away from the front lines. What we
would have feared far more were smaller groups patrolling stead-
ily—especially cavalry.

In many parts of the world today, counterguerrilla operations
conducted by regular troops rely on the tactic of sweeps through
the countryside like those of the Japanese regiments that chased
our guerrilla battalion in Burma. The sweeps are too well pub-
licized and too cumbersome to bring results. This tactic leads to antagonism between the regular troops and the population. Villagers fear reprisals and refuse their help. Soldiers sense that they are in guerrilla territory and act accordingly toward the people. Military inadequacy leads to failure and so to defeat.

I fear that in the past our military-aid programs for countries fighting against guerrillas have often followed the mistaken assumption that all war is similar to the large-scale tank and artillery engagements so familiar in Western Europe. The tactics of guerrilla warfare and the customs and culture of the peoples, it seems to me, should determine the proper weapons for counterguerrilla forces. For instance, prior to World War II, the mountain tribes of Burma conducted their wars with long knives—a kind of sword called a "dah"—and with one-shot, muzzle-loading flintlocks. Burma's mountainous regions are sparsely settled and the semi-nomadic inhabitants constantly move from one mountain valley to another when the soil begins to wear out. Consequently, they see no point in holding ground or in taking ground, and their whole history in war is one of lightning raids, sneak attacks, and ambushes.

Those of us in OSS who tried to make our guerrilla troops attack a defended position or stand by their own position reaped only disaster. We had to adapt our weapons and our tactics to the terrain and to the customs of the people. I found that my own troops, accustomed to fighting with knives, would wait until the enemy was within arm's reach before firing their guns. I also found they saw no point in sticking around after exhausting the first clip load of ammunition. They were brave in sneaking up on an enemy; they were brave in holding their fire in an ambush until an enemy was upon them; but their fundamental maxim was that the wise soldier lives to fight another day. The Americans who thought their purpose was to stand and hold found themselves all alone in standing and holding.

The lesson was obvious, it seemed to me. I equipped my men with submachine guns of .45 caliber. The men wanted to wait until the enemy was close before opening fire, and the jungle itself rarely permitted a shot ranging more than a few yards. I needed weapons with a large volume of firepower but neither
range nor accuracy. I equipped my eight-man squads with seven submachine guns and one light machine gun. One squad had 60-millimeter mortars to lay down an umbrella of fire to cover our withdrawal. Our tactics were traditional for guerrillas - we ambushed, we hit, and we ran. This particular unit, operating behind the enemy line for six months, killed over 300 of the enemy, blew up many bridges and ammunition and supply dumps, and yet suffered less than a dozen casualties.

For effective counterguerrilla operations, we need radical changes in organization, combat doctrine, and equipment. Our key units might be decentralized groups of 50 men, self-reliant and able to operate autonomously, fanned out into the countryside. The premium is on leadership, for only men of courage and great skill can make this system work; with such men, plus decent pay and training, a counterguerrilla force should not be difficult to maintain.

The operational concept is as follows: A guerrilla-infested part of the country is marked off and divided into sections. Each section is patrolled by one of these units, but all are in contact with a central headquarters, which in turn has a reserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrillas, a patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent patrols. As the latter converge, headquarters dispatches paratroops or helicopter transports behind the enemy, who is surrounded and destroyed. Once an area is pacified, the government consolidates its control and moves its forces on to the next section of land to be cleared. The main ingredients then are constant patrols, good communication facilities, rapid mobility, and a capacity for rapid concentration.

One further point. The operations must cause minimum harm to the people, lest they become antagonistic to the government. The troops must be highly disciplined to respect civilian rights and property. They should offer help (ranging from field repairs to actions like Magsaysay’s offer of legal services in the Philippines). Cargo planes should carry in supplies, so that the forces do not have to live off the countryside. The ones for anticivilian behavior should be diverted squarely to the guerrillas themselves. They are the ones who are compelled to take to repressive measures, seizing rice or conscripting men in their desperation. As
they lose popular support, they will have nothing to fall back on when they suffer military defeats.

I hope that this last point indicates my awareness of how important it is to have popular support in conducting an internal war. Many observers argue that stability and physical security are basically political issues, depending on the popularity of governments. To this they add that economic development is the key to popular support and the criterion by which regimes will be judged.

In the long run, popular support is essential for stable governments and a stable world. And there is no question that economic development, modernization, and reform are key factors in creating popular support and stable governments. But in my judgment, it would be mistaken to think that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments are popular and where modernization, economic development, and reform are going forward. And the usual corollary to this thought—the notion that the existence of guerrillas is proof positive that the government is unpopular and therefore not worth supporting—is even more mistaken. It is, in fact, defeatist. We need modernization, economic development, and reform to defeat guerrillas. But other things are also needed.

Let me draw on my personal experience once more. When we fought in Burma, about 10 per cent of the people were pro-West, another 10 per cent were pro-enemy, and the rest were indifferent or turned inward toward their own family and village. Yet our guerrilla group performed with great success. We recruited men not only from the 10 per cent who were pro-West, but also from the 80 per cent who were indifferent. We gave no quarter to the enemy and his supporters, but we did everything we could to avoid creating hardship for the rest, and to help them when we could. We were careful to move around their growing crops. And when we had to ask them for food, we paid or arranged an airdrop of double the amount of rice we took. Before the war was over, it was the enemy and his supporters in the puppet government who appeared oppressive to the people—not we guerrillas.

The idea that guerrillas thrive only where the government is unpopular may apply to the more developed parts of the world. But in many parts of the world, states are underdeveloped in the
political-administrative sense as well as economically. The number of people are few who have the training to perform the standard civil-service jobs that we take for granted. Lacking that "steel frame" in which India takes such just pride, a government appears as a weak and distant entity to most villagers, except when it serves as a burdensome tax collector. In most lands, at least half the people are indifferent to the government. Even the active elements, ranged for or against the regime, are not too set in their political commitments.

In these circumstances, maintaining the bare minimum of national services is enough to determine a nation's fate for the short run. In the Congo, the collapse of two supports—the military Force Publique and Belgian technical service—revealed how far the state has to go before becoming an administrative entity.

By contrast, the Somali Republic, which gained its independ ence at the same time, also faced a potentially difficult situation—keeping newly joined regions and powerful tribal groups satisfied. As matters developed, no pseudopopular manifestation of discontent emerged, thanks in part to a small but efficient Western-trained civilian police force.

As for modernization, although essential for the long haul, it cannot help much in a counterguerrilla program. Modernization inevitably uproots established social systems, produces political and economic dislocation and tension, and cannot deliver results quickly enough to relieve these short-term pressures.

However, there is mounting unrest in rural areas all over the world. What peasants increasingly crave is social justice and reform—at a minimum, the old way of life with the cruelties removed.

This includes reform of land-tenure arrangements; reasonable rent, credit, and market facilities; and simple modern tools. They may see ahead to the value of urban centers that buy their produce—instead of importing from abroad and forcing them to raise crops for export—and, in turn, manufacture for their simple needs. Finally, they crave peace and physical security.

Yet there is a growing link between urban and rural unrest. As modernization begins, the poorer farmers drift to the city, there to form the hard core of the unemployed shun dwellers who
overtax the rudimentary metropolitan facilities. These unfortu-
nates form the recruits for the city mobs that Communists and
demagogues have been turning out in the Middle East and Latin
America for the past fifteen years. The political link between the
two becomes clear when we see how the very poor are used as
recruits for guerrilla forces in the rural areas and for “people's
militia” in the urban regions. Communists have long made use of
the former in sustaining a rebellion; Castro and Che Guevara
have become adept at using both groups to support the present
Cuban regime. In Latin America alone, Venezuela, Bolivia,
Colombia, Colombia, and Peru come immediately to mind as countries
where the combined urban-rural problem exists.

What is required first is a program of social reform. Very often
the conservative element in a community will struggle irration-
ally against all reform. As a consequence, we have encountered
in several parts of the world the amazing and suicidal spectacle of
conservatives giving secret aid to the Communists in order to
undermine modest reformist efforts.

Equally important is the need to indicate some effort and
progress on the long path to modernization. Small results, if they
prove the intent of a regime, can inspire faith that will outlast
the distress of early change. Finally, where these efforts are com-
bined with democratic government and mass party organization,
the government can broaden its base of physical power.

In Venezuela, for example, the ruling party has been fostering
reform and change. It has also created a national organization,
with loyal popular militia elements to support it. Though not
professionals, militiamen can keep the peace in the face of pro-
vocative demonstrations and can perform useful services in sup-
plementing the work of regular forces. A government that cannot
get its image across to the peasantry or mobilize peasant support
will find its functions in both these endeavors usurped by the
Communists.

To summarize my feeling on popularity, reform, and moderni-
zeation: (1) they are important ingredients but are not the deter-
minants of events; (2) their role must be measured more in terms
of their contribution to physical security than we generally
realize.
Let me refer briefly to several other variations on the theme of internal security—the political factors that threaten the stability of new states. So far we have noted primarily the nature of the Communist threat and the issues of good government and economic development. Unfortunately, on top of these universal problems, most states have to grapple with specific difficulties that create further divisions, induce tensions, and propel even the best-intentioned regimes to violence. Among these difficulties are the following:

1. Antagonisms Between Underdeveloped States. The familiar pattern of rivalry between neighbors, as old as history itself, exists with even greater intensity today because so many new states have suddenly sprung into being. Territorial claims and other sources of friction are still fresh, as in the Persian Gulf or India's northern border regions. Such difficulties generate tensions, arms races, and nationalistic fervor, which Communists try to exploit.

2. Internal Disagreements. I am referring here to friction between regions of a state or between a region and the center. The issues of regionalism in India, separatist movements in Indonesia, and tribalism in the fragmented Congo are examples of serious challenges to governmental authority and stability.

3. Social-Class Antagonism. It is characteristic of established economic elites that they feel themselves threatened from below and refuse to countenance the very reform that would ease the real dangers that they face. The great failures of old regimes in France before 1789 and Russia at the start of this century are but the outstanding instances of this historic problem that presents itself on almost every continent today.

4. Intense Disagreement over Foreign Policy. Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact despite internal opposition and disapproval by all other Arab states is a case in point. Radical-nationalist African states accuse their neighbors of following a colonial, subservient line. In trying to get them on a comparable course, radical states engage in clandestine operations to subvert neighboring regimes or support opposition factions whose ideology resembles their own.

5. Traditional Political Rivalries Within a Social Class. Colom
The Guerrilla—And How to Fight Him

Libia offers the leading example of two parties that, without basic social or ideological differences, became embroiled in a long civil war, so bitter as to cause over 250,000 casualties. This war literally superimposed itself on all the other problems of security that normally confront a developing state. The army had to act to keep that situation from fragmenting the country.

6. Lack of Popular Belief in the State as a Sovereign Entity. In large areas of Africa and the Middle East, normal loyalties follow either tribal and provincial lines or grand dreams of regional African or Arab unity. The state does attract some loyalty because it is a going concern, one that can be used as a lever of power at both these other levels. With this overlapping of loyalties, it is only too easy for a government to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors and further weaken their internal cohesion—always, of course, in the belief that its cause is just.

7. Ethnic or Racial Issues. Rebellious tribesmen are constant drains on national military power in various states throughout Asia and Africa. The Communists found in Malaya’s Chinese community ready hands for their bloody insurrection, partly because of interracial political rivalries. Indians in some Latin American countries are living at very low standards, are beginning to stir, and are potential bait for a Communist ethnic-economic appeal. Central-African pagans have strained relations with Moslem Arab northerners in a crossroad land that is beset by outside pressures.

8. Banditry. This is a cultural inheritance in many parts of the world. Bandits (or armed rural gangs) who flout the authorities and exploit neighbors have long existed in many areas—their activities colored perhaps with varying degrees of political or ideological overtones, but essentially dedicated to violence. One thinks of recent illustrations in the Philippines, of traditional sporadic outbreaks in Java, of troubles experienced by the new state of Burma. These actions impoverish the peasant, ruin the government’s authority, paralyze public morale, and open the path to similar Communist tactics or to establishment of Communist authority in that region.

9. Constitutional Crises. Unconstitutional extension of presidential power, so often exemplified in the history of Latin Amer-
ica, is one example of a constitutional crisis that may lead to political turmoil when such excesses are traditionally resented and countered by violence. The seizure of power by a military junta is another.

There are other obvious factors, such as the outburst of nationalism that may follow independence, proximity to Sino-Soviet territory, the existence and strength of a Communist Party and its orientation toward Moscow or Peking, and, of course, revolts against colonial rule and white minority rule in certain areas. The addition of just a few of these special hazards to the basic difficulties I described earlier places a tremendous strain upon a government’s staying power. You can clearly see why I am saying that internal security is a problem in its own right and not simply a function of good government or economic growth.

There are many things we can do to help responsible and friendly governments attack this problem all along the line. I have already illustrated how the training of armed forces can be better geared to the specific war against guerrillas. Equally important is the training of police and other forces to cope with the lesser manifestations of violence, not only in detection and surveillance, but also in handling actual outbursts. We may find ourselves encouraging reformers to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circumstances we may need to help create citizens’ militia forces. We are seriously interested in broadening the will and capacity of friendly governments to augment social and political reform programs as a basis for modernization.

We must also look for ways to ease the access of beleaguered states to outside assistance. The Communists use the concept of state sovereignty as a device to seal off a land from “intervention” once they have made sufficient inroads. They use international law, appeals to neutralist neighbors, the unpleasant reactions to what is called “Western imperialism,” and the threat of force in this effort. We must foster the growth and use of international organizations as sources of help and help on all the problems I have mentioned, and help that can be on the scene and in action before the crisis reaches its peak. In this way, we may ward off a show-
down or at the very least have elements there to indicate outside support in being and on the way. In any event, the United States must be prepared to become deeply involved. This effort may be costly, but careful and early involvement is far less expensive or dangerous than a crash program. The Communists are already committed everywhere, and unless we approach the problem in a systematic way, with considerable thought, we will simply be paving the way for Mr. Khrushchev in his new and potent tactic—internal war.
Guerrilla Warfare and U.S. Military Policy: A Study

PETER PARET AND JOHN W. SHY

The 1960's, a Marine Corps officer recently said, may be "the decade of the guerrilla." Events in Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in the Caribbean do indeed seem to bear out his prediction. No longer is the irregular warrior a military orphan. The Administration has proposed a rapid expansion of "unconventional warfare capabilities," a call to which Congressmen and journalists have responded with enthusiasm. Even The New York Times has printed a primer on the subject culled from Mao Tse-tung.*

Most of us will agree that this swing in attitude is overdue. For too long, nuclear weapons have monopolized the nation's intellectual energies and material resources. Even the growing interest in the possibility of limited war has largely accepted the traditional definition of "war." Only now, when guerrillas in Laos, Cuba, the Congo, and Algeria have directly touched our national interest, do we seem to be awakening to the full range of military possibilities. More reflection on earlier events in Greece, Palestine, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya, Cyprus, and even Kashmir and Kenya might have shortened this unfortunate time lag in our thinking.

But just as many people have tended in the past to regard a certain weapon or doctrine, whether "massive retaliation" or "limited war," as the single solution to our military problems, there is now a danger that such tendencies will shift toward the guerrilla and subversion. This kind of attitude, to which few of us are immune, reflects a weakness for gadgets and fashions that

* See pp. 3-10 for this text.
has no place in our thinking on defense. The enthusiasts of guerrilla warfare have made their case after a long, dry season of neglect. The time has come, however, to balance the discussion. We need to analyze what we have learned about guerrilla operations, and to clarify our thinking about the relation of guerrilla warfare to American foreign and military policy.

The first question to ask is a simple one but perhaps for that reason is usually ignored: What are the functions of guerrilla warfare?

Historically—both before and after Spanish peasants fighting against Napoleon put “guerrilla” into the dictionary—the irregular has usually been defending his country against foreign invasion. The twentieth century, however, has brought two other functions more clearly into view: The guerrilla may be a weapon of insurrection, aiming at the capture of political power; and he may be the instrument of foreign aggression. Today the second and third functions are our primary concern, although guerrilla operations against conventional attack or in the aftermath of a nuclear strike remain conceivable.

The insurrectionary and aggressive functions of guerrilla warfare are not new in themselves. People discontented with their governments and agents of foreign powers have often been involved in violent uprisings that used unorthodox military tactics. What is comparatively new is the development of a body of theory that has systematized the technique of using guerrilla warfare for the seizure of national or international power and has placed the irregular fighter among the weapons systems of modern war.

Colonel T. E. Lawrence, leader of the Arab guerrilla campaign against Turkish communications in World War I, was the first of the new partisan “leader-theorists” to have appeared in the twentieth century. These men, in their actions as well as in their writings, have extended Clausewitz’ analysis of the armed populace as a military instrument, to include the use of irregulars for political purposes. While Mao Tse-tung is deservedly the best known among them, Mikhail Frunze, Leon Trotsky, and, most recently, Che Guevara, are others of importance.

What can these men teach us? They have described the conditions under which guerrilla warfare can be initiated and sus-
tained. They have analyzed both the techniques and the objectives of guerrilla warfare. Finally, perhaps surprisingly, they have revealed the inherent limitations of this form of combat.

An Algerian rebel leader recently explained the necessary conditions for guerrilla warfare in terms of "terrain." He was using the word both in an unconventional and in its conventional, geographical, sense. Strategically, irregulars need considerable space in which to pursue hit-and-run operations successfully. Mao, for example, has doubted whether extensive guerrilla warfare could ever occur in a country as small as Belgium. Tactically, irregulars require rough country, with few people and poor roads difficult of access to their opponents.

But the Algerian leader was also using "terrain" in the extended sense of "political terrain." Internationally, diplomatic support for the guerrillas can weaken their opponent, provide moral and material assistance, and even furnish military sanctuary that may compensate for inadequate space in the area of active operations. Internally, guerrillas must have the active support of some, and the acquiescence of most, of the civilian population.

Internal popular support is the indispensable condition for successful guerrilla action. This fact makes the relationship between the military and civilian realms more intimate than in any other type of warfare. Although this point is often stated, its rationale is too little understood. Why must the guerrilla have a firm psychological base among the people?

First, the irregular fighter is recruited by some ideological commitment—however crude it might be—and not primarily by administrative machinery. Only such commitment can sustain the self-control and unit discipline demanded by this most punishing kind of combat. Agents, infiltrated from abroad, may play an important role, but perhaps the greatest advantage of the guerrilla is that he is a native, fighting among people and over ground he has known since birth.

Second, civilian support helps to solve the critical problems of logistics and intelligence. The local populace provides food, shelter, medical care, and money. More important, it furnishes the information the guerrilla must have in order to enjoy both surprise when he attacks and security from attack by his oppo-
nent. Even when the mass of the people seem no more than apathetic, afraid, and unhappy at being caught in the midst of an internal war, they are not truly neutral. If the guerrillas are succeeding, then the people are giving them vital intelligence and denying it to their opponents. As Guevara has written: "One of the most important characteristics of a guerrilla war is the notable difference that exists between the information the rebel forces possess and the information the enemies possess."

Popular support is indispensable to the guerrilla because he is militarily weak, a fact easily forgotten. After all, the guerrilla fights as he does because he lacks the weapons, equipment, supplies, technical skills, and often numbers needed to fight in any other way. Seldom if ever has anyone deliberately chosen a guerrilla strategy when other choices existed. If sufficient military strength is available, conventional organization and tactics produce a decision more quickly; if the goal is political, strength makes possible a coup d'état instead of a costly, protracted civil war.

Even the American revolutionaries, whose armed populace gave them enormous guerrilla potential, used partisan warfare only as a last resort. This traditional reluctance to employ guerrillas unless forced to do so is understandable. Guerrillas do great damage to the very society they are trying to defend or control because their weakness keeps them from protecting people or property. Their strength derives not so much from weapons and organization as from changeable popular attitudes. In short, guerrilla warfare as a military means to a political end is both costly and risky. Civil War historians who are fond of praising the partisan exploits of Mosby in northern Virginia should remember the sequel: Sheridan devastated the Shenandoah Valley, and Mosby, deprived of his guerrilla base, ultimately failed.

True, guerrilla warfare has one major advantage in this nuclear age. If employed as an instrument of foreign aggression, it constitutes an "ambiguous threat" by confusing the legal, political, and even military bases for an effective international response. But most of the native guerrillas and their civilian supporters must have a stronger motive for fighting than serving the convenience of a foreign power. The internal conditions for irregular warfare
must be right before the guerrilla becomes available as a means of aggression.

The weakness of the guerrilla himself and his consequent need to gain and maintain strength among the civilian population largely determine his techniques and objectives. Unable to destroy his opponent physically by direct, military action, he fights psychologically by indirect, political means. Never attacking unless overwhelmingly superior, and never fighting long enough to be caught by a counterattack, the guerrilla leader uses combat itself as a psychological weapon. With an unbroken string of victories, however insignificant many of them may be, he creates confidence in ultimate success among his supporters. At the same time, he fosters a growing despair among his opponents.

The guerrilla converts his reliance on the civilian population into an advantage. Because he cannot hold ground or even do large-scale damage to enemy forces, his objective becomes control of the population. He pursues this objective not only by politically organizing and indoctrinating the people, but also by educating his own men in their role of winning civilian support. The “Three Disciplinary Rules” and “Eight Points of Attention,” which Mao formulated as early as 1928, make it plain to all irregular soldiers that they are expected to behave not as conquerors or bandits, but as disciplined representatives of a new social and economic order.

This new order, Mao also declares, is at the heart of the struggle. “Without a political goal,” he writes, “guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people.” Land reform, nationalism, corruption, poverty—these are the issues exploited by modern guerrillas to win people over. Once it is organized, and convinced of both the certainty and the justice of a guerrilla victory, the civilian population replaces the traditional tools of war with a less tangible form of strength.

The required integration of military and political action goes beyond formulating a popular program and then letting the partisans themselves act as its salesmen. Even the smallest tactical operation may have political implications. For example, an attack on an enemy strong point seems necessary, but may alienate the
local inhabitants or expose them to reprisals against which they cannot be protected. The political consequences may well outweigh the possible military gain and the raid is not carried out. The Algerians have adopted perhaps the most extreme solution to this problem of politico-military coordination by introducing a political officer, who himself has had previous experience as a military commander, at every echelon down to the section.

It is useful, with our new concern over guerrilla warfare, to imagine ourselves in the position of the guerrilla leader. We then see that he is face to face with some serious difficulties and certain inherent limitations. In La Guerra de Guerrillas, Che Guevara, like Mao, understandably stresses the positive side of irregular warfare. But a close reading of his book reveals a series of dilemmas for the guerrilla leader.

Above all, the guerrilla leader must be continually active—harassing enemy communications, ambushing isolated posts and detachments, creating by acts of violence a general climate of insecurity. His movement thrives and grows on continual, small successes. At the same time, he must never risk a defeat. Defeat not only hurts his small, poorly equipped forces, but it also weakens partisan morale and civilian confidence. The psychological damage may be greater than the military. This was probably true of the July, 1961, battle in South Vietnam, where the Viet Cong lost fewer than 200 of their 5,000-10,000 fighters. The guerrilla leader attempts to walk a fine line between rashness and necessary boldness.

Second, there is a dilemma posed by terrain on the one hand, targets on the other. The rougher the terrain, the more secure is the guerrilla force. But the rougher the terrain, the more difficult is it for guerrillas to find local supplies and to hit the most important military and political targets. Guevara admits that the cities and the suburbs are the sensitive areas that must be attacked and indoctrinated, but that precisely those areas are most dangerous for guerrilla operations. Even the flatter, more fertile, and heavily populated farmlands constitute "unfavorable terrain."

There is also the matter of guerrilla discipline. Guevara notes that individual conviction drives most guerrillas to fight but they must submit to a discipline that is extremely severe by regular
standards. Only under such discipline can they meet the extraordi-
nary physical and emotional demands placed upon them by
irregular warfare (similar demands nearly destroyed the combat
effectiveness of Allied long-range penetration groups in Burma
in 1944). In Cuba, one method of solving this conflict between
individual motivation and extreme regimentation was to let unit
committees, rather than combat commanders, perform certain
judicial functions. Nevertheless, even such self-imposed discipline
cannot afford any doubts about the cause or the leadership. For
this reason, guerrillas themselves seem to be especially vulnerable
to psychological attack.

The guerrilla leader faces still another dilemma in dealing with
the civilian population. Although many of the people may be dis-
contented, their discontent must be translated into willingness to
commit or support illegal, violent acts. Generally they are brought
to do this by a combination of political persuasion and military
success. But rarely if ever has a guerrilla movement been able to
avoid more coercive techniques, including the use of terror. The
crucial question then becomes whether coercion, and especially
terror, will alienate people more than it intimidates them.

Some American officials and journalists have recently argued
that terror alone, used by guerrillas infiltrated into an area, can
maintain the popular base needed for guerrilla warfare. But Che
Guevara, in his field manual for Latin American revolutionaries,
does not seem to agree. He returns to the question of coercion
repeatedly, never quite clarifying the answer, but clearly reveal-
ing the complexity of the problem. "Terror," he admits on the
one hand, must always be "justly punished." Guerrillas display
"absolute implacability" toward "contemptible persons." And
especially in "unfavorable terrain"—cities or farmland—where
propaganda is most important but military operations are most
hazardous, the guerrillas eliminate "recalcitrant enemies... with-
out leniency... There can be no enemies in dangerous places."

On the other hand, Guevara rejects terrorism as a general
policy because it "is a negative weapon that produces in no way
the desired effects, that can turn a people against a given revolu-
tionary movement, and that brings with it a loss of lives among
those taking part that is much greater than the return."
There is some historical evidence supporting his point. The Greek Communists, although successful for a time in using coercive methods, eventually drove over a half-million of what should have been their strongest supporters off the land and into the cities. The Malayan Communists, once committed to a policy of terror, found that it undermined their campaign of political indoctrination and they abandoned it within a year. In southwestern Korea, North Korean guerrillas successfully terrorized the peasants until threats ceased to be certain of execution. Then terror began to boomerang. Even the Algerians claim to have given up the large-scale use of terror, as a means of keeping Moslems in line, after finding its disadvantages too great.

Terrorism, of course, can have other important uses besides maintaining popular support. A government too weak to provide a popular rallying point, a government without the administrative machinery or military strength to perform its minimum functions, may find that terrorism so completely disrupts life that peace on any terms seems preferable. Employed against a colonial regime weakened by political difficulties at home and abroad, terrorism alone may achieve the objective of the guerrillas. This happened in Palestine and Cyprus. In Cyprus, EOKA never engaged in large-scale irregular combat although its operations had all the other characteristics of guerrilla warfare—a popular cause, civilian protection of the partisans, and governmental difficulties in obtaining information and maintaining order without further alienating the population. In the end, the British decided that a political settlement in Cyprus was preferable to all-out war against the insurgents.

But the use of violence by the partisans against civilians remains an ambiguous, not an invincible, weapon for the guerrilla leader. Indiscriminate or selective terror, less extreme forms of coercion, even sabotage if it disrupts civilian life too greatly, may have a backlash that repels rather than attracts popular support. At times, however, guerrilla forces must resort to these techniques, and the guerrilla leader must deal with the difficult problems of just when and how to use them, and how to keep them under control.

Unfortunately, Guevara barely touches on the last and greatest
dilemma of the guerrilla leader (the rottenness of the Batista regime largely solved it for the Cuban revolutionaries). As we shall see, the big problem lies in the difficult choices involved in pushing the war to a victorious conclusion.

The belief that irregular operations must be regularized if partisans are to win has become one of the dogmas of guerrilla theory. Before Mao, both experience and doctrine had primarily concerned the defensive function of guerrilla warfare, which takes for granted a friendly regular army that eventually invades the country and operates in conjunction with the partisans. Mao was the first to see clearly that such an army might be created from the guerrilla force itself. Having consolidated their position through irregular warfare by the early 1930's, the Chinese Communists began to engage in more conventional operations. They reverted to a guerrilla strategy against the Japanese invasion in 1937, but after 1945, drawing upon his pool of combat-trained manpower, Mao used primarily regular forces in expelling Chiang from the mainland.

When there is no chance of large-scale foreign intervention, and when the enemy is politically and militarily strong, with both the will and the intelligence to use his strength, the dogma of regularization undoubtedly holds true. The psychological character of guerrilla warfare then becomes only the means of creating and consolidating the popular base, which in turn must eventually provide enough soldiers sufficiently well trained to defeat the enemy in open battle. But there are a number of pitfalls on the road to regular operations—regularization may be not just a dilemma, but a complex of dilemmas.

The first of these is proper timing of the transition. Premature regularization invites military disaster but overlong attachment to irregular operations may exhaust the population. The Chinese Communists worried most about the latter danger, the vice of "guerrillaism"; the Algerian rebels had to resist the opposite temptation, of seeking the domestic and diplomatic prestige of conventional operations before being militarily ready. One reason for the ultimate defeat of the Greek Communists appears to have been that before they could afford to do so they were fighting as regular forces, with heavy weapons and territorial bases.
Territorial bases are mentioned by Guevara as being of great value even before any attempt is made to regularize operations. They make it possible to have training and rest areas, supply dumps, and hospital facilities. Of course, he adds, they must be "secure," but how to make them secure against first-class regulars is not answered. Bases, it would seem, offer the sort of fixed target that counterguerrilla forces always seek and rarely find.

In China and Indochina, guerrilla groups turned into regular armies capable of defeating large enemy forces. In both cases, this was achieved with foreign assistance, and there is little evidence that victory can ever be gained without such help. To be sure, guerrillas will supply themselves with arms and ammunition by raids, and the civilian population will provide other essentials. But the FLN required the sanctuary of Tunisian territory and even Castro needed outside support, including the crucial U.S. arms embargo against Batista in 1958. Yet foreign aid can be a two-edged sword for the guerrilla leader. The aims of the guerrilla movement and its foreign ally will never coincide exactly, and the differences may be important, especially if exploited by their mutual enemy. This need to acquire foreign aid makes possible the third function of guerrilla warfare—its use as an instrument of aggression. But even Communists, with their talent for linking local grievances and Russian or Chinese foreign policy in a single ideological framework, do not always find it easy to dominate a guerrilla movement. At the same time, the guerrilla leader may find it difficult to bargain for outside help without undermining or compromising his own objectives.

In all of these dilemmas, the guerrilla leader must display exceptional judgment. Guerrillas, unlike more conventional forces, lack the strength to make up for faulty decisions. Moreover, a shrewd opponent who understands the nature of irregular warfare can considerably narrow the area in which sound decisions by the guerrilla leader are possible.

We have outlined the nature of guerrilla warfare—its setting, objectives, techniques, and limitations. What do these factors mean for the United States? We are not here urging specific solutions to specific problems, but our analysis may offer some
guidelines for thinking about the general problem of the relationship of guerrilla warfare to American policy.

Guerrilla warfare concerns the United States in three different ways:

1. In planning to employ guerrillas defensively, thus strengthening the ability of non-Communist states to resist regular attack.
2. In employing guerrillas as offensive weapons.
3. In bolstering the defenses of a friendly nation fighting guerrillas, or threatened by them.

Too often these areas are confused, or lumped together under the phrase “unconventional warfare capabilities.” Since they deal with different problems, they should be kept distinct.

The first area—planning to use guerrillas as a defensive weapon—needs little discussion. It appears most applicable to NATO, as a means of making Western European peoples indigestible for a conventionally armed invader or able to conduct the broken-back war that may follow thermonuclear strikes. Any such plan must, however, meet several important considerations. One is the fact that guerrillas, because of their weakness, must rely for protection on a nearly impenetrable counterintelligence screen. Would not peacetime reserve guerrilla units be subject to infiltration, or even to the capture of so many personnel in the initial shock of invasion, that the entire organization would be fatally compromised? The resistance movements of World War II were recruited under wartime conditions, certainly disadvantageous in some ways, but perhaps essential if a guerrilla force is to survive.

If the problem of security seems solvable, there is a geographical difficulty to consider. Western Europe is a fairly constricted area, with a high density of people and communications and with few natural bastions. Most of it is very “unfavorable terrain.” Undoubtedly guerrilla warfare is possible in Western Europe for a short time, especially if the Communist invaders are heavily engaged against Western regular forces. But it seems a dubious NATO strategy to rely on guerrillas as a major deterrent or as a means of prolonged resistance. Everything will depend, of course, on the willingness of the civilian population to fight back. In
short, it may prove difficult if not impossible to stockpile effectively the components of guerrilla warfare.

Using guerrillas as an offensive weapon, either to put pressure on the Communists or to overthrow a government obnoxious to the United States, has recently received considerable attention. In case of major war, it would clearly be a way to exploit discontent in the Communist rear—in Hungary, for example. But its employment as a weapon in the Cold War, or as a new instrument of American diplomacy, is another matter.

All would agree that it is in the satellite area that the launching of guerrilla movements seems most profitable. Yet is it not precisely this area where such ventures are most risky? Communist regimes are past masters of this kind of warfare and could be expected to fight back with ruthless efficiency rather than become less militantly Communist. If a guerrilla movement should achieve some success, despite or perhaps because of Communist repression, there would be real danger of escalation to a higher level of violence. The United States, through some miscalculation of this almost incalculable kind of warfare, might find itself with the unhappy choice of abandoning friends or raising the stakes. Some analysts of nuclear strategy have seen Western-backed satellite revolt as the most likely occasion for a Russian surprise attack on the United States.

Aside from the direct danger to ourselves, our potential allies in these countries would undergo great and prolonged suffering. It is doubtful if they could ever win without American armed support, and except in an all-out war that would seem out of the question. In other words, we would be asking these people to act as pawns in our global strategy. Besides, if somehow it should free itself from Communist control, could a society terribly damaged by internal war be stable without resort to totalitarian techniques? Is the United States interested in such an outcome, and is it willing to bear the responsibility for liberating people by these means?

Finally, does the United States have the capacity to conduct covert military operations on an extensive scale? The Cuban venture was not a fair test because its concept largely rejected guerrillas in favor of a more conventional strategy. Nevertheless,
there is a reason to suspect that our ability to conceal from others and from our own population what we are doing is not very great. It has been argued that the adoption of guerrilla subversion as American policy would lead to fundamental changes in both our internal structure and our international objectives. To many Americans, such changes are unacceptable in that they seem to erode the very basis of our national existence.

Not only may objections be raised on grounds of principle, there are practical reasons for treating with caution any proposed employment of guerrillas to overthrow governments. If such a break with what we like to think of as traditional policy also ruptures the general American consensus on national purpose, then we may have weakened ourselves internally more than any international gain might be worth. Although the Cold War is certainly not a popularity contest, we may also make it more difficult for actual and potential allies to conclude that it lies in their interest to work with us.

For example, a government under guerrilla attack might find it impossible to accept help from an aggressive United States without discrediting itself in the eyes of its own population as a tool of imperialism. In such an eventuality, the United States would have suffered, not just a drop in nebulous international prestige, but a tangible military reverse. W. W. Rostow, in one of the most complete statements yet made by the Administration on guerrilla warfare,* has argued this point persuasively: “Despite all the Communist talk of aiding movements of national independence, they are driven in the end, by the nature of their system, to violate the independence of nations. Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence. And the truth will out.”

Public interest in the employment of guerrillas by the United States has tended to sideline discussion of what is in fact our most pressing problem: how to fight against guerrillas. Such discussion as has occurred has generally taken the form of debate between the exponents of military aid and the exponents of economic aid

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* See pp. 54-61 for his text.
to underdeveloped areas. It should be clear from the character of guerrilla warfare, however, that neither military measures nor political measures by themselves will solve the problem of defense against guerrillas.

For purposes of analysis, counterguerrilla action may be separated into three tasks, but they are so intimately related that success in one task often depends on progress in the others. The tasks are to defeat the guerrilla militarily, to break his connection with the civilian population, and to re-establish governmental authority and social order.

Professional soldiers are familiar with the tactical problems of fighting irregulars but a few points can be profitably made here. Successful counterguerrilla operations, as in the Philippines, have always combined a grid system of territorial control with mobile striking forces. The mobile striking forces cannot normally be made up of friendly civilians, organized and trained to fight as guerrillas. Instead, they are composed of the best regulars, able to exploit all the technological and administrative advantages of modern military organization, and to employ them in unconventional fashion as well. Since the territorial forces are mainly police or home-defense units, the role for friendly guerrillas in counterguerrilla action seems very limited.

The French attempted to use such guerrillas in Indochina but without much success, mainly because they did not have the popular base from which to operate. Similarly, the United States should not expect to base its military action against guerrillas on local popular support, especially in the early stages of a conflict. French regular troops, on the other hand, never seem to have been able to operate unconventionally. The British forces in Malaya, with a smaller war on their hands, succeeded to a remarkable extent in using irregular tactics against Communist guerrillas. It is important for the United States to understand this distinction between guerrilla tactics available to both sides, and guerrilla organization, which is naturally opposed to the government.

In Indochina, the French also failed to break the line between the guerrillas and the civilian population. Their failure was due not to a lack of understanding but to a lack of firm decisions on countermeasures. Troops in the field, frustrated by the sullen
uncommunicativeness of the population, were allowed to commit occasional excesses and often to be simply rough in their handling of civilians. In the same way, until it was stopped, police brutality in South Korea and the Philippines actually helped the Communist partisans.

It is not simply a question of being kind to the natives but of keeping some legal framework intact. Counterguerrilla forces represent the government to most of the people caught in the midst of a guerrilla war. If these forces act more irresponsibly than the guerrillas themselves, the government can hardly hope to appeal to people as their protector and benefactor. Admittedly, the government will often have to employ some unusually harsh coercive measures in breaking the guerrilla-civilian link, but such measures must above all be legally formulated and applied. No government, unless it plans to resort to truly totalitarian techniques, can use terrorism or indiscriminate brutality against its own people without undermining its position.

Though the conduct of troops in the field can ruin any governmental plan for severing the guerrilla from his popular base, there is much more to accomplishing this task than having well-behaved soldiers. One obvious requirement is a psychological-warfare program. On the basis of past experience, this program must be highly sophisticated if it is to succeed. It does not tell lies, because the civilian target of the program knows more about the guerrillas than the government does. It does not confuse people potentially sympathetic to the guerrillas with the guerrillas themselves, because it seeks to break, not reinforce, the links between them. It will sometimes spread information that would normally be classified, because immediate and convincing reports of successful military operations are the best means of persuading people that support of the guerrillas is unwise.

Another standard method of denying the guerrilla his popular base is the resettlement of populations. Resettlement has been successful with the Chinese squatters in Malaya, and partially so with the Arabs in Algeria. But when calculating the military advantages of resettlement and planning the details of the program, full weight must be given to its political, economic, and social effects, which are often extremely harmful.
The ultimate technique in isolating guerrillas from the people is to persuade the people to defend themselves. Militia-type local defense units help in the military defeat of the guerrillas. Gradually they may replace the territorial garrison forces and free regulars for mobile operations. They protect their communities, ambush raiders, and furnish intelligence and security to mobile forces in the vicinity. But at least as important is their political function: Once a substantial number of members of a community commit violence on behalf of the government, they have gone far toward permanently breaking the tie between that community and the guerrillas.

The third task in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations consists in assisting the threatened government to re-establish social order and its own authority. Although this task seems wholly nonmilitary, it in fact attacks the underlying discontent that sustains violence. Neither economic aid from the United States nor domestic authoritarianism is an adequate answer to this problem. The government in question must administer reform effectively and honestly but without seeming to be simply responding to the program of the guerrillas. Moreover, despite certain obvious short-run disadvantages, the government will probably gain in the long run if it permits more rather than less political activity—including criticism of the government. Such activity gives discontented persons a choice other than supporting either the government or the guerrillas, and it keeps discontent above ground, where the government can measure and alleviate it.

Perhaps such a reform program sounds impossibly idealistic, but its planks are based on the British accomplishment in Malaya. For those who still doubt that basic reform and guerrilla warfare are connected, there is the example of the late Ramón Magsaysay, who crushed the Huk rebellion as much with reform as with weapons. The United States must of course decide whether it is ready to interfere in the political affairs and even in the administration of weak and often irrational friends, and help them—force them if necessary—to carry out the needed program. At the same time, the United States itself must be clear on what kinds of reform it will support, and what kinds are too radical to be compatible with its own objectives and political situation.
There is little hope that, in place of reform, the United States can simply persuade the people of a guerrilla-infested state to change their minds. For years French army officers, who have become the leading theorists of “revolutionary warfare,” persisted in ignoring the simple fact that most Algerian Moslems were not interested in becoming part of a greater French nation. The idea that the minds of illiterate, economically backward people can be manipulated over a wide range of desires is probably wrong. In any case, we do not have the time to try it. Instead, the United States must accept the fact that real grievances, producing real demands, provide most of the impetus for guerrilla war, and we must prepare to meet or at least undercut those demands.

It would be false to conclude this discussion of guerrilla warfare on an optimistic note. Guerrillas present a difficult and an expensive problem for American military policy. But the first step in solving the problem is to understand it. The second step is to base action on that understanding, even when momentary pressures argue otherwise. The greatest danger in dealing with guerrillas is oversimplification; the second greatest is impatience. Approaches to the problem that unduly stress either military or nonmilitary action are the worst kinds of oversimplification, though each may seem tempting when one has lost patience with a more complex approach. Only by constantly recalling the fundamental structure of guerrilla movements, and by continuously putting what may seem like fine theoretical distinctions into practice, can the intricate but essential coordination of political and military action be maintained toward ultimate success.
It does not require much imagination to understand why President Kennedy has taken the problem of guerrilla warfare seriously. When this Administration came to responsibility, it faced four major crises: Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam. Each represented a successful Communist breaching—over the previous two years—of the Cold War truce lines which had emerged from World War II and its aftermath. In different ways, each had arisen from the efforts of the international Communist movement to exploit the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world, and each had a guerrilla-warfare component.

Cuba, of course, differed from the other cases. The Cuban revolution against Batista was a broad-based national insurrection. But that revolution was tragically captured from within by the Communist apparatus, and now Latin America faces the danger of Cuba's being used as the base for training, supply, and direction of guerrilla warfare in the hemisphere.

More than that, Mr. Khrushchev, in his report to the Moscow conference of Communist Parties (published January 6, 1961), had explained at great length that the Communists fully support what he called wars of national liberation and would march in the front rank with the peoples waging such struggles. The military arm of Mr. Khrushchev's January, 1961, doctrine is, clearly, guerrilla warfare.

Faced with these four crises, pressing in on the President from day to day, and faced with the candidly stated position of Mr.
Khrushchev, we have, indeed, begun to take the problem of guerrilla warfare seriously.

To understand this problem, however, one must begin with the great revolutionary process that is going forward in the southern half of the world, for the guerrilla-warfare problem in these regions is a product of that revolutionary process and the Communist effort and intent to exploit it.

What is happening throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia is this: Old societies are changing their ways in order to create and maintain a national personality on the world scene and to bring to their peoples the benefits modern technology can offer. This process is truly revolutionary. It touches every aspect of the traditional life—economic, social, and political. The introduction of modern technology brings about not merely new methods of production but a new style of family life, new links between the villages and the cities, the beginnings of national politics, and a new relationship to the world outside.

Like all revolutions, the revolution of modernization is disturbing. Individual men are torn between the commitment to the old, familiar way of life and the attractions of a modern way of life. The power of old social groups—notably the landlord, who usually dominates the traditional society—is reduced. Power moves toward those who command the tools of modern technology, including modern weapons. Men and women in the villages and the cities, feeling that the old ways of life are shaken and that new possibilities are open to them, express old resentments and new hopes.

This is the grand arena of revolutionary change, which the Communists are exploiting with great energy. They believe that their techniques of organization based on small disciplined cadres of conspirators—are ideally suited to grasp and to hold power in these turbulent settings. They believe that the weak transitional governments that one is likely to find during this modernization process are highly vulnerable to subversion and to guerrilla warfare. And whatever Communist doctrines of historical inevitability may be, Communists know that their time to seize power in the underdeveloped areas is limited. They know that, as momentum takes hold in an underdeveloped area—and
the fundamental social problems inherited from the traditional society are solved—their chances to seize power decline.

It is on the weakest nations, facing their most difficult transitional moments, that the Communists concentrate their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process. They believe that the techniques of political centralization under dictatorial control—and the projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress—will persuade hesitant men, faced by great transitional problems, that the Communist model should be adopted for modernization, even at the cost of surrendering human liberty. They believe that they can exploit effectively the resentments built up in many of these areas against colonial rule and that they can associate themselves effectively with the desire of the emerging nations for independence, for status on the world scene, and for material progress.

This is a formidable program, for the history of this century teaches us that Communism is not the long-run wave of the future toward which societies are naturally drawn. But, on the contrary, it is one particular form of modern society to which a nation may fall prey during the transitional process. Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization.

What is our reply to this historical conception and strategy? What is the American purpose and the American strategy? We, too, recognize that a revolutionary process is under way. We are dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence, with increasing degrees of human freedom. We seek two results: first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and, second, that each nation will be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and its own ambitions, the kind of modern society it wants. The same religious and philosophical beliefs which decree that we respect the uniqueness of each individual make it natural that we respect the uniqueness of each national society. Moreover, we Americans are confident that, if the independence of this process can be maintained over the coming years and decades, these societies will choose their own version of what we would recognize as a democratic, open society.
These are our commitments of policy and of faith. The United States has no interest in political satellites. Where we have military pacts, we have them because governments feel directly endangered by outside military action and we are prepared to help protect their independence against such military action. But, to use Mao Tse-tung's famous phrase, we do not seek nations which "lean to one side." We seek nations which will stand up straight. And we do so for a reason: because we are deeply confident that nations which stand up straight will protect their independence and move in their own ways and in their own time toward human freedom and political democracy.

Thus our central task in the underdeveloped areas, as we see it, is to protect the independence of the revolutionary process now going forward. This is our mission, and it is our ultimate strength. For this is not—and cannot be—the mission of Communism. And in time, through the fog of propaganda and the honest confusions of men caught up in the business of making new nations, this fundamental difference will become increasingly clear in the southern half of the world. The American interest will be served if our children live in an environment of strong, assertive, independent nations, capable, because they are strong, of assuming collective responsibility for the peace.

The diffusion of power is the basis for freedom within our own society, and we have no reason to fear it on the world scene. But this outcome would be a defeat for Communism—not for Russia as a national state, but for Communism. Despite all the Communist talk of aiding movements of national independence, they are driven in the end, by the nature of their system, to violate the independence of nations. Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence. And the truth will cut.

The victory we seek will see no ticker-tape parades down Broadway, no climactic battles, no great American celebrations of victory. It is a victory that will take many years and decades of hard work and dedication—by many peoples—to bring about. This will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism. It will
be a victory of men and nations that aim to stand up straight, over the forces that wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations of modernization. What this victory involves, in the end, is the assertion by nations of their right to independence and by men and women of their right to freedom as they understand it. And we deeply believe this victory will come—on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

If Americans do not seek victory in the usual sense, what do we seek? What is the national interest of the United States? Why do we Americans expend our treasure and assume the risks of modern war in this global struggle? For Americans the reward of victory will be, simply, this: It will permit American society to continue to develop along the old humane lines which go back to our birth as a nation, and which reach deeper into history than that—back to the Mediterranean roots of Western life. We are struggling to maintain an environment on the world scene that will permit our open society to survive and to flourish.

To make this vision come true places a great burden on the United States at this phase of history. The preservation of independence has many dimensions.

The United States has the primary responsibility for deterring the Communists from using nuclear weapons in the pursuit of their ambitions. The United States has a major responsibility for deterring the kind of overt aggression with conventional forces that was launched in June, 1950, in Korea.

The United States has the primary responsibility for assisting the economies of those hard-pressed states on the periphery of the Communist bloc, under acute military or quasi-military pressure which they cannot bear from their own resources; for example, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran. The United States has a special responsibility of leadership in bringing not merely its own resources but the resources of all the free world to bear in aiding the long-run development of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and their social life. And, as President Kennedy has made clear, he regards no program of his administration as more important than his program for long-term economic development, dramatized, for example, by the Alliance for Progress, in Latin America. Inde-
The Theory and the Threat

Independence cannot be maintained by military measures alone. Modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them.

Finally, the United States has a role to play in learning to deter the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, if possible, and to deal with it, if necessary.

It is, of course, obvious that the primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas cannot be American. These are many ways in which we can help—and we are searching our minds and our imaginations, to learn better how to help; but a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot. This is so for a quite particular reason. A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and in the hills, fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a guerrilla war. He can help create conditions in which it can be won, and he can directly assist those prepared to fight for their independence. We are determined to help destroy this international disease, that is, guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation.

Although as leader of the free world the United States has special responsibilities which it accepts in this common venture of deterrence, it is important that the whole international community begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression. It is important that the world become clear in mind, for example, that the operation run from Hanoi against Vietnam is as certain a form of aggression as the violation of the 38th Parallel by the North Korean armies in June, 1950.

In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the free world is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are, at best, half-truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases—with rights of sanctuary—is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way toward modernization. For instance, it requires somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an
organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: Its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build, and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression; and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront.

In facing the problem of guerrilla war, I have one observation to make as a historian. It is now fashionable to read the learned works of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara on guerrilla warfare. This is, indeed, proper. One should read with care and without passion into the minds of one's enemies. But it is historically inaccurate and psychologically dangerous to think that these men created the strategy and tactics of guerrilla war to which we are now responding. Guerrilla warfare is not a form of military and psychological magic created by the Communists. There is no rule or parable in the Communist texts that was not known at an earlier time in history. The operation of Marion's men in relation to the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution was, for example, governed by rules that Mao merely echoes. Che Guevara knows nothing of this business that T. E. Lawrence did not know or that was not practiced, for example, in the Peninsular campaign during the Napoleonic Wars, a century earlier. The orchestration of professional troops, militia, and guerrilla fighters is an old game, whose rules can be studied and learned.

My point is that we are up against a form of warfare that is powerful and effective only when we do not put our minds clearly to work on how to deal with it. I, for one, believe that with purposeful efforts most nations which might now be susceptible to guerrilla warfare could handle their border areas in ways
which would make them very unattractive to the initiation of this ugly game. We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not merely a proper military program of deterrence but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done.

Similarly, I am confident that we can deal with the kind of operation now under way in Vietnam. It is an extremely dangerous operation, and it could overwhelm Vietnam if the Vietnamese—aided by the free world—do not deal with it. But it is an unsuitable operation, by the book, based more on murder than on political or psychological appeal.

When Communists speak of wars of national liberation and of their support for “progressive forces,” I think of the systematic program of assassination now going forward in which the principal victims are the health, agriculture, and education officers in Vietnamese villages. The Viet Cong are not trying to persuade the peasants of Vietnam that Communism is good; they are trying to persuade them that their lives are insecure unless they cooperate with them. With resolution and confidence on all sides, and with the assumption of international responsibility for the frontier problem, I believe we are going to bring this threat to the independence of Vietnam under control.

My view is, then, that we confront in guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas a systematic attempt by the Communists to impose a serious disease on those societies attempting the transition to modernization. This attempt is a present danger in Southeast Asia. It could quickly become a major danger in Africa and Latin America. It is our task to prevent that disease, if possible, and to eliminate it where it is imposed.

Every American should be aware of the military and the creative dimensions of the job. Those with whom I have the privilege of working are dedicated to that mission with every resource of mind and spirit at our command.
II

WINNING IN THE MOUNTAINS—GREECE

The Anti-Bandit War

Victories have not come often for the free world as it stumbles along the dim and perilous track of the guerrilla. When, as in Greece, such a victory is won, it is fortunate if there is a distinguished military analyst on the scene.

Colonel J. C. Murray is widely recognized as one of the Marine Corps' most incisive thinkers and writers, as well as a combat-tested troop commander. The highly demanding jobs he has been assigned testify to the esteem in which he is held.

We believe military professionals will find his study particularly knowledgeable and penetrating. The comments of the Gazette editors in 1954, when this article first appeared (in somewhat longer form), highlight its significance.
The Anti-Bandit War

Colonel J. C. Murray

In the confusing welter of international problems engaging the attention of the American public following World War II, the cancer of expansionist Soviet Communism fastened itself in many areas without attracting particular attention. It was not until this malignancy reached out to take control of Greece—the birthplace of democracy—that it was clearly isolated and labeled as such. Once identified, it met determined resistance, the resulting struggle focusing the attention of the free world first on the local problem—then on the larger issue.

Forced into the field of active international assistance by the financial inability of the British to render further assistance to the Greeks, the U.S. decided to come actively to the support of the Greeks, thus taking the lead in developing a policy of containment. The influence of this policy has been world-wide, but it has come into open conflict with expansionist Communism in only three areas—Greece, Korea, and Indochina.

"The Anti-Bandit War" is the first comprehensive analysis of the earliest of these three conflicts.

Some of the conclusions are unexpected. The effects of U.S. assistance were perhaps more far-reaching in the political, economic, and psychological fields than in strictly military matters. The military defeat of the Communists was hastened by two notable events. The first was Tito's split with the Cominform, which itself might not have been possible had not American assistance in Greece assured a friendly flank instead of what might have otherwise been a segment of Cominform encirclement. The second was the appointment of Field Marshal Papagos as Commander in Chief of the Greek Government forces.

The study of this first contact between expansionist Soviet
Communism and the policy of containment is of more than historical interest. It is of immediate, current, and continuing interest. The problems arising from the common frontier with expansionist Communism are not confined to Greece, where the present settlement may be transitory. They exist along the entire 20,000-mile frontier of the Soviet empire. At any point along this front, the pattern of Communist aggression in Greece may appear or reappear in whole or in part. "The Anti-Bandit War" lays bare the anatomy of this pattern and discloses the magnitude of the effort required to defeat it in Greece.

Editors

I.

In August, 1949, in two swift blows, the Greek Government forces, 265,000 strong, drove the self-styled "Democratic Army," consisting of less than 20,000 fighters, from the soil of Greece. Superficially, this appeared to be no great feat of arms. Indeed, it seemed scarcely to merit a second thought save for the curious circumstance that this comparatively small force had withstood the government forces for three years. That the Democratic Army had been able to do this, and, in so doing, had prevented the establishment of conditions favorable to the reconstruction of Greece, warrants serious study in its proper context. The problems arising from the common frontier with Communism exist today in Iran, Burma, and Indochina as well as in Korea, and the pattern of Communist aggression in Greece, as distinct from that employed in Korea, may appear elsewhere in whole or in part.

What factors present when the government achieved its easy victories in Vitsi and Grammos in 1949 were not present when the guerrillas undertook operations in 1946? What factors present from 1946 to 1948 had altered by 1949, and in what respect? Had changing circumstances altered the significance of constant factors in the situation? In short, what were the factors that led to the defeat of Communist aggression in Greece in August 1949?

For the most part, answers to these questions are to be found in events in Greece during the years 1946-49. However, the
events of that period have their roots in the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation and in the liberation. Then too, happenings in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria had repercussions in Greece. In addition, Greece was near the vortex of the Cold War politics of the great powers, and its affairs were influenced thereby to a greater extent perhaps than those of any other nation. Thus reference must be made to trends and events which lie outside the strict geographical and chronological limits of the anti-bandit war. Moreover, although this study deals primarily with the military aspects of the war against the guerrillas, political and economic considerations inevitably intrude.

With the signing of the Varkisa agreement, in February, 1945, defeat was acknowledged by ELAS, the field force of the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front, which had gathered strength by monopolizing the cause of resistance to the occupation and husbanded it for the postwar struggle for control of Greece. But this did not signalize the Communist Party's abandonment of the struggle for power. Although 40,000 weapons were surrendered under the agreement, they were largely unserviceable. The better weapons were cached away for the next round. Although most of the members of ELAS returned to their homes, 4,000 crossed the frontier to find sanctuary with the satellite neighbors. Others remained in the mountains, potential nuclei for future bands. These were hard-core Communists or criminals who could not expect to benefit by the partial amnesty features of the Varkisa pact.

As the façade of the National Liberation Front, behind which the Greek Communist Party had originally marshaled its forces, fell away, the Party leaders sought new catalysts. They found them in continued economic distress, in the inability of political leaders to establish an effective government, and in extremes in the treatment of the opposition by Rightist groups.

Having previously failed to gain control of Greece by political maneuvering and outright revolution, the Communists now sought to achieve control as a consequence of the incorporation of Greece or parts of it in a Communist federation of the Balkans. Their purpose was to facilitate the imposition from without of what they had failed to achieve from within. They had only to
create the vacuum into which external forces, which stood waiting, could flow.

Thus, when the bands began to re-form following the first post-war election, the Communists sought to prostrate the economy and discredit the government preparatory to their later, but unsuccessful, effort to establish a satellite-recognized "Government of Free Greece," or to detach Greek Macedonia, and even possibly Epirus and Thrace, through annexation by Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, respectively.

The assumption of the initiative by the guerrillas tended to define the objectives of the government. These were: to establish and maintain conditions of economic and political stability within Greece, to suppress the disruptive guerrilla forces, and to interdict the aid to the guerrillas which began to flow across the northern borders.

Guerrilla warfare distinguishable from that of 1942-44 only by its greater ferocity began to burgeon here and there during the summer of 1946. Initially it was confined to areas near the northern border but Right-wing extremists retaliated in kind in the south, giving the disorder a seemingly widespread character, which the Communists, unaided, could not have accomplished. Thus attention was diverted from the area in which internal disorder could have been attributed to foreign intervention, and the Communists won an early advantage in their ability to camouflage the war as a domestic affair—the Greek people against the government in Athens.

Although the Varkisa agreement did not so promise, it may have been understood that British troops were to be withdrawn from Greece following the plebiscite on the return of the King, scheduled for August. In view of this, the Communists refrained from extending the scope of the disorder before then. But when British troops remained beyond that date, Communist leaders were unwilling to delay longer. Guerrilla activity, seriously resumed after the election in March, was unleashed on an increased scale in late September.

The situation developed along the lines of the following schematic and highly rationalized outline:

The campaign began with the murder of isolated officials—
individual gendarmes or mayors of small villages, and the beating and threatening of Right-wing citizens of prominence. Murders were committed "for giving information." Publicity was given to both the event and its cause to discourage recourse of citizens to their officials. These activities threw a heavy burden on the gendarmerie, which had to extend its patrolling and disperse its forces in an effort to maintain public morale in the affected areas.

Attacks on small patrols and posts of the gendarmerie forced them to consolidate—to decrease the number of patrols in order to increase their strength.

Then came raids on small villages abandoned by the gendarmerie. Their purpose was to obtain food and improve bandit security.

Next came attacks on larger gendarmerie detachments—those of thirty to forty men. This confined the gendarmerie to the larger towns in the affected areas. Finally the army was called in.

The tactics used against the gendarmerie were now called into play against the army. Small posts and patrols were attacked by superior forces. This forced the army to concentrate, but by this time the guerrillas were able to direct attacks against their frontier posts and against isolated garrisons of company size.

A number of fairly well-defined bandit areas now had been established in which army forces could not move or operate except in considerable strength.

Within these areas, strong bands conducted systematic raids on villages and towns. They removed food stocks and animals and drove inhabitants from their homes, sometimes murdering the residents of one village before warning the occupants of others to leave. Thus, the guerrillas embarrassed the government by creating a refugee problem and aggravating the food shortage in a country already within sight of starvation.

To further isolate the bandit areas from government influence, the guerrillas initiated the attack and sabotage of communications. Endeavoring to protect its own lines of communication and answering the growing political demand for protection of towns and public utilities further reduced the army's potential for offensive operations.

The government forces, by now engaged in full-scale opera-
tions against the bands, achieved some success, but the bandits avoided being brought to decisive action. The army frontier posts had been forced to concentrate, leaving large stretches of the frontier unwatched. When guerrillas in the north were hard pressed, they merely withdrew across the border, where pursuit was arrested by satellite frontier guards.

Having tested the offensive capabilities of the army, the bandits in late 1947 began to try to hold ground in certain areas to protect their supply routes. Moreover, the Communists were ready to play their trump card, the establishment of the “Provisional Democratic Government.” To give substance to this fiction, they had to be able to show that a reasonably large area was controlled by the “Free Government.” This government was proclaimed in the Grammos area on December 24, 1947.

The foregoing outline stresses the military aspects of the operations of the Democratic Army, but it does not conceal the salient characteristic of guerrilla strategy; that is, that it was economic, political, and terrorist—and, only in the last instance, military. The guerrilla offensive was directed not against the armed forces, but against unarmed civilians, the public services, lines of communication, transportation, commerce, industry, and agriculture—the warp and woof of the economic, political, and social order. Such operations as were conducted against the army were directed to attainment of greater freedom of action as regards the real objective—destruction of the economic, political, and social order. The guerrilla strategy was neither offensive nor defensive; it was evasive. Later it began to develop a defensive character in certain areas along the northern frontier. Elsewhere, evasion remained the keynote of military strategy. Meanwhile the real war, the war of destruction and sabotage of the life of the nation, continued unabated.

The army’s first major campaign was initiated in April, 1947. The plan was to attack first in central Greece and then sweep gradually northward to the border, destroying the guerrillas along the way. Thereafter the border would be sealed against reinfiltiration. Tactically, areas containing guerrilla concentrations were to be isolated and surrounded, whereupon the trapped guerrillas were to be annihilated.
After some months, it was recognized that this campaign was a failure. During its course, the guerrillas waxed in strength and influence. A series of operations planned for the winter months was canceled. Following a reorganization, a new series of operations was begun in April, 1948. A preliminary phase to clean up south-central Greece appeared to go well, but the timetable lagged and the guerrillas consistently escaped the planned encirclements. The campaign culminated in a battle for the Grammos Mountain area, which began on June 29. There, 12,000-15,000 guerrillas defended themselves for two and a half months against the attack of 50,000 government troops. The guerrillas eventually withdrew into Albania, but immediately reappeared in the Mount Vitsi area, to the northeast. Operations against this new position failed. Meantime, guerrilla activity increased elsewhere, particularly in the Peloponnesus, where the guerrillas gained the initiative.

By midwinter, the guerrillas had reestablished themselves in the Grammos area, but the army, employing 25,000 men, was wresting the initiative from 3,500 guerrillas in the Peloponnesus. Meanwhile, the Army was preparing the 1949 campaign. It opened with another clearing operation in central Greece. As in 1948, this phase proceeded successfully. By the end of June, it was in the mop-up stage and the concentration of troops for the Grammos-Vitsi phase was started. Following a diversion in the Grammos area, an attack was launched in the Vitsi area on August 10. Within three days, the position had been overrun. Of a guerrilla garrison of 7,000, approximately 5,000 withdrew to Albania. In the Grammos operation launched on August 24, the 200 square miles of the area were occupied in five days, and 4,000 guerrillas withdrew into Albania.

Guerrilla manpower may be measured in terms of three categories of personnel—those serving with the bands in Greece, self-defense collaborators, and bandit reserves outside Greece. The first category indicates the immediate combat strength of the Democratic Army. The number of collaborators gives a measure of the intelligence, security, and administrative services available to the bands. The numbers outside Greece included wounded fighters, recruits in training, and personnel engaged in training or
logistical activities. To these may be added a number of older men and women and abducted children of no combat value. This figure provides an index to the number of replacements and reserves available to the bands. It is, therefore, a measure of their staying power.

Supplementing the three categories of personnel listed above were undetermined hundreds of Yugoslavs, Albanians, and Bulgarians who worked behind the borders of those countries to aid the guerrillas.

The rebels started operations in 1946 with a strength of 2,500 fighters. By the end of the year, it had reached 8,000. In April, 1947, it was 14,250, and in November, 18,000, where it began to level off. From this time onward, the number of guerrilla fighters, in spite of a one-time peak of 26,000, was maintained so constantly between 20,000-25,000 as to raise the conjecture that this may have been the established personnel allowance for the bands of Greece. Whatever the reason, the number of fighters serving with the guerrillas remained in the vicinity of 20,000-25,000, except during the initial build-up and again just prior to the collapse. At this latter time, the strength had fallen to less than 18,000.

The numerical strength of the "self-defense" element of the guerrilla movement can only be estimated. The value of the collaborator lay in the fact that he was not known—in daylight, a peasant tilling his fields; at night, he might bear intelligence to a guerrilla headquarters or place mines in the highway. Some were discovered; others never will be. Their number was great. The magnitude is indicated by the capture or surrender of 1,600 collaborators in connection with the military defeat of a force of 3,600 guerrillas in the Peloponnesus in early 1949. The ratio of collaborators to guerrillas was even higher on the mainland, particularly near the northern frontiers, where the guerrillas exercised domination for long periods of time and where the price of survival, in many instances, was collaboration. An indication of the potential for collaboration is available elsewhere. The three elections held since 1949 show that at least 200,000 males of voting age were favorably disposed toward, or susceptible to, the influence of the Communists. This does not mean, of course, that
all were active collaborationists, but it is a factor to be kept in
mind in assessing the strength of the guerrillas.

Many of those serving in the bands when warfare was renewed
had enjoyed the hospitality of the northern neighbors prior to
the call to action. The number crossing into the satellites follow-
ing the signing of the Varkiza agreement was about 4,000, and
the numbers of bandits harbored in Albania, Yugoslavia, and
Bulgaria thereafter did not fall below this. A representative esti-
mate of the number of Greek rebels in the satellites during the
war is: Albania—4,500 combat effectives and 6,500 noneffectives,
including older men and women, wounded fighters, and children;
Bulgaria—2,000–2,500 combat effectives and 2,500 noneffectives;
and Yugoslavia—4,000 combat effectives and perhaps 10,000 non-
effectives.

Few of these reserves were committed during the final battles,
and these from Albania and Bulgaria only. Tito’s closing of the
Greek-Yugoslav border in July, 1949, quarantined 4,000 combat
effectives in Yugoslavia and drove a wedge between the main
strength of the guerrillas in central Greece and 2,000–2,500
guerrillas in Bulgaria and 2,500 in east Macedonia and Thrace.
The latter, having been deprived of the protected east-west route
north of the frontier, could not move to the support of central
Greece as government forces controlled the region between sea
and frontier in central Macedonia. Thus, the closing of the border
resulted in an outright loss to the guerrillas of 4,000 fighters and
isolated as many as 5,000 more from the balance of the guerrilla
forces. This was a personnel loss of 30–35 per cent.

Ground forces employed by the government in military or
paramilitary functions during the anti-bandit war included the
National Army, the National Defense Corps, the gendarmerie, and
armed civilians. The strengths of all components were increased
from time to time as the magnitude of the task of eliminating the
guerrillas was more fully appreciated and as the means of main-
taining larger forces became available.

When the government returned to Athens in October, 1944,
the only remnants of the prewar army were two units: the Third
Brigade of 2,000 men and the “Sacred Squadron” of 600–800
officers. The United Kingdom undertook to equip and train a
new army. The objective was to make it an effective force of 100,000 by 1948. However, by April, 1947, the need for employing the army against the bandits resulted in decisions to revise its strength upward to 120,000 and to shorten the planned training program.

In early 1948, it was increased to 132,000. A temporary increase of 15,000 was decided upon in April to permit the training of replacements for casualties during the projected campaign. This brought the authorized strength of the army to 147,000. In November, this temporary strength was made permanent.

As realization of the inconclusive character of the 1948 campaign spread, both the Greek Government and the British Military Mission advocated further increases in the strength of the army. In fact, it was one of the conditions put forward by General Papagos as a prerequisite to his acceptance of the position of Commander in Chief that it be raised to 250,000. This, however, proved to be unnecessary.

The problems experienced by the army in protecting the civil community during the summer and fall of 1947 suggested the formation of an organization to provide a static defense of towns and villages. Immediately after the liberation, when there had been no instrumentality to take control of the territories previously dominated by ELAS, a National Civil Guard had been formed. It had combined certain of the normal functions of the police and the army. It was hastily organized, poorly controlled, and given to excesses, and no one was sorry when the gendarmerie replaced it in November, 1945. This experience, however, provided a precedent that was drawn upon in meeting the new problems.

In October, 1947, it was decided to form a National Defense Corps under army control. The initial authorization was for 40 battalions of 500 men each—a total of 20,000. Cadres for the battalions were provided by the army, and the fillers were ex-servicemen. Men from the same locality were placed in the same battalion. After a short period of training, a battalion was posted to the region from which its members came. The theory was that they could live at home, functioning on a “minuteman” basis. In this way, it was hoped that the civil community could be pro-
ected and the army freed to go after the guerrillas without greatly increasing the dislocation of the national life and economy. Further, it was expected that the poorly organized civilian components could be dissolved and the gendarmerie reduced to its normal strength.

In January, 1948, the goal for the National Defense Corps was changed to 100 battalions of 500 men each—a total of 50,000. Eventually, 97 of these units were formed, but the "minuteman" principle was gradually abandoned. More and more NDC battalions were "vitalized" and redesigned as light-infantry battalions. As such, their status was undistinguishable from other units of the army.

The gendarmerie in Greece is an armed police force, which, under the Ministry of Justice, maintains order except within the limits of towns having municipal police. Its normal strength is about 20,000. The organization had fallen into disrepute through continuing to function under the German occupation authorities, and although there was no evidence of extensive active collaboration, it was considered necessary to rebuild it from the ground up following the liberation. In this task, the government was aided by a British Police and Prisons Mission. Under its guidance, the gendarmerie was reconstituted and in November, 1945, it resumed its duties. Owing to the growing threat to public order, its strength was increased to 32,000, but even this was insufficient. The disorder had grown beyond police proportions. Efforts to use the gendarmerie in army-like operations were unsuccessful. It was not equipped or trained to function in this manner. Moreover, while the gendarmerie played soldier, its primary function suffered. A policeman's usefulness depends on his local knowledge—a familiarity with people and places that enables him to detect the unusual. Police cannot be organized in large units and moved from place to place without sacrificing an important principle of police organization. Consequently, when the NDC was formed, the gendarmerie was reduced in strength and confined to police work. Its strength thereafter was maintained at about 25,000.

From the first, the government was confronted by the ugly fact that its mission had two aspects. It must protect the civil
power and population so that the economy could continue to function, and it must destroy the bandit forces. But the bandit forces could be engaged and destroyed only by aggressive pursuit, and, in the absence of any instrumentality other than the gendarmery for civil defense, the employment of the major portion of the army in such operations would have left the civil community without direct protection. After its first more or less fruitless series of offensive operations in 1947, the army succumbed to political pressures to make static dispositions of troops for the protection of the civil community. This defensive mission was a bottomless pit which long absorbed much of the army's capacity for more productive undertakings.

Eventually, this highly unsatisfactory situation was alleviated by the formation of the NDC and by the arming of civilians. Thus, by an increase in government forces of 50,000 for local defense purposes and by utilizing to some extent the capacity of communities to protect themselves, more profitable employment of the army became practicable.

The great disparity in numerical strength between government forces and guerrilla fighters is shown in the following tabulation, which represents the approximate status as of the month of July, 1949:

**Government Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek National Army</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Corps</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil police</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian components</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>232,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Democratic Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With bands in Greece</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas in satellites</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborators</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite personnel</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II.

From the start of the bandit war to its end, the Democratic Army consisted almost exclusively of light infantry. The guerrillas had a "cavalry brigade" and some antiaircraft and field artillery. Artillery, however, was of little value. Neither the guns nor any quantity of ammunition could be concentrated for employment. Except in the Grammos and Vitsi areas, where it was used both in defense and in support of guerrilla attacks, artillery was employed only in delivering sporadic harassing fire on towns or villages. It contributed to the campaign of terrorism against the civil population, but its military significance was slight.

The services of the Democratic Army were, for the most part, established beyond the frontier, where they were protected from attack. They included training centers, transient camps, hospitals, and forwarding points for supplies. Within Greece, except in the base areas, services were provided by the fighters themselves or by collaborators.

Since they were lightly equipped and unimpeded by service elements or territorial responsibility, the guerrillas had good mobility in a tactical sense and a high degree of flexibility. Bands could be subdivided without appreciable loss of combat efficiency. Conversely, they could be increased to the limits of effective control. Every man was a fighter. The bands had no soft rear. They could face to the rear or to a flank with facility.

Evasion and temporary local concentration of superior forces—each an important page in the book of guerrilla tactical doctrine—were aided by this flexibility. When threatened by encirclement, bands could split into small groups to lie up until the danger passed or slip through army lines to reassemble far from the closing noose. Offensively, a temporary local concentration of superior forces could be built up in the rear of army lines or in the midst of government-controlled territory by the infiltration of such small groups.

Concealment, too, was aided by the factor of composition. Of nondescript appearance and without heavy equipment, the guerrillas could sometimes melt into the civil population. Their forma-
tions were so inconspicuous by contrast with the large, comparatively well-equipped columns of the army that the former invariably had the advantage of better combat intelligence.

The virtual absence of service troops, which gave the guerrillas so much tactical mobility and flexibility of employment, was also the source of their greatest weakness. Bandit logistics, except in the border areas, could not support sustained combat operations and failed entirely under the demands of a protracted engagement.

Finally, as regards firepower, the guerrillas had a high volume at short ranges, but little at medium and none at long ranges. The guerrillas were at their best in an ambush which they could break off, if need be, to disappear into rough terrain. They were excellent in a raid on an undefended locality or a night raid against a defended locality, provided they had built up previously, as was their custom, a local superiority of force. They were at their worst in a daylight attack against a fortified position or in an effort to defend by holding ground. They were incapable of winning military decisions against orthodox formations, but they were well fitted to conduct war against the civil populace.

The Democratic Army was employed initially in accordance with its capabilities; that is, in ambushing small forces, in raids against poorly defended localities, and in sabotage of public utilities. As regards the army, the guerrillas practiced harassment and evasion. In 1948, however, the Democratic Army began to hold ground. The old tactics were not given up. Indeed, when army pressure on guerrilla positions had to be eased, raids in other areas became more frequent and more determined. It was simply that a new strategy was superimposed upon the old.

Its decision to hold ground placed the Democratic Army at a disadvantage and contributed to its defeat. Organizational changes were made to decrease the disadvantages of the new tactics, but the guerrillas could not alter materially the composition-of-forces factor. By the decision to hold ground, they opposed light infantry in large, relatively static concentrations to attack by balanced forces. Thus they exposed weakness to strength and their initial success in the Vitsi area was due only to the army’s inability to exploit its own strength. Moreover, though the guerrillas turned the government’s 1948 offensive into a stalemate in
front of Vitsi, they suffered severe casualties in men and morale from which they never fully recovered.

Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, wartime commander of the Allied Mission to the Greek guerrillas, in commenting on the contrast in structure between ELAS (Communist-dominated partisans) and EDES (Rightist partisans), observed that whereas the latter deployed forces in small bands commanded by comparatively independent junior officers, the "amateur strategists" of ELAS developed a large, centralized army of divisions and corps, in which the chain of command was also a military hierarchy. In his view, this type of organization was excellent for imposing military law on the areas dominated by ELAS, but poor for guerrilla operations.

When guerrilla operations were resumed in 1946, circumstances were different. The guerrillas were unable to assume responsibility for the governance of the civil population. A territorial organization was created but it was separate from the organization for combat. The zone of operations was divided into sectors. "Sector headquarters" exercised coordination within their areas but did not control operations. Their tasks were the establishment of communications, intelligence, logistics, and the handling of political matters. Within the sectors were the hill masses used by the combat units as operating bases. The combat units were bands of different sizes which moved about freely within a sector or between sectors. In other words, this was, by Woodhouse's standards, a good organization for guerrilla operations.

During 1947, the loosely organized bands of sixty to seventy men grew into bi-companies and battalions as guerrilla strength increased. The guerrillas explained their failure to take the offensive during winter 1947-48 on the grounds of organizational weaknesses. In preparation for the army's spring offensive, the guerrillas decided to consolidate the areas they held, and to effect "improvements" in their military organization to permit war on the plains. In short, they were departing from an organizational structure suitable for their purposes.

Reasons contributing to this decision can only be surmised. Perhaps there were militaristic tendencies among the "amateur strategists." Perhaps guerrilla strength had grown to the point
that the leaders anticipated challenging the army in full-scale warfare. Perhaps the difficulties experienced in directing and coordinating numerous independent bands were too great. More probably, however, the decision to reorganize resulted primarily from the decision to defend an area along the northern borders. The employment of the bands in a task of this nature would require more effective means of control.

The decision to defend represented a departure from the principles of guerrilla warfare. To attempt to hold territory indefinitely is to rely upon force of arms, and the guerrilla who relies upon force of arms alone is doomed to defeat.

What induced the guerrilla leaders to make this decision? It may have been to give substance to the fiction of the Government of Free Greece, or to acquire a territorial base comparable to Yenan in China, or the “People’s Republic” in Korea; or it may have reflected guerrilla recognition that they could not continue operations without supplies from across the border. To secure their supply lines, they had to defend a base area through which supplies could pass on the way to the bands.

In early 1948, the battalions of 1947 grew into brigades, and in May, a guerrilla division was formed. By the end of 1948, the guerrillas had 8 divisions. These divisions controlled some 23 brigades, 42 battalions, 25 bi-companies, and 18 independent companies.

The gathering of light infantry into nominal “divisions” did not make them divisions in the sense of a force of combined arms. No supporting arms were added. The available forces were simply gathered into larger formations. These were not capable of meeting on equal terms the units of the army, which could find, fix, and fight them with greater success than it had the smaller bands. The peculiar advantages of the guerrilla had been sacrificed. The departure from proper guerrilla organization and tactics assisted the army during its 1949 campaign.

The combat arms of the army consisted of infantry, artillery, armored reconnaissance, tanks, and combat engineers. Originally, supporting arms were not organic to the division. They were under the control of various directorates of the general staff and units were attached to, or placed in support of, corps or divisions.
according to circumstances. The division, then, consisted of little more than infantry, headquarters, and signal elements. Supporting arms, however, were established to provide certain attachments. A mountain division was normally reinforced by a cavalry squadron, a machine-gun company, engineers, and a regiment of mountain artillery. Field divisions were similarly reinforced, except that armored cavalry and field artillery replaced cavalry and mountain artillery.

The basic difference between field and mountain divisions, the strengths of which were about 10,500 and 8,500 respectively, lay in the means provided for their transportation. The field division, of which there were three, was organized for war on the plains. Thus, it was equipped with motor transport. The mountain division was provided animal transport. There were four such divisions. The relative availabilities of animal and motor resources and differing operational requirements resulted in many variations from these standards as the war wore on. Finally, by the spring of 1949, the then-existing eight divisions were placed under the same establishment. The new division, the strength of which was about 9,300, included as organic elements an engineer unit, a scout company, and a battery of 75-mm. pack-howitzers.

The standard division, a compromise between the specialized field and mountain divisions, could operate effectively over any terrain. The new organization also recognized that the habitual widespread employment of army units made it necessary to include as organic parts of the division a modicum of engineer and artillery support.

In all, six types of infantry were employed by the government. In addition to the mountain and field infantries referred to above, there were commando infantry, National Defense Corps—subsequently light infantry—gendarmery, and armed civilian components.

At the onset of guerrilla activity, the army was not yet fully organized. It was deficient in training and, to some extent, in equipment, and the organization of its combat units, even those of the mountain type, was not entirely suitable for combat against the comparatively small guerrilla bands of that period. There was, however, a psychological need for a measure of early success in
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arresting the depredations of the guerrillas. In this situation, the British Military Mission, its thinking conditioned perhaps by the experiences of the United Kingdom in the early days of World War II, sponsored the organization of commandos to speed training and to provide small units specially trained to combat guerrillas.

Forty commando companies were formed initially. Subsequently these were organized into four groups of five companies each. The strength of the group was about 625. In the summer of 1949, the four commando groups were placed under two brigade headquarters, and a fifth group was organized.

As had happened in the U.K. and in the U.S., the best fighters were concentrated in the commando units. They received better pay, equipment, training, living conditions, and more publicity. Everything was done to set them up as a special category of personnel. This they became, but the reason for it lay not in this favoritism. The real sources of their esprit de corps were their intense military activity and a succession of military victories.

Owing to their offensive spirit and the widespread confidence they inspired, the commandos began to gain a monopoly of the right to fight the guerrillas. Other units, recognizing their superiority, were content to let them do so. Commanders, appreciating their quality and the readiness with which they undertook operations, began to use them in preference to other troops in operations of all kinds. It became necessary for the Commander in Chief, who regarded these troops as a kind of strategic reserve, to state their proper role. Commandos were to be used along the following lines:

1. In night raids to open gaps in defensive works for later exploitation by infantry.
2. In deep raids into enemy-controlled territory.
3. In penetrations to attack the rear of enemy troops pinned down by fire, especially near the end of the fight.
4. As strategic reserves to be transported to the point of employment by rapid means such as aircraft.

Except for an initial reluctance to accept the idea of special units, the commando concept was not questioned in Greece.
They were regarded as lightly armed, highly mobile, and very effective. Actually the commandos were not lightly armed; they carried more firepower than a corresponding number of infantrymen from a standard unit. Their mobility is questionable since they had no means of transportation save walking. Except for arms, however, they were lightly equipped. Consequently, they could be moved readily in transportation from external sources. They could operate effectively at night owing to their high state of training. They could gain surprise owing to their light equipment, their ability to make long marches, and their superior fieldcraft, and they could make deep penetrations of the combat-patrol type owing to their ability to march and to operate for short periods with minimum equipment. They were not suitable for sustained operations, and they were dependent to a far greater degree than standard units upon external administrative services. It is doubtful if the functions assigned commandos were of such a nature as to warrant the maintenance of special units, with the concentration of effort and dislocation of morale that such a course of action entails. To a degree, the effectiveness of the commandos was achieved at the expense of the standard infantry units. With proper training, the latter could have performed the missions assigned the commandos. They could, in addition, have held ground on the defensive or have taken their place in an attack against a fortified position. They could sustain themselves, moreover, without excessive reliance upon the service and supply agencies of the army.

Armored cavalry and tanks did not play a significant role. Unable to penetrate the mountain areas where most of the fighting took place, armor normally reinforced the garrisons of towns. It tended to raise the morale of the soldiers and particularly the townspeople, who were impressed by such tangible evidence of strength. Occasionally, armor was used to support a counteroffensive to drive guerrillas out of a captured town. Armor may have disturbed the guerrillas. Their extensive use of AT (anti-tank) mines, and their efforts to build up an antitank capability by the acquisition of AT guns and by the designation of infantry “tank fighters,” suggest as much. It is doubtful, however, if the
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largely psychological advantage that accrued to the army by its possession of armor justified the effort that went into the maintenance of this arm.

Owing to the composition of forces, the National Army enjoyed two great advantages over the Democratic Army. First, it was capable of fielding balanced forces of combat arms, whereas the guerrillas were infantry only. Second, it was adequately supported by supply and service elements. This gave it strategic mobility and tactical staying power. The guerrilla, on the other hand, had few service formations outside the base areas. Thus, his units in south and central Greece had little strategic mobility and limited staying power.

At the outset of the war, the guerrillas employed their forces in accordance with their capabilities. In 1948, however, they began to defend certain areas along the northern border and to employ larger formations in south and central Greece. In so doing, they placed themselves at a disadvantage with respect to the superior arms and logistic capabilities of the government forces. Following the 1948 campaign, the guerrillas attempted to constitute artillery and other supporting arms, but their efforts met with little success. Their final military defeat was due in part to their effort to oppose a balanced force of arms with infantry alone. The guerrillas at no time had the capability of directly opposing the army. Why they allowed themselves to be placed in this position is difficult to understand.

The table of equipment for a guerrilla brigade, the strength of which was about 1,500, provided the following armament:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small machine guns</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine guns</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light mortars</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium mortars</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So far as is known, no guerrilla brigade ever attained a strength of 1,500, and it is improbable that any brigade was ever equipped
in the prescribed manner. Guerrilla methods are not characterized by such precision. Nevertheless, the table is of value as an indication of guerrilla thinking with respect to armament. Probably no more accurate estimate of the numbers and types of weapons in the hands of guerrillas could be made than one arrived at by distributing arms to the total number of guerrillas in accordance with the ratios established by this table. It would be necessary to add the limited number of heavier crew-served weapons not included in the brigade table of equipment. These included light field and mountain artillery, light antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a few heavy mortars. The total number of weapons would also include those stored locally and the resources of the governments to the north. There is little evidence that the guerrillas ever experienced shortages in weapons, except in isolated instances where they were due to difficulties in distribution rather than to an over-all shortage.

The guerrilla weakness in weapons was the result not of short supply but of lack of standardization. There was infinite variety in their weapons. This diversity was the product of their manifold sources. It gave the guerrillas many headaches and prevented them from getting maximum performance from their armament. Weapons training could not be standardized. Weapons maintenance was rendered difficult by a shortage of spare parts and by the fact that parts were not interchangeable among the various makes. Perhaps worst of all was the fact that ammunition supply was infinitely complicated. Weapons were often out of action because ammunition of the proper type was not available at the right time and place, while local supplies of ammunition were sometimes partially useless. These problems were magnified by the widespread deployment of guerrilla units and poor communications. A significant increase toward the end of the war in German weapons—rifles, in particular—may have been due less to the exhaustion of Balkan stores than to an effort on the part of the guerrillas to standardize arms.

Apart from their variety, guerrilla weapons were those used by infantry the world over. The conditions of the war, however, brought the mine into great prominence. The guerrilla, having no motor transport, could place antitank mines at will, knowing that
they would not interfere with his own movements. The limited road net and poor trafficability of the terrain off the roads ensured a profitable return. Antitank and antipersonnel mines were employed extensively, both offensively and defensively, and for sabotage. Their weight was a disadvantage, but tens of thousands were transported into Greece and the hundreds of legless men one sees there today give convincing evidence of their effectiveness. The mine was the most effective single weapon in the guerrilla arsenal.

In respect to armament, the objective of creating a modern army in Greece had not been attained when operations against the guerrillas began. Although there was a standard table of equipment, the weapons on hand varied from unit to unit according to the availability of equipment.

The principal infantry weapons were the .303 rifle, the Sten gun, and the Bren gun. The last named was distributed one per squad or about 36 per battalion. The only crew-served weapons in the battalion were mortars. A 2-inch mortar was placed in each rifle platoon. The only battalion weapon was the 3-inch mortar.

In summary, the armament of the battalion included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-inch mortars</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-inch mortars</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren guns</td>
<td>approx. 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303 rifles</td>
<td>approx. 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sten guns</td>
<td>approx. 75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The brigade consisted of three battalions. No supporting arms were introduced at this level. The division, in turn, consisted of three brigades. No supporting arms were organic with the division. However, a medium-machine-gun company of 16 Vickers was normally attached, and there were available for the support of each division about two batteries of artillery and a reconnaissance squadron.

The artillery was organized into eight regiments. The mountain regiment consisted of two batteries of 3.7 mountain howitzers. Sometimes attached was a battery of 4.2 mortars. The field regiment consisted of two batteries of 25-pounders. In addition, there
were two batteries of medium artillery consisting of four 5.5's each.

The armored reconnaissance squadrons, equipped with the U.S. scout car and the British-made Humber armored car, were organized into reconnaissance regiments, of which there were three. To complete the list of armament, it is only necessary to add three small tank units, equipped with British Centaur tanks of limited serviceability, and later the U.S. Sherman.

A casual inspection of this armament establishment reveals that it is light, even by mountain standards. Particularly striking are its deficiencies in machine guns and artillery. But limited numbers and firepower of the weapons were not the only shortcomings. Much of the equipment had been war surplus in the first place and ordnance maintenance was deficient.

The first change in armament was the substitution of the 60-mm. for the 2-inch mortar. This was followed by the gradual substitution of the 81-mm. for the 3-inch mortar. The absence of sufficient artillery suitable for mountain operations having been noted, the 75-mm. pack-howitzer was procured and delivery was made in the spring of 1948. A battery of four guns was provided each division, a development that went a long way toward increasing its self-sufficiency and its effectiveness in mountain warfare.

By February, 1948, the contracting quantities of British weapons dictated their concentration in certain units. A decision was reached to replace the .303's, the Bren guns, and the Vickers machine guns in three divisions and nine light-infantry battalions with the 1903 rifle, the Browning automatic rifle, and the M1919A4 machine gun, respectively. The changeover was effected in two of the three divisions prior to the final battle.

The advent of the U.S. light machine gun served to bring about a reorganization of the machine-gun establishment, not only in the three divisions to be U.S.-equipped but the five British-equipped divisions as well. The division machine-gun company was replaced by a four-gun platoon in each infantry battalion. This increased the machine guns in the division from an entirely inadequate 16 to 36, and placed them organically at the level of their normal employment.
To meet the need for a direct-fire weapon suitable for attacking covered emplacements, two new weapons were introduced in July, 1949—the 2.36 rocket launcher and the 75-mm. recoilless rifle. Rocket-launcher teams were organized on the basis of nine per division, and a mule-transported recoilless-rifle company was formed. The latter was to be assigned to the highest commander in the battle area, who could reassign its elements in accordance with the tactical plan and the nature of the enemy fortifications. The early collapse of the guerrillas did not permit full evaluation of the usefulness of these weapons.

When the decision was reached to re-equip three divisions with U.S. arms, it was also decided to re-equip the commandos. Prior to that date, they had been equipped with the .303 rifle, a high ratio of Bren guns, and submachine guns, but no machine guns. In this case, the M1 rifle rather than the Springfield replaced the .303. Each group received 58 Browning automatic rifles to replace a like number of Bren guns, and Bren guns on hand in excess of this number were retained. Five 2.36 rocket launchers were issued for a group machine-gun platoon. The conversion of the commando units was accomplished quickly, and all five groups were re-equipped prior to the final campaign.

A comparison between the total numbers of guerrilla and government weapons has no more significance than a comparison between the total personnel strengths of the respective forces. In the early stages of the war, the guerrilla, man for man, was as well-armed as the soldier of the National Army. An army unit had no advantage in firepower over a guerrilla unit of equal size, except when the former had the benefit of artillery and air support.

That the guerrillas recognized their weakness vis-à-vis the artillery of the army is attested by their efforts, between their defeat in the Grammos in 1948 and the final campaign, to build up an artillery arm in the base areas, particularly Vitsi, which they occupied the longest. Artillery pieces of various types were obtained, but the guerrillas were unable to constitute an effective artillery arm. Their failure may be attributed to a lack of artillery know-how; to the action of the air force in seeking out and
destroying gun positions; and to inability to obtain adequate supplies of artillery ammunition.

III.

The term "combat efficiency" as used here embraces such factors as training, command and staff functioning, discipline, and morale.

Any judgment on the training of the Democratic Army depends upon the frame of reference. By orthodox standards, it was deficient in almost every respect. Obviously, however, such standards are not appropriate. Guerrilla warfare has been little rationalized by the armies of duly established governments. For example, until recently the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations devoted only eight paragraphs to the subject. Historically, guerrilla warfare has been a practical art largely rebuilt from the ground up wherever the need for it arose. In recent years, it has been embraced by international Communism as a tactic of revolution, and the employment of partisan warfare by the forces of international Communism will in time foster more effective anti-guerrilla doctrine.

In Greece, the Democratic Army did not have to start from the beginning in the development of its tactics. It was able to draw upon a vast reservoir of practical experience. Many of its leaders had served with ELAS during the occupation, but a higher standard of partisan warfare had been developed under Tito in Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav Army had many expert partisan warriors. The guerrillas of Greece benefited from their experience.

Evidence was presented to the United Nations Commission Concerning Frontier Incidents that men picked from the refugees who fled across the border following the abortive revolution in Greece were trained in guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia and Albania. In Yugoslavia, Slavic-speaking Greeks were attached directly to the army for training. The Commission examined copies of military manuals in the Greek language used for theoretical and practical training in guerrilla warfare in both Yugoslavia and Albania. Finally, it was reported that prior to the formation of
the Government of Free Greece, General Nadj, a Yugoslav expert in guerrilla warfare, directed guerrilla operations from Skopje.

Guerrilla leaders, then, were not without theoretical training in guerrilla warfare, but there were few theorists among them. They were practical soldiers selected for their ability to get things done. Failure was accepted as evidence of incompetence and the leader who failed was replaced. The tempo of operations was such that an incompetent leader was soon exposed.

If the leaders were qualified by training and experience in guerrilla warfare, they were less so for orthodox warfare. The evolution toward a strategy that depended upon the formation of larger units and upon the adoption of conventional military tactics tended to deprive the Democratic Army of leadership adequate to its requirements.

The training of the fighters varied widely. Some were as well qualified as regards training as the leaders; that is, experience in ELAS, training in the satellites, and experience in the field. Others fell far short of this, particularly toward the end of the war. Training in the satellites was continued for new recruits, but the journey there was long and oftentimes impracticable. Thus training was given locally in loosely organized training centers, and some recruits received their only training in the bands themselves. This training was minimal, ranging downward from two months to almost nothing. For example, recruits taken at Karditsa were given only fifteen days' training prior to their participation in the attack on Karpension. Since much of the time was devoted to political indoctrination, military training could have included little more than the elements of fieldcraft and basic weapons instruction. Perhaps the best and most extensive training came from association with veterans on the job. The guerrilla who survived became battle-wise.

If the impression has been created that the policy and strategy of the Communists was firm and steadfast at all times, it has been unintentional. While a detailed analysis of guerrilla leadership and guerrilla morale is scarcely practicable, some indication of the confusion that beset the guerrillas' efforts can be given.

The great mass of the guerrillas were carried along by the
leaders and by a deluge of propaganda concealing adverse developments or rationalizing them in the light of the Party line.

There were two orders of morale among the guerrillas. The first was the morale of the hard-core Communists. Initially, a high proportion of the guerrillas were of this cast, but with the increase of forced recruiting, a morale problem arose. The morale of the forced recruit, while not necessarily low, was of a different order. It depended upon the amount of his political indoctrination. When possible, the new recruit was sent across the borders for indoctrination. When this could not be done, his indoctrination was carried out in Greece. This training being incomplete, continuous propaganda had to be carried on within the bands in order to keep up morale. More time was spent in this type of activity than in military training. A good percentage of forced recruits responded favorably to indoctrination, but few became zealots.

Beginning early in 1949, the opportunities for the indoctrination of recruits decreased sharply because of the increasing aggressiveness of the army, which kept guerrilla units on the move. The new, limited training was scarcely adequate to convert a forced recruit into a hardened guerrilla who could endure the rigors of guerrilla life without complaint. As 1949 wore on, the leaders had more and more difficulty in maintaining morale. By July, probably the majority of the 18,500 guerrillas would have surrendered if given a chance; and by the time of the Vitsi and Grammos battles, guerrilla morale was at the lowest ebb since the start of the war.

Those who are inclined to regard the Greek Army with intolerance for its early showing in the antiguerilla war would do well to turn back the pages to the year 1940. The results attained in six months of combat with the Italian Army afford a striking manifestation of combat efficiency. Factors that went into it were:

- A well-trained regular army as a nucleus for expansion.
- Trained reserves.
- Competent commanders and staff officers.
- High national morale, universal and unstinting public support, and outstanding combat esprit.
These factors were dissipated in the period between the Greco-Italian war and the war with the guerrillas.

From April, 1941, to the summer of 1945, the Greek Army (for all practical purposes) was nonexistent, and during this time much of its know-how was lost.

An army dissolved for four years is not rebuilt in a day, and efforts started in 1945 did not progress rapidly. Training proceeded slowly, and the guerrilla activity of the fall of 1946 found an army unprepared for active operations.

In April, 1947, the army started its first large-scale offensive, and from that time onward, its units were so engaged that training was thought to be impracticable. Moreover, on the part of officers who had long been deprived of command responsibility or who had it thrust upon them without adequate preparation, there was a lack of appreciation of the importance of training, particularly in the units. There was a tendency to feel that training within a unit which had already seen active combat entailed a loss of face for the unit and its personnel.

It may be said, then, that the level of training in the army never exceeded individual training; and that as the older reserves were replaced, the level of individual training was becoming less satisfactory. In view of this, interest developed in the previously neglected field of unit training.

This survey gives an indication of the state of training, which was reflected in the army’s combat efficiency. It would be incorrect to leave the impression that the limited ventures in unit and field training during the last year of the war made a significant contribution to victory. Infantry still performed less efficiently than could be desired at the attack in Vitsi in August, 1949. However, the efforts were of value.

As the army enjoyed a superiority of 10 to 1 in men and matériel, its prolonged inability to eliminate the guerrillas raises a question as to the quality of its direction. Was the ineffectiveness of the army the result of failure of commanders to employ effectively the forces placed at their disposal? Did the absence of effective leadership prolong the war? To some extent, these questions must be answered in the affirmative. A lack of competent and aggressive commanders plagued the army in 1947 and 1948.
A comparatively low standard of professional training was not the only cause of command failures. Important too were a certain lack of discipline and the absence of a strong “will to fight.”

In some countries, effective constitutional barriers have been established between military power and domestic politics. Others have been less successful in this respect. Greece has been among the latter. Personal relationships between individual military officers and political leaders were not uncommon, and many military officers had channels by-passing the army command and the War Ministry through which they could reach the government. Moreover, the army command, which owed its tenure to the government, could not disregard the wishes of the political figures who made it up. Thus, the military command’s control over the army tended to be circumscribed by political considerations.

These nonmilitary influences affected army efficiency during the early stages of the anti-bandit war. Incompetent officers could not be discharged without governmental action, and this was difficult to obtain. Attempts to remove officers were projected into the realm of politics, where they were not susceptible of a sound solution. The inability of the army to remove incompetent and insubordinate officers tended to destroy respect for authority. Subordinate commanders occasionally disregarded orders, confident that no great misfortune would accrue to them through their failure to obey. To the habit of half-measures in the execution of field orders, which prevailed in 1947 and 1948, may be attributed some of the army’s lack of success.

Another factor that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the army, along with the state of its training and deficiencies in the professional qualifications of its officer corps, in the earlier effort, was the lack of a strong “will to fight.” This lack of offensive spirit, which was compounded of many elements, fed upon itself. Prolonged lack of success developed a sense of frustration and futility. The army came to believe that it was engaged in a Sisyphean task. The same operations were repeated again and again, and there was no end in sight. What was the good of sacrificing men and effort in a bold attack to seize an objective, when it was certain that the same objective would have to be taken again next month or next year? This feeling of hopelessness
reached its nadir when thoughts of victory, engendered by the early success of the 1948 campaign, were dashed to the ground by the guerrilla defense of the Vitsi area. Another year of war had passed and the end was no nearer. The situation appeared no better than at the start of the campaign.

This malignancy received nourishment from other sources. Among them was the lack of discipline. The habit of questioning orders, which was mentioned earlier, affected the army's confidence in its command and leadership. A spirit of indecision was fostered, which militated against decisive action. To take decisive action involves the acceptance of risks. A miscalculation may result in failure and censure. Since the bandits seldom attacked a large military formation, a commander who temporized reduced his chances of making an error. The inaction of a commander might have disastrous effects upon a campaign, but if there were no errors of commission on his part, it was difficult to proceed against him. Consequently, the commanders sometimes showed a tendency to wait for the guerrillas to call the cues. Failure to take the initiative produced fear of the enemy's capabilities and weakened confidence on the part of the army as to its own capabilities. This lack of complete self-confidence led the army to waver in its belief of ultimate victory.

This weakening of confidence in ultimate victory was not confined to the narrow field of military operations. It extended into the wider field where the objective was the establishment of security and economic well-being for the people of Greece. The Communists had succeeded in creating a situation under which the government's effectiveness was hampered. If the government was incapable of consolidating such gains as the army might make, why go on with it? Why make fruitless sacrifices? Why not "peace at any price" now, instead of later?

The soldier who had less than confidence in the ultimate outcome had personal grievances that reduced his offensive spirit. The original call-ups were reservists of the older classes who fought in the war with Italy. As there was for a long time no replacement program, these men had no prospect of relief—only a vista of a succession of military operations until they stopped a bullet or stepped on a mine. Quite apart from the soldier's feeling
that he was being called upon to risk life and limb while younger men watched from the side lines was his concern for his family. Many of these older men were married and their pay was so low that their families lived on the verge of starvation.

Finally, there were some active Communists in the army and a widespread tolerance of varying degrees of Communist ideologies. Economic conditions in Greece produced many dissatisfied citizens. Communist teachings, once driven underground by Metaxas, gained considerable currency during the occupation and resistance. Many soldiers and even officers were mildly tolerant of Communist ideologies and possibly even sympathetic toward the guerrilla cause. To evaluate this factor one must recall that the issue between Soviet expansionist Communism and democracy had not been clearly defined. By gaining control of the resistance movement during World War II, the Communists had identified themselves with the defense of Greece. Thus they had gained as adherents many patriotic Greeks. It would take time for them to recognize the changed situation—that the guerrillas no longer fought for Greece and freedom, but for the Kremlin and slavery.

The weakened offensive spirit, product of these many factors, manifested itself in commanders in a disinclination to come to real grips with the enemy. In the soldier, it resulted in the degeneration of the battle into a protracted long-range fire fight from which the guerrilla was able to disengage at will. There was no real effort to close with him to secure his destruction. The net result was indecisive action.

Efforts made by the British and American missions prior to 1949 to persuade the government to give the army a free rein in the conduct of operations, and to encourage the army to take more aggressive action, were not too productive. It was not until the dark weeks of the Vitsi stalemate of 1948, when national morale dropped to an all-time low, that the government took a substantial step to improve the situation. In October, Prime Minister Sophoullis wrote General Alexander Papagos proposing that he accept supreme command of the Greek land forces.

General Papagos, although holding an honorary appointment in the Court, was in military retirement at the time. Prior to World War II, he had been Chief of the Army General Staff.
Upon Greece's involvement in that war, he became Commander in Chief of the Army. In this capacity, he had directed the army in the war against Italy. The German occupation of Greece and his imprisonment in Germany deprived the General, until a later date, of a full measure of recognition for this service. Nevertheless, his military reputation was established and he was universally respected as a patriot.

General Papagos did not immediately accept the government's proposal. He replied that he could do so only if certain conditions were accepted by the government. These provisions included, among other things, the establishment of his jurisdiction as Commander in Chief with power to direct operations, to decide all matters pertaining to military organization, and to post and transfer officers. He was to have the right to recall to active duty any retired officer, whereas no retired officers were to be recalled without his approval. The government, after long debate, accepted these provisions.

The instances where it is possible to put a finger on leadership and its value in a crisis are rarer than military histories would have us believe, the role of the commander is often exaggerated. But Papagos had qualifications that were needed at this time. Having refused to accept the post as Commander in Chief until far-reaching commitments as to his authority had been made, he was in a position to exert a firm direction on the conduct of military operations. Such direction was needed at this time to exploit fully the many favorable factors in the situation that had been created by U.S. assistance, the falling out of Tito and the Cominform, and the increasing recognition of the true nature of the guerrilla war in Greece.

No development could have been more fortuitous than the appointment of Papagos. Improvements in the effectiveness of the army were already under way and the beginnings of decisive action were noticeable. However, it was Papagos who consolidated these gains and brought the army to the fruition of its potentialities. He restored discipline in the army by the ruthless removal of unsuitable officers. He stressed aggressive action and ordered the Greek Armed Forces into a series of offensive operations which deprived the guerrilla of the initiative and afforded
him no respite. He gave the guerrillas no opportunity to recruit replacements for their increasing battle casualties, but harried them until they were driven from Greece.

Under Papagos, the army was galvanized into action. Its manpower was not increased, its training was not greatly improved, and there was no significant increase in its equipment. The army was simply made to do what it was capable of doing, and no more than this was then needed to gain the victory. Seven months after the appointment of Papagos as Commander in Chief, the war was at an end.

Through the appointment of Papagos, the advisory functions of the U.S. and British Military Missions came into their own as a means of increasing the efficiency of the army. The missions provided a mechanism by which faults in the army down to division level could be brought to the attention of the Commander in Chief, along with impartial advice and recommendations for improvements. The value of the missions depended not only upon their acceptance but upon the ability of the Commander in Chief to implement their recommendations. Papagos had, prior to his appointment, sought to restrict the influence of the missions. However, following his appointment, he gave every indication of appreciating the value of their services. Moreover, unlike his predecessors, he was capable of implementing their recommendations. His success was due in no small part to the manner in which he accepted the advice and recommendations of the U.S. and British missions, and made full use of them.

IV.

Three geographical factors enter prominently into a consideration of the disposition of forces. These are the frontier, the mountains, and the sea. The influence of the sea and its importance as a means of communication are discussed later. The frontier may be regarded as the source of the war as well as the greatest ally of the Democratic Army in prolonging it. The mountains, too, were an asset of inestimable value to the guerrillas. Without them, the war in Greece could scarcely have been sustained.
From the standpoint of the Greeks, defense of the frontier is a Herculean task. From the Adriatic to the Turkish border, the frontier measures more than 700 miles. If Greece's eight wartime divisions were disposed along the border, the average divisional frontage would be nearly 100 miles. But its length is only a part of the problem. The trace of the frontier, running from one end to the other through a maze of mountains, has no defensive strength. To the north lie other mountains, permitting defense on successive positions, but the coastal plain to the south affords no such possibilities. Thus, the historic routes between the Aegean and the central Balkans, which cross the frontier in the valleys of the Strimon and the Axios and at the Monastir Gap, prejudice defense of the frontier from the south far more than from the north. Long and defensively weak, the border is also inaccessible. Except near the routes just named, it is remote and communication with it is almost nonexistent. Orthodox military formations cannot operate there, and mountain units can move and be supplied only with difficulty.

An additional disadvantage to the Greeks in defending the frontier is that the eastward projection has no depth. The seacoast lies only a few miles from the frontier, and in this region, lateral communications on land are limited to one road and one railroad, both vulnerable to attack.

Greece is composed of mountains interspersed with small, intermontane valleys. The Pindus Mountains extend southeastward from the Albanian border 160 miles to the Gulf of Corinth. A southward extension rises in the Peloponnesus. The range varies in width from 40 to 60 miles. Its maximum height is 7,500 feet, and it constitutes a nearly perfect barrier to east-west communication between the Albanian border and the Gulf of Corinth. Metsovan Pass, however, transits the barrier in north-central Greece at an elevation of about 5,000 feet. Ground movement anywhere in the Pindus is limited by deep, narrow valleys having few flood plains.

Another mountain mass, Mounts Vermion-Olympus-Ossa-Pelion, forms a semicircular arc along the western coast of the Aegean south of Salonika. It reaches inland at its southern extremity to join with the Pindus range south of Thessaly Plain. A wide
plateau joins this mass with the Pindus north of the same plain.

Along the northern coast of the Aegean, the Rhodope Mountains extend from Bulgaria into eastern Macedonia and Thrace. Although not as high as the Pindus, this range, too, is steep and rugged.

Because of these mountains and others of lesser significance, movement in Greece is channelized along the few routes following the passes that connect the intermontane valleys. Elsewhere, particularly in the Pindus, great areas can be reached only on foot or by mule. Military formations cannot operate in these areas, and they have traditionally enjoyed considerable freedom from the police power of the various governments that have controlled the territory throughout its complicated history. Many of these areas have been used for generations by bandits as operating bases and sanctuaries.

The first activity of the bands was confined to areas along the northern borders. Here the bands enjoyed a tactical advantage such as is rarely given to any belligerent. They could not be decisively engaged. Whenever they were hard pressed, they simply withdrew across the border.

The Pindus range, between Metsovan and the Gulf of Corinth, and the range between Vermion and Pelion provided perhaps a dozen areas suitable for guerrilla operations. They were protected by their inaccessibility. From them it was possible within a few hours to raid villages on the plains and harass the roads winding through the narrow valleys. Movement from one area to another was comparatively easy, particularly at night. These areas were organized as bases of operations, but the bands were not committed to their defense. They followed guerrilla tactics here, moving from area to area to avoid being engaged.

The establishment of concentrations in south and central Greece involved an additional commitment on the part of the guerrilla high command. A line of communications by which supplies could be forwarded to these concentrations was essential. As the government forces controlled the established routes, the Pindus range was used for this purpose. An area of the northern Pindus had to be secured to protect the point at which supplies could be moved from Albania or Yugoslavia into Greece for for-
warding via the Pindus route. To meet this requirement, the guerrillas committed themselves to the defense of the base areas of Grammos and Vitsi. Although alternates to the Pindus route were sometimes used, this decision remained a keystone of their strategy until the end of the war.

When the base areas were threatened, the guerrillas redoubled their harassing attacks elsewhere to divert government forces from that front. During the 1948 campaign, the greatest effort was made in the Peloponnesus, where there had been little previous activity. Because few government troops were in that area, the guerrillas were very successful. When the army delayed sending reinforcements, several deputies from the Peloponnesus withdrew from the government. The policy of nonreinforcement was followed, however, until the stalemate in Vitsi became winter bound, when an overwhelming force was sent to the Peloponnesus. The guerrillas had grown by that time to a strength of 3,500, but their disposition was unfavorable. The naval patrol in the Gulf of Corinth prevented their escape to the mainland, and the guerrillas in the Peloponnesus were liquidated in early 1949.

The establishment of concentrations in south and central Greece and the base areas in the northern Pindus did not mean that the other areas along the northern frontier were inactivated. On the contrary, perhaps six mountain regions adjacent to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were used intermittently as operating bases, and approximately one-fifth of the total guerrilla strength was disposed there. A great advantage enjoyed by the guerrillas operating in Macedonia and Thrace was their ability to move from area to area under cover of the frontier. Yugoslav occupied a central position in this covered route of communications. The Tito-Cominform rift, therefore, with the resultant closure of the border, was a serious blow as regards the disposition of the guerrillas.

In the 1948 campaign, the guerrillas were able to oppose their main strength to the army first in the Grammos, and subsequently in the Vitsi regions. In 1949, through occupying both areas simultaneously, they allowed their forces to be split. The army conducted its concentration so that the guerrillas were unable to determine where the main effort was to be made. Following a
holding attack in Grammos, the attack was delivered in Vitsi. The operation was completed so quickly that no reinforcement was possible. The Vitsi force was so disorganized and demoralized that it was unable to reinforce the Grammos position. The guerrillas had committed the fatal error of allowing their forces to be divided. They had perhaps anticipated that they would be able to shift forces from one area to the other as they had in 1948. Their inability to do so contributed to their defeat.

As of 1947, the army was organized into an army command and two corps. The former was located at Volos; the latter at Larissa and Salonika, respectively. At this time, four divisions and two independent brigades assigned to one corps were disposed in Thessaly, Epirus, and central Macedonia. Three divisions and one independent brigade assigned to the other corps were located in eastern Macedonia and Thrace, and four independent brigades were disposed in southern Greece and the Peloponnesus. Subsequently a third corps was activated. The assignment of corps areas and the disposition of troops varied thereafter in accordance with operational requirements.

Greece has three major lines of land communications. One parallels the Pindus range on the west to connect the Gulf of Corinth with the Albanian border. A second, passing between the Pindus and the Vermion-Pelion range, connects Attica with Salonika, the Monastir Gap, and the single line of east-west communications. The third follows the north shore of the Aegean paralleling the northern frontier. The majority of the towns are situated on or near these three routes. With the guerrillas exercising a precarious but tenacious control over the mountain areas of the Pindus range, the Vermion-Pelion range, and along the northern borders of Macedonia and Thrace, these routes and the towns scattered along them were extremely vulnerable. From operating bases in the mountains, the guerrillas could readily descend to harass them at any point. The war, therefore, developed as a war without a fixed front.

Owing to the disposition-of-forces factor, the guerrilla had the advantage of good terrain for evasion and for defense. The northern frontier, behind which he was able to conduct all manner of military activity in areas denied to the army, was a particular
advantage. This was canceled in part by Yugoslavia's support following the Tito-Cominform split. Outside the northern base areas, where the army controlled the routes of communication and the guerrillas operated from adjacent and intervening mountain areas, the war developed as a war without a front. Here the army's control of communications gave it strategic flexibility and tactical staying power. Whenever army forces ventured off the established routes, as they had to in order to engage the guerrilla, they found the terrain the greatest obstacle. The guerrilla had superior observation, the ability to execute rapid tactical movements, and the ability to interpose terrain obstacles between himself and the government forces.

The guerrilla's control of communications outside the base areas was of a low order. This influenced adversely his ability to concentrate forces and to supply them, particularly during a protracted engagement. This disadvantage was minimal so long as the Democratic Army conducted guerrilla-type operations using small bands. It grew in significance as the bands formed into battalions, brigades, and divisions.

In each day of combat, the U.S. soldier uses 37 pounds of supplies, including: 6 pounds of rations, 6 pounds of equipment, 5 pounds of fuel and oil, and 20 pounds of ammunition. Had the guerrillas used supplies on a comparable basis, their 25,000 men would have needed 1 million pounds or 409 2½-ton truckloads daily. Needless to say, they did not use supplies on this scale.

The average guerrilla was inured to hardship. His needs were few. He was satisfied with a diet of bread, milk, cheese, lamb, and goat. Such items as salt, sugar, coffee, and tobacco were difficult to come by and were sometimes missing. His equipment comprised boots, clothing, a blanket, a knife or bayonet, and a firearm. Medical supplies, while negligible on a pro rata basis, did in the aggregate constitute a significant quantity. The ammunition carried on the individual was 20-30 rounds, while 200-300 were carried for machine guns. Owing to this low initial allowance and the difficulty of effecting resupply in combat, ammunition was used sparingly. The mine, however, was used extensively.

In considering ammunition requirements, a distinction must be
made between troops operating within the defending base areas and those operating elsewhere. The number of artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns and heavy mortars in the former areas increased requirements there. Omitting this special case, the daily resupply for the average guerrilla did not exceed 5 pounds made up as follows: rations, 3 pounds; equipment, 1 pound; and ammunition, 1 pound—a total of 5 pounds.

The requirement for transport probably varied between 1 and 2 pounds per day for each guerrilla operating in south and central Greece. This seems insignificant, but neither the supplies nor their quantity were insignificant. Without these supplies, which could not be obtained locally, the guerrillas could not function effectively. They were vital, therefore, to guerrilla operations.

Five thousand guerrillas in south and central Greece would have used 50–100 animal loads daily. Taking 120 miles as the average distance from the base areas to the users, the turn-around time was in the neighborhood of two weeks. Thus, 700–1400 animals would have been employed constantly in this traffic, even if no allowance is made for losses in transit. These were actually quite high. Mule trains were intercepted frequently by the air force or army units and damaged or destroyed.

The problems involved in organizing the routing and protection of the supply trains moving between the base areas and the bands in central and southern Greece were many. They were greatest when the army was active. During such times, the bandits were expending more supplies than normally. They were forced to abandon stores that could not be carried. They were unable to requisition supplies in areas through which they might be passing, as this took time and provided information to the army. Similarly, raids upon towns or army stores were impracticable. Finally, the mule trains from the north had greater difficulty in getting through, and not infrequently the bands were unable to keep their rendezvous with such trains. On top of this, greater numbers of casualties required evacuation to the north. On many occasions, bands experienced local and temporary shortages of supply due to these factors. During the 1949 campaign, however, the operations of the army so reduced the effectiveness of the
guerrilla supply system as to render it incapable of meeting the minimum needs of the bands in south and central Greece.

Yugoslavia occupied a key position in the provision of foreign aid to the Greek guerrillas. It had a pivotal position geographically. Bulgaria was remote from the area of greatest guerrilla activity. Yugoslavia lay between Albania and Bulgaria. More than that, it completely surrounded Albania so that the latter had no access to the U.S.S.R. or other satellites except via Yugoslav territory.

As the Grammos area was adjacent to Albania, supplies moved to Greece through this area had to pass through Albania, but this does not mean they had their source there. On the contrary, the greater part came from Yugoslavia. The Vitsi position could be reached from either Albania or Yugoslavia. Prior to January, 1949, the bulk of supplies entering Vitsi came from Yugoslavia. During the month of January, however, supplies from Yugoslavia declined to almost nothing, and virtually all supplies received after that date came from Albania. This, and the low levels in certain classes of supplies found in the Vitsi and Grammos positions after the collapse of the guerrilla defense, suggest that the Tito-Cominform rift so affected the supply situation of the Democratic Army that it was, by the spring of 1949, no longer capable of carrying on operations on the scale of 1947 and 1948. Indeed, this may have been the proximate cause of the guerrilla collapse.

Supplies and equipment were provided the National Army on the basis of authorized tables of equipment. These tables provided few luxuries and were in some cases too spare. The British had been unable to meet all requirements, but the most essential combat supplies and equipment had been provided. With U.S. aid, the army was completely equipped by the middle of 1948. Thereafter, procurement was designed to keep it so equipped and supplied and to meet the requirements caused by increases in the forces or in their allowances. Supply shortages probably never seriously affected the combat efficiency of the army. If so, it was in any case fully equipped and supplied according to the accepted standards by the middle of 1948. Thereafter there were no significant shortages.
V.

Air operations against the guerrillas were of two general types. The first consisted of air operations aimed at "isolation of the battlefield." However, all Greece was a battlefield and the objective of such operations was simply the destruction of guerrilla forces. The second type of air action was direct support of ground troops.

Three techniques were employed in conducting the first type of operations. First, there were preplanned strikes on targets located in advance by ground intelligence or by aerial photography. The second, armed reconnaissance, was normally conducted only when information indicated the probability of finding a profitable target, as when a large enemy formation was known to be on the march in a given locality. The third technique, and the one most commonly employed, was to locate targets by the employment of reconnaissance aircraft. These remained on station until the arrival of strike aircraft to guide them onto the target.

A high percentage of the total air effort went into attacks of this type. They were delivered against troops on the march, in bivouac, or in concentrations for attack or defense. They were delivered against bandit headquarters, bandit-held towns, supply installations, and defensive positions. They tended to restrict daylight movement of guerrillas. They harassed his concentrations and punished his forces during withdrawal from action. The only limiting factors to this independent air campaign were the availability of pilots, suitable aircraft, and the difficulty of target identification. These operations were being conducted over Greece, not hostile territory, and everything that moved could not be attacked. Occasionally, too, army units and harmless noncombatants were attacked, but the number of legitimate targets was great, and a much greater effort in the air to locate and attack such targets would still have paid dividends.

Direct support took many forms. It included command liaison, tactical reconnaissance, air observation, air spot for artillery, aerial photography, aerial resupply, the dropping of propaganda
leaflets, and the attack of targets in conjunction with the ground forces. The last named was, of course, the most important. The importance of direct air support was enhanced by the limited allocation of artillery and mortars, by the nature of the terrain, which often prevented the employment of artillery, and by the fact that the bandits did not stand their ground, but sought to withdraw from action by movement. The provision of mountain artillery improved fire support in mountain operations, but there persisted in Greece a need for “flying artillery” such as seldom has been experienced elsewhere. Given properly trained pilots, suitable aircraft, air-ground coordination, and communications, the opportunities for profitable employment of aircraft in direct support would have been myriad.

The record of Royal Hellenic Air Force operations during the war leads to the conclusion that the return from the air effort immeasurably exceeded the return from any comparable effort on the ground. Its manpower cost ranged from a minimum of 5,000 to a maximum of 7,500, as compared to a minimum of 120,000 and a maximum of 150,000 in regular army units alone. Moreover, casualties sustained in the air were infinitesimal as compared with those sustained on the ground.

The financial cost of air operations in Greece cannot be regarded as representative of the cost of such operations generally, since low-cost surplus aircraft and equipment were employed. Thereby, the cost of air operations was only a fraction of the cost of ground operations, probably less than 10 per cent.

The commando groups had been organized as antiguerrilla forces. They were employed, however, in actions that scarcely justified the maintenance of special units. The British Military Mission advocated that they be reorganized as pursuit forces to range widely and rapidly through the mountainous country in pursuit of the elusive guerrilla. They were to be air supported, air supplied, and, insofar as practicable, airborne and air transported.

The union of the capabilities of tactical air with those of the raiding forces would have multiplied their effectiveness. Such a union might well have produced the most effective synthesis of
means for conducting nearly all phases of the antiguerilla war, except the deliberate attack of fortified areas.

There was a significant failure to visualize the possibilities that lay in fuller exploitation of the greatest weakness of the guerrilla—his lack of air capability and any positive means to combat it. Faulty techniques were endured because of this failure as were also poor maintenance, the continued use of aircraft of limited suitability, and all the other factors that robbed Greece of a full return on its investment in the air. It was this failure, too, which prevented the allocation to the air of a greater portion of the total effort.

There was no war at sea during the guerrilla uprising. However, no corresponding number of men contributed more to the ultimate victory than those of the Royal Hellenic Navy. Its role was not a dramatic one. On an average of about four times a week, ships were called upon to deliver gunfire ashore to assist in the defense of a beleaguered coastal village or to support an army unit operating near the coast. Ofttimes guerrillas would steal or capture a caïque, and it would be necessary for the navy to go in pursuit of it. Sometimes a naval landing party would be put ashore to investigate reported guerrilla activity. Frequently, army raiding parties were embarked and landed to make such searches or to make ancillary landings in conjunction with larger operations ashore. On one occasion, the navy was called upon to participate in a large-scale amphibious landing. The day-to-day duties of the RHIN were the patrolling of Greek waters and the provision of sea transport for the movement of troops and supplies. Thus the navy maintained control of the seas surrounding Greece, denying those waters to the guerrillas. By providing sea transport, it assisted in the full exploitation of the advantages that accrued to the government through its command of the sea.

It may be said that the factor of command of the sea has been assigned too much importance, since the guerrillas had no naval capability. True, but it was because that capability was denied them by the navy. Save for the navy, the guerrillas could have gained and exercised a limited control of the sea lanes. That they could get possession of any of the hundreds of caïques which ply the waters surrounding Greece was often demonstrated. Had
they been able to operate those vessels, the course of the war would have been very different. Instances of attempts to use vessels from Albania for supply purposes occurred in the Peloponnesus in September, 1948. Had there been no restraining influence in the form of a Greek Navy, it is even possible that armed vessels might have found their way into guerrilla hands.

Patrolling was carried out to enforce shipping and sailing regulations, and suspicious vessels were taken into custody for investigation.

Some of the specific objectives of patrolling directed against the guerrillas were: (1) preventing escape, (2) preventing reinforcement, (3) preventing resupply, (4) preventing reinestation of cleared areas, (5) isolating guerrilla concentrations, (6) keeping the Communist virus from spreading to areas that had not been affected previously, by preventing the movement of agents and organizers, and (7) guarding the islands around Greece on which prisoners of war were interned.

On the political, psychological, and economic fronts, factors that contributed to the defeat of the guerrillas were:

*The British and U.S. programs of aid to Greece.* The presence of British troops in Greece at the onset of guerrilla operations exercised a restraining influence on the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, preventing direct intervention in Greece and open aid to the guerrillas. U.S. participation strengthened this restraining influence. The British and American aid programs sustained the government of Greece and enabled it to mobilize, equip, and supply large military forces, while at the same time staving off the collapse of the national economy.

American interest, moreover, tended to fill the vacuum when the U.K. alone could no longer provide support on the required scale. American assistance was provided on such a scale as to improve the morale of the Greek nation by giving it hope that peace might be restored and that a degree of economic stability might once again be achieved.

*The Tito-Cominform rift.* Yugoslavia held a pivotal geographical position among the three satellite countries along Greece’s northern frontier. Yugoslav Communism quite naturally, there-
fore, had taken the lead in the Cominform-directed aggression against Greece. The Tito-Cominform rift broke down the mechanism established to provide support to the guerrillas and resulted in a division within the leadership of the guerrillas. Although this division was resolved in favor of the Cominform, the rift tended to deprive the guerrilla movement of the conviction of immediate purposefulness. Moreover, the establishment of a new mechanism for providing assistance to the guerrillas was scarcely practicable, owing to the key geographical position of Yugoslavia. The full implications of the Tito-Cominform rift were not felt immediately, but were experienced progressively from the fall of 1948 until July, 1949, at which time the Greek-Yugoslav border was closed by order of Tito.

The Tito-Cominform rift was, to some extent, a product of British and American aid to Greece. Had Tito felt that the guerrillas could win in Greece with attendant encirclement of Yugoslavia by Communist governments, it is doubtful that he would have had the courage to stand his ground in the dispute with the Cominform. Thus the Tito-Cominform rift which aided Greece in the anti-bandit war was itself, to a certain extent, a by-product of British and American aid, particularly the latter.

On the military front, factors contributing to the defeat of the guerrillas were:

The appointment of General Papagos as Commander in Chief of the government forces. The appointment of General Papagos resulted in the fuller development of the combat potential of the Greek Armed Forces. By the relief and dismissal of unsuitable commanders and by emphasizing continuous, aggressive offensive operations against the guerrillas, General Papagos used the existing military forces more effectively. There was no increase in the numerical strength of the armed forces during his tenure. It was simply that the forces, as they existed, were used more effectively. Continuous pressure kept the guerrillas on the move, inflicted heavy casualties, and afforded them no opportunity to resupply or replace casualties. Thus, their relative combat power gradually declined during the six-month period that preceded their final collapse.
The Papagos appointment brought the planning and advisory function of the U.S. and British Military Missions into their own as factors contributing to the victory.

The Tito-Cominform rift. The Tito-Cominform rift reduced the amount of military aid available to the guerrillas. By January, 1949, supplies furnished through Yugoslavia had fallen off to a mere trickle. There are indications that small-arms and artillery ammunition may have gone into short supply prior to the final collapse of the guerrilla operations. The final blow to the guerrillas as a result of this rift was the closing of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier in July, 1949. This deprived the guerrillas of the effective use of approximately 30 per cent of their fighters and denied them the use of the regions north of the frontier as a protected maneuver area. Supply shortages and manpower losses resulting from the Tito-Cominform rift may justify its identification as the proximate cause of the guerrilla collapse.

The partial abandonment of guerrilla tactics by the Democratic Army. The tendency of the Democratic Army during 1948 and 1949 toward a military strategy that depended for its success upon the organization of larger formations and the employment of orthodox military tactics implied a growing reliance upon military force alone. Under the existing conditions, any such development played into the hands of the government forces. The guerrillas were opposing weakness to strength. The decisive defeat of the guerrillas was made possible by their departure from proper guerrilla organization and tactics in their effort to defend the base areas along the northern frontier and the gathering of their one-time small bands into larger formations ranging in size up to the division.
III

WINNING IN THE JUNGLE—MALAYA

Victory in Malaya
Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans, MBE

“Never in the history of warfare have so few been chased so much by so many” might well sum up the completely successful British antiterrorist campaign in Malaya. But the jungle is the great equalizer, and as usually happens, combat came down to man-to-man in the infantry, in what at times was an almost microscopic war.

Lieutenant Colonel Mans fought that war against the terrorists, the leeches, and the jungle from 1953 to 1956. He was a rifle-company commander of the First Battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment, for more than a year later, he served on the Headquarters Staff of the famed Seventeenth Gurkha Division. From that experience, he presents here two pictures: the high-level overview of deploying units, and the small-unit view of individual men at war. There are lessons in each. It must be understood that these are Lieutenant Colonel Mans’s own opinions and in no way should be construed as representing his government’s views.
Victory in Malaya

Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans

I.

The emphasis being placed on guerrilla warfare at the present time by the armed forces of the United States has stimulated considerable study of antiguerrilla campaigns fought in recent times. Prominent among these is the war waged by the British against the Communist terrorists in Malaya. It has been suggested that the tactics employed in Malaya might be equally successful in South Vietnam. Therefore, an examination of how and why the Reds were defeated in Malaya may be of value in planning similar operations in the future.

The Communist movement began in Malaya as far back as 1924, when agents of the Chinese Marxists arrived in the country with the express intention of luring great numbers of Overseas Chinese into the Party. Some initial success was achieved with two Chinese races in particular, the Hakkas and the Hainais; the latter, although they had a monopoly of certain trades in Malaya, such as running eating places and grocery stores, were not much esteemed by their fellow Chinese. The Hainais, however, did constitute the bulk of the domestic servants, especially in European households, and it is interesting that many of those who, prior to 1942, had served senior officials and merchants, later became leaders of the terrorist movement.

With the Malays, the Communists had little success. This courteous, easygoing people found nothing attractive in an ideology that made hard work and sacrifice its basic precepts. The inability to win Malay support was to be a continual stumbling block to the Communists in the years ahead.

In the late 1920's and the 1930's, the Communists in Malaya
and Singapore, with the help of their Soviet and Chinese masters, gradually consolidated their position. The familiar pattern of infiltration into trade unions, encouragement of labor disputes, and the distribution of seditious literature became increasingly apparent. In 1936, the Party promoted a series of strikes in Malaya. At Batu Arang, the country's only coal mine, 6,000 laborers seized the property, and it required a sizable military operation to bring matters under control.

At the outbreak of World War II, the strength of the Malayan Communist Party was 37,000, half of which was in Singapore. At first, in common with their comrades in Britain and France, they did their best to disrupt the British war effort. It was not until Germany attacked Russia, in June, 1941, that they decided to cooperate with the government. However, even then, the policy was one of convenience only, and they stressed their determination to expel the British from Malaya as soon as practicable.

Cooperation meant that selected Party members were trained at No. 101 Special Training School in Singapore, which had been set up early in 1941 by the British Army to give instruction to both soldiers and civilians in irregular warfare against the time when Japan might enter the war. About 200 members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) went through the school, and between the fall of Singapore, in February, 1943, and May, 1943, when the British regained contact with anti-Japanese guerrillas in Malaya, these trainees formed the hard core of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the military side of the MCP resistance movement. Starting in December, 1943, British assistance in the form of liaison teams, arms, food, and equipment was intensified, until by V-J Day, there were more than 4,000 active guerrillas under British command. At the same time, however, unknown to the British, there was another clandestine group of similar strength whose mission was to form the hard core of antigovernment guerrilla forces when a terrorist campaign was launched.

When the MPAJA was disbanded in December, 1945, many of its members responded to the call to hand in arms and ammunition, but large caches of these were hidden in the jungle for use later. During 1946 and 1947, there was much internal dissension
in the MCP. This centered around the controversial figure of Loi Tak, then the Secretary General. An Annamite like Ho Chi Minh, with whom he met often in the 1930's, Loi Tak had for some time been suspected of double-crossing the Party. In March, 1947, when he was due to be interrogated by the Central Committee, he anticipated events and decamped with all the funds. He has never been seen since.

The lack of cohesion in MCP policy in the years immediately following the war, coupled with the remarkable recovery of Malaya during this period, made it obvious to the MCP that it could achieve its aim of a People's Republic only by armed conflict. The MCP was encouraged in these views at the Russian-sponsored meeting of Asian and Australian Communists held in Calcutta in February, 1948. In March of that year, the decision to embark on a terror campaign was made, and by June, arson and murder were widespread. On June 18, the Malayan Government proclaimed a state of emergency, and one of the first "hot" wars of the Cold War had begun.

The MCP was well prepared for battle. It had planned its political and military chain of command some years before, in the waning days of the Japanese war. The jungle organization numbered about 10,000, although accurate figures were impossible to compile. The overwhelming majority were Chinese with only a few Malays and Indians, thus bellying from the start the MCP's claim to be an "all-Malayan" movement. In addition to the force in the jungle, a much greater number of sympathizers remained in the towns and villages. Confident of a quick victory, the MCP started its shooting war.

The terrorist organization had a considerable influence on British deployment during the campaign. Over-all policy was evolved and directed by a Central Committee of twelve members headed by the new Secretary General, Chin Peng. Spencer Chapman, the wartime guerrilla leader, in his book *The Jungle Is Neutral* describes Chin Peng as "Britain's most trusted guerrilla." He very soon became Malaya's most wanted terrorist. Directives from the Central Committee went to the North and South Malayan Bureaus, these in turn passed instructions to the State Committees, and it was at this level that tactical operations were
planned. The State organization was founded on the political framework of the Federation: nine states each with a ruling sultan and a state government, and the two British-administered settlements of Malacca and Penang. The chain of command from the State Committees went through District Committees to Branch Committees. The District and Branch Committees had the task of keeping in day-to-day touch with the Min Yuen, or Masses' Movement, as it is known in Communist China. The Min Yuen was a vast network supplying the terrorists with food, clothing, and medical supplies, as well as providing them with a first-class intelligence system. The exact number of willing, and unwilling, members of this organization will never be known. In his book *Menace in Malaya*, Harry Miller made a conservative estimate of 500,000. Liaison between the terrorists in the jungle and the Min Yuen was maintained by "Masses' Executives," who carried on their everyday business in towns and villages while acting as undercover men for the District Committees. In this way, propaganda could be fed into these communities while, at the same time, the more material means of existence could be smuggled out.

Initially, the MCP tried to keep its political and military organizations separate. Political direction was to be passed down the committee chain and military tasks carried out by the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The MRLA began life with a grandiose battle order of regiments but these gradually dwindled to independent platoons. In later operations, the MRLA was often assisted by Armed Work Forces who were their link with the Min Yuen. As the British gained the initiative in the jungle war, the MCP, like many similar movements before and since, found it impracticable to divorce the political from the military and consequently the two structures quickly intermingled. Quite often State Committee members were also regimental commanders. This fusion became more pronounced as the terrorists' strength was reduced.

On the government side, the day-to-day administration at this time was based on the state governments, which were largely run by Malay officials with British advisers. The state sultans and their governments had a measure of autonomy, but in the final
analysis, they were responsible to the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur.

Initially, the burden of the emergency fell upon the shoulders of the Federation Police. This was a mixed force of some 10,000 men of all ranks—comprising Malays, Chinese, and a few Indians—under British officers. They were not organized for a jungle war in terms of either personnel or equipment, but they bore the brunt of the first shocks in an exemplary manner. It was a special squad of Chinese and Malay detectives that gave the Communist terrorists (or CT's, as they became universally known) their first setback. On July 16, 1948, this squad, led by a British police officer, Bill Stafford, killed Tan Yew, the commander of the MRLA. Much of the credit for weathering the stormy days of 1948 and 1949 must go to the Malayan police.

The army units in Malaya and Singapore were still in the throes of postwar reorganization. The British Gurkha regiments, which were destined to play a decisive part in the war, had only just been re-formed after the division of the original Gurkha brigade between Britain and India when the latter country was granted its independence. Furthermore, although the army set out to give the maximum aid to the Federation Government, it always had to keep an eye on the colony of Singapore, where MCP agents were active among the very large Chinese community.

In the early days of the war, the CT's had considerable success. They concentrated on rubber estates and tin mines with the obvious intention of disrupting Malaya's two basic industries. Their main targets were European planters and managers, together with Chinese and Indian overseers. The Min Yuen gave them up-to-the-minute information on the movements of their intended victims, and providing the murder was carried out expeditiously, there was little chance that the Security Forces would arrive in time. ("Security Forces" was the collective description of all armed antiguerilla agencies.)

The terrorists' task was made much easier at this time by the presence of a very large number of Chinese "squatters" living near the jungle edge. These "squatters" were usually the labor force for adjacent mines and estates and therefore ripe ground for Min Yuen activity. Whether or not the inhabitants wanted to
assist them made little difference to the CT's; after a few well-chosen murder victims had been dispatched, the rest of the community was sufficiently cowed to agree to any demand, especially as the execution was normally by strangulation with a length of piano wire, for bullets were valuable to the CT's and not to be wasted on a few recalcitrants of their own race.

Another noticeable feature of CT tactics in the early days of the campaign was a definite tendency to move about in large bodies of up to 100 in strength. On the rare occasions when security forces contacted these large gangs, numbers of CT's were killed. This gregarious attitude contrasted sharply with methods they adopted later. Many a "Tommy" or "Johnny Gurkha" serving in Malaya in the middle 1950's thought wistfully, after hours of fruitless patrolling, of the days when a contact meant a good scrap with a large gang, instead of a quick shot at a single fleeing figure.

Three major facts became apparent at this time. First, that this was to be a long and arduous campaign, that there was no easy road to success. Second, that it could not be won unless a first-class intelligence organization was built up. Third, and most important, that this was a war the military could not win on its own; the intricate web of civil administration, police, army, and civic leaders had to be woven into a cohesive whole, capable of functioning as a war-winning machine. This concept was expressed in his usual succinct way by General Sir Gerald Templer when he addressed a press conference in London soon after he was appointed High Commissioner for Malaya: "I should like it to be clearly understood that in Malaya we are conducting the campaign against Communism on all fronts. We are fighting not only on the military front, but on the political, social, and economic fronts as well." It was Sir Gerald's predecessor, Sir Henry Gurney, tragically killed by a CT ambush in October, 1951, who first spoke the words that became the slogan of the campaign in Malaya: "This is a war for the hearts and minds of the people."

In 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in Malaya, and although he held that appointment for only just over eighteen months, the plan he conceived during that time laid the foundation for final success.
The Briggs Plan had three main aims:

1. To bring the population, especially the isolated sections, under effective administration and protection. This included the resettlement of "squatter" communities.
2. Concurrently to expand the police and local-defense forces.
3. To establish a unified civilian, police, and military system of command and control for all antiterrorist operations.

The resettlement plan involved the transfer of more than half a million people, but its worth was underlined by the violent reaction of the CT’s; they used every means to delay and hinder its operation. That the Communists in Southeast Asia realize the adverse effect that resettlement can have on their strategy is highlighted by their determined efforts to interfere with the Agroville scheme in South Vietnam. In August, 1961, the government of South Vietnam, commenting on the Communist plan of campaign in their country, stated that from 1958 on subversive and violent action was employed with the aim of disrupting rural deployment measures and creating insecurity in the countryside.

In Malaya, the resettlement of large numbers of Chinese into protected villages had a twofold effect. It made the CT’s come to well-defined areas to collect food and supplies and thus expose themselves to Security Force ambushes; furthermore, it raised the morale of the "new villagers" by giving them better living conditions. Showing them the tangible evidence of what democracy had to offer was also instrumental in oiling the wheels of the intelligence machine. Contented citizens are more likely to cooperate with the forces of law and order than discontented ones.

It was obvious that if Communist attempts to break down the resettlement plan were to be defeated, the new villages must have the means to resist attack until reinforcements arrived. This meant a considerable expansion of the police force in order to provide permanent resident defense groups. Gradually, their protective duties were taken over by Home Guard units formed by the villagers themselves. As the war against the terrorists progressed, these Home Guards took a more and more prominent part in offensive operations; there was a good deal of intervillage rivalry
over the comparative efficiency of their respective units. Much of the credit for the performance of the Home Guards must go to the many army and police units who provided instructors for them.

General Briggs appreciated that a policy of resettlement and protection of those resettled would not succeed unless the operational machinery for prosecuting the war was properly geared to take full advantage of the dividends from such a policy. He concluded that war by committee, although it is an anathema to most soldiers, was the only sure way of coordinating both planning and operations. He therefore created War Executive Committees at state and district levels. To initiate policy, he set up a War Council, consisting of himself and the separate heads of the civil administration, police, army, and air force. Control at the highest level was centralized further when General Sir Gerald Templer assumed the appointments of both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, in February, 1952. He amalgamated the Federal Executive Council with the War Council, stating at the time: “There can be but one instrument of policy at Federation [national] level.”

Early in the campaign, it was decided to organize the intelligence agencies around the police rather than the army. This capitalized on the static nature of police deployment, which enables the police to build up the intelligence picture in one area over a long period. The agency responsible for collecting, collating, and disseminating intelligence was the Special Branch of the Federation Police. Special Branch officers were located at the federal, state, and district levels. Liaison between them and army units working in their areas was carried out by Military Intelligence Officers (MIO’s). MIO’s worked alongside Special Branch officers in the same office and in many cases carried out each other’s duties in an emergency. Gradually, this system provided an ever-increasing flow of information for the Security Forces. As the war progressed, military commanders in Malaya came to have more and more respect and admiration for the work of the Special Branch. Some of the most devoted officers in this service were the Chinese inspectors who functioned mostly at district
level and thus ran a daily risk of death at the hands of their terrorist fellow countrymen.

The build-up of police and local-defense forces under the Briggs Plan enabled the Army to concentrate on offensive tasks. A *sine qua non* for the success of such operations was that commanders at all levels as well as troops had to know intimately the particular area in which they hunted. This was proved time and time again when otherwise efficient units were introduced to a strange sector where they were unfamiliar with the terrain and the habits of the local CT’s. From this fact developed the system known as framework deployment.

Framework deployment evolved around the infantry company. A battalion normally covered a district, with its companies occupying definite sectors in the district. Sometimes it was possible to keep one company as a reserve for unforeseen circumstances, but usually districts were so large that reserves could be kept only at higher levels of command. Anyway, the important thing was to have the troops on the ground, where they could take immediate advantage of Special Branch information. Battalion and brigade commanders still retained some inherent flexibility by being able to denude one area of troops temporarily in order to support another where the CT’s were active. However, these reinforcements were often a mixed blessing to the company commander *in situ*; although they reduced the intensity of patrolling for his own platoons, the CT’s, like rabbits, had a habit of going to ground when too many hunters were nearby. I believe that higher commanders must resist a tendency to swamp an area where guerrillas are beginning to move around boldly. The accent should be on normal activity for as long as possible to tempt them to overplay their hand. In the jungle, the sledgehammer has a habit of missing the nut.

I can best illustrate how framework operations were controlled by drawing upon my own experience as a company commander in Malaya in 1954.

My company was deployed in a district of North Johore, and in this case, as our battalion covered three districts, I represented my commanding officer as the military member of the local District War Executive Committee (DWEC). Our committee
was a typical one. The Chairman was the Malay District Officer. The members consisted of the British Adviser to the District Officer, the Senior Police Officer, the District Home Guard Officer, the District Information Officer, three local civilians (one European, one Chinese, and one Malay), and myself. The full committee normally met once weekly but the Operations Subcommittee was often in daily session; this consisted of the District Officer, the Senior Police Officer, and myself, with others called in if necessary. I must stress that whereas we planned as a committee, the day-to-day conduct of operations was a joint military-police responsibility. We ran a joint operations room manned by a mixed team of soldiers and policemen. This was the nerve center of all our work and the control station for our radio communications to army and police patrols. A patrol requiring clearance to pursue CT’s outside its allotted boundaries would get this by a radio message to the joint operations room. In turn, any patrols operating in the vicinity would be quickly warned of the new development. This was vitally necessary if groups were not to clash with each other in the dense jungle, where one shot first and questioned afterward.

Most of our work was routine and mundane, to the extent that jungle patrolling can ever qualify for either of those descriptions. We followed up Special Branch information and we played our own hunches. There were few spectacular successes, but we kept the terrorists on the move, constantly harrying them and doing all in our power to starve them out of the jungle.

The most successful operations in Malaya were those aimed at denying any form of food supplies to the CT’s. They were usually conceived at state level and planned in detail by the district concerned. Such operations went on for a considerable time, three to four months in many instances.

The decision to strike at a certain area had to be taken in the greatest secrecy for it entailed attacking not only the stomachs of the CT’s but also those of their potential suppliers in the villages. Rationing was stringently enforced, even to the extent of insisting that all cans should be pierced by their purchasers before leaving a shop to prevent their being put into food dumps for terrorists. In a food-denial operation, the innocent suffered
with the guilty, but to make exceptions was an invitation to failure.

As their food caches were reduced, the CT's grew more and more desperate. They took risks that exposed them to Security Force retaliation. Information began to flow, and for the army, life became truly hectic. Ambushes and patrols were the order of the day. The strain on junior commanders was considerable. A spoiled ambush meant not only the escape of terrorists but a great loss of prestige in the district. Loyal citizens were prepared to undergo hardship and near starvation if they saw the tangible signs of success, but they were not so eager if the army and the police failed when the opportunity arose. I well remember one occasion when a careless movement by one tired man caused an ambush to be sprung prematurely, after twenty-eight days of waiting for a CT courier to pass along a track. The unfortunate soldier was not allowed to forget his lapse easily.

Lack of food often forced a CT to surrender. He would slip away from a gang in which he had spent many years and make his way to the road to give himself up to a passing planter or the nearest police post. In his book Red Shadow over Malaya, Brigadier Hen比利ker recounts how one CT managed to appear just at the moment that Vice-President Nixon arrived at a village police post during his visit to Malaya in 1953. The Vice-President was assured that not even the British Army would have tried to "arrange" a sideshow like that!

The mentality of a surrendered terrorist in Malaya was curious. Within minutes of giving himself up, he was quite prepared to lead Security Force patrols to his recent hideout and watch calmly while they attacked and killed his erstwhile comrades. I closely questioned one on the subject and he said with brutal frankness that when one realizes that the Cause has failed, why waste time holding inquests? Espouse the winning side as quickly as possible without further recrimination or regret. This truly evidences an ability to pull a bamboo curtain down over the mind; but it is also a trait of fatalism that we should exploit to the utmost when fighting Oriental terrorists.

The full effects of food denial and the consequent CT losses by death and surrender were constantly made known to the
remainder by the long arm of psychological warfare. "Loud Mouth" aircraft fitted with powerful loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio broadcasts were all used to make certain that those who had escaped so far were made fully cognizant of the perils to come and of the very simple alternative—surrender. On one occasion, I took part in a novel type of operation in which the CT's were assured by all available means that there would be no shooting in a certain area for three days in order to allow them to surrender without danger. There was much wagging of heads by the pessimists, but we got three surrenders and these were directly responsible for the elimination of four more CT's. The troops thought this a very good dividend for three days' rest.

In the latter stages of the campaign, bombing of terrorist camps achieved some very conspicuous successes, but it was in the realm of air transport and air supply that the air force really made its name in Malaya.

The ability of Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force pilots to drop supplies in the jungle with pinpoint accuracy meant that patrols could continue to operate as long as there were terrorists to follow. Your logistic "tail" was not a fixed base on the ground but an aircraft that could appear over you at any given time and drop the wherewithal to fight and live. I recall being away from base for about six weeks and receiving air supply drops every four days, as regularly as clockwork, with an occasional map "fix" thrown in by a friendly pilot when I was none too sure of our exact location.

The helicopter was another winning tool in Malaya. It enabled troops to be put down into clearings in the deep jungle minutes after takeoff from the main base, thereby immensely increasing tactical flexibility. However, the CT's soon grew wary of the whirlybirds, and numerous stratagems had to be evolved in their use. One could no longer try to descend literally on top of a camp, for the CT's heard the helicopters approaching and very quickly dispersed. Therefore, we landed patrols simultaneously in a wide ring around the suspected area, using some of the patrols to provide "stops" while a selected assault party moved in. Many variations of this drill had to be used if we were to get the maximum value from these invaluable S55's and Whirlwinds. The
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first question our soldiers asked when briefed for a deep jungle operation was "Will there be choppers?" The alternative was a wearying approach march, lasting probably days, with anything up to fifty pounds of ammunition, food, and equipment to carry. Properly employed, the helicopter is a battle-winning weapon in antiguerrilla warfare.

Success in Malaya did not come easily. It had to be worked for. Hundreds of man hours of patrolling often producing nothing but frustration—or all might turn on a split-second encounter. Thousands of troops had to be indoctrinated in the art of fighting an elusive enemy and at the same time taught that living in the jungle was no mystery of eating roots and drinking out of bamboo but rather the understanding of an unofficial but well-tried principle of war.

Tactical drills and patrolling techniques were built up gradually from the experiences of many units, especially from those splendid Gurkha battalions that spent more years in Malaya than anyone else, and yet were still hunting CT’s in 1959 with the same zest as they showed at the beginning of the emergency. Their combat experiences, together with those of many others, were tested at the Jungle Warfare Training Center.

To try to summarize all the ingredients of our success in Malaya is extremely difficult, for there were many. Some we discovered early; others took much time and effort to produce. But I believe the following factors were vital:

1. The evolution of a coordinated intelligence network. The existence of an efficient police force was invaluable in this connection, and in countries where the latter does not exist, building one up may have to be the first step in the campaign.

2. The hearts-and-minds campaign to win the support of the people, carried out with enthusiasm by all ranks of the Security Forces. Here it should be remembered that success breeds success. A battalion that eliminated most of the CT’s it encountered had more influence for good on the local population than one that had a series of failures.

3. A well-integrated command system. A real requirement under this heading is tact on the part of the military commander
working with the civil authorities. However, in the final event, he must make it plain that he alone commands and issues orders to his own soldiers.

4. The need to appreciate that this type of politico-military war is a slow business. It took eleven years before Malaya could be officially declared free from the menace of Communist terrorism, and even now a small group of hard-core fanatics still remains on the Malayan-Thai border.

Lastly—and, in my view, most important—success was due to a well-trained Security Force team able to kill and harry their enemy until he was exhausted. They fought their opponent in the jungle and out of it, and beat him.

II.

With the possibility looming that United States forces may find themselves faced with operations in Southeast Asia similar to those the British faced in Malaya—with the aid of Gurkhas, Malays, Fijians, and Africans—it may be of value to pass on some of the fruits of our experience.

As a preamble to any discussion of minor tactics against guerrillas, I must emphasize my belief that troops should never be introduced “cold” to such operations. A carefully coordinated training program, preferably carried out in a comparatively safe area within the country in which they are going to fight, enables them to learn their trade in the right locale and at the same time become thoroughly acclimatized.

In Malaya, all incoming units were initiated into antiguerrilla tactics at the Far East Training Center in Southern Johore. The experience of my own battalion was typical. Our unit advance party, consisting of all the rifle-company commanders and a selection of platoon commanders and noncommissioned officers, was put through a month’s intensive course at the Center, culminating in a strenuous three-day patrol. The training area was usually free of CT’s, but the few who occasionally intruded injected just enough spice into the proceedings to keep everyone on his toes. Our predecessors had in fact killed a CT on their
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final training patrol, thus registering their first success in Malaya while the main body of the battalion was still on the high seas!

The end of advance-party training was timed to coincide with the arrival of the rest of the unit. The company commanders, with their trained assistant instructors, then put their men through the same training program as they themselves had just completed.

During this time, our commanding officer, with his intelligence officer and other headquarters staff, made periodic visits to the unit we were due to relieve. Therefore, by the time the battalion moved upcountry to its operational area, all ranks were acclimatized and had received an elementary but nevertheless essential introduction to antiguerrilla tactics. The polish to the rough article was applied later. At the same time, key personnel had had the opportunity to meet the civilian administrators and police officers with whom they would soon be working; they were also in a position to brief company and platoon commanders on such matters as the terrain in the new area and the habits of local CT’s.

To many, this lengthy preparation may seem an overleisurely approach to war in this modern age. However, in this kind of warfare, a unit’s initial showing has a profound effect, for good or bad, on the enemy’s morale. The better the preparation, the more chance there is of getting the team away to a flying start. Furthermore, an early success can have a sharp effect on a wavering local population. It may well coax information from a loyal but hitherto frightened civilian; and information is the life-blood of the antiguerrilla system, for it leads to that most profitable form of operation—the ambush.

By far the most successful and, in terms of effort, the easiest way to eliminate CT’s was with a well-planned ambush. For this reason, its planning and execution deserve detailed study.

The first essential in the planning of an ambush was information. This was usually supplied by the Special Branch of the Federation Police. It might take the form of a very carefully compiled dossier on the movements and habits of certain local terrorists over a period of months, indicating a rendezvous for a food lift or a meeting at a specified date and time. Alternatively, it could be information of doubtful reliability brought in by an informer in need of cash. Whatever the source, action had to be
taken and taken fast. In Malaya, many false trails were followed and a large number of hours spent in great discomfort before one met with success.

Once the information was received, the next and most difficult task was the reconnaissance of the likely area. Overt inspection usually invited failure; the mere presence of an officer in uniform in a rubber field or near the wire fence of a protected village was sufficient to warn all rubber tappers and other nearby workers that an ambush was in the offing. The word was quickly passed to the local Masses’ Executive, and the proposed food lift or meeting with the terrorists was canceled. Various stratagems had to be adopted to defeat the curious in these circumstances. A brother officer in my battalion, dressed in civilian clothes and carrying a theodolite, once posed as a surveyor of the Public Works Department in order to reconnoiter a difficult ambush site. On another occasion, I had an awkward half-hour in the role of the representative of a company that sold a latex-growth stimulant. While a planter friend kept the Chinese overseer in conversation, I took a surreptitious look around, under the guise of carrying out a seemingly detailed inspection of the nearby rubber trees. Where even serious playacting was too risky, we had to rely on estate maps, aerial photographs—where the jungle canopy permitted these—and, in the final event, local knowledge. We built up our records of local topography by insisting that every patrol commander write a brief report of his patrol in the Company Patrol Log upon his return and, where possible, include rough sketches of the terrain. In this way, we established a good picture of our operational area. When information was “hot” and had to be acted upon immediately, our local knowledge was often the only guide to planning the ambush location.

After reconnaissance, the next step was to determine which kind of ambush would be most suitable. Generally this decision was influenced by three main factors: the type of target, the nature of the terrain, and the time of day, or night, when the trap was likely to be sprung.

The target could usually be classified in one of two broad categories: an individual or a small group of terrorists coming to a meeting, or, alternatively, a much larger body moving in from
the jungle to take a food lift from a protected village. Whereas the small group would probably be handled best by a few picked marksmen, a larger gang necessitated the deployment of a much bigger force in what was known as an area ambush. Because information on the exact number of CT's likely to be involved was often very sketchy, the area ambush was the layout normally employed.

The area ambush consisted of a number of small groups of two or three men deployed so as to cover all possible avenues of escape from the actual CT rendezvous. In thick jungle, these escape routes were limited to paths or game trails, but in a well-kept rubber estate, where the undergrowth was cut short between the lines of trees, considerable ingenuity was required in trying to predict which direction the fleeing CT's would take when fire was opened.

When CT's were suspected of movement into cultivated areas bordering on the jungle, a modification of the area method was
possible. This took the form of laying the ambush from the jungle side, looking into the clearing or plantation. However, this type of plan was suitable only for daylight operations.

Most food lifts took place at night, and the site was nearly always somewhere in the wire perimeter of a protected village. In these cases, the customary procedure was for the ambush party to leave camp after the evening-curfew hour. The men would move straight into their prearranged positions and remain there until the CT’s came. If the mission was abortive, they returned to camp before the curfew was lifted, at dawn. In the latter event, care would be taken to obliterate signs of the occupation against the possibility of having to return to the same spot on several successive nights.

When the information indicated the possibility of a daylight ambush near the jungle edge, the troops would move out ostensibly in another direction, as if proceeding on a routine patrol. Once in the forest, the force moved to an area between 500 and 1,000 yards from the jungle edge and established a temporary base. From here, the commander made a careful and covert reconnaissance, taking care to avoid being seen by rubber tappers or cultivators. Once individual positions had been selected, the first group for duty moved forward and occupied them as silently as possible. In these circumstances, it was always advisable to station in the rear of the ambush party a group whose task it was to look back into the jungle. CT’s had an odd habit of approaching from unexpected directions.

The strain of remaining constantly alert in the hot, humid climate of the jungle is considerable, and this was often accentuated by the proximity of local workers. If they suspected an ambush, Communist sympathizers would suddenly become unusually clumsy and drop their latex buckets with as much clangor as possible. This was a well-known signal indicating that Security Forces were in the vicinity. To sustain split-second reactions by the men, the ambush party had to be relieved fairly frequently; in my company, we usually worked on the principle of two hours on and four hours off. Reliefs would come forward from the jungle base camp, moving silently, having left all their heavy equipment behind. This kind of ambush could be maintained for
up to four or five days, providing sufficient rations had been brought in the first instance. The same method was used when it was suspected that CT’s might return to one of their camps subsequently discovered by us. One such ambush was mounted by a platoon of our battalion for ten days. On the tenth day, CT’s did in fact return to the camp, and just when the platoon commander was waiting for them to come within point-blank range, an overanxious soldier opened fire prematurely and the gang escaped. In the British Army, we have a saying that, expressed in polite terms, states that there is an idiot in every section. In antiguerrilla operations, it is my experience that he usually appears when he is least welcome. We tried to weed ours out in training but the odd one escaped the net in this case.

Any form of ambush, whether it was a special job for a small group of picked marksmen or an area affair involving the best part of a company, merited very careful rehearsal. We would first try to find a piece of ground near the camp that resembled as far as possible the actual ambush site. Groups would then be positioned to work out arcs of fire. If this procedure was not feasible, the plan would be studied from a rough sand model quickly constructed in the camp area. When to open fire was always a tricky problem for ambush commanders, and guidance could be given on this during rehearsals by having other members of the company simulate the approach of a CT gang coming from a number of different directions, thus giving the ambush party an opportunity to gauge both distance and size of targets. If time permitted, this drill was also gone through at night. Night illuminating devices were also tested. Throughout my time in Malaya, we were constantly experimenting with electrically detonated flares to give us precious light at the moment the ambush was sprung. Nowadays, portable infrared devices would be invaluable for this purpose. The Claymore-type weapon would also appear to have a definite place in both the night and day types of ambush.

In our rehearsals, we also paid very careful attention to the drill for placing the men in ambush. It was our rule that after the commander gave a prearranged signal that all positions had been occupied, anyone moving in front of these positions would
be shot. Similarly, the stand-down procedure had to be rehearsed and all signals completely understood. We also practiced a drill for examining the scene of an ambush once it had been sprung. This involved the commander’s detailing a group as a search party. On his order, they would come forward to check dead and wounded CT’s. The rest of the ambush party would cover them in this task.

Lastly, and most important of all, weapons had to be thoroughly tested for accuracy. This was done on the jungle range that a company either inherited or constructed. The jungle range was an improvised but very useful ancillary to every camp. It was usually about 20–30 yards in length, with a sandbagged butt. Targets could be silhouettes representing CT’s fixed in a stationary position or moving on an extemporized pulley system. Weapons were tested here from positions identical with those normally found in ambushes, i.e., around trees, over logs, and poking through jungle undergrowth. This was also the time to ensure that weapons were functioning correctly.

After the rehearsal, all that remained was the final check. This had to be meticulous. Any equipment that rattled had to be removed or fixed with adhesive tape, hair cream was washed off as this could be smelled by the CT’s, and black greasepaint was applied to all exposed parts of the body. Officers then inspected once again for those small but telling details that so often meant the difference between success and failure. Describing these and other preparations that his battalion made before an ambush, the late Richard Miers, in his book Shoot to Kill, summarizes them as follows: “Overelaborate preparations for such a miserable enemy? Not on your life. After living for so long like hunted animals the terrorists had acquired an instinct for danger and a speed of reaction to it which were little short of the uncanny. At the slightest hint of trouble they were off—slipping and twisting through the undergrowth like some unearthly djins.”

Thus prepared, the ambush party would move out. The troops appreciated that the chances of success hung on a slender thread; they knew that if they were unsuccessful, more information would have to be sought, and even if they killed or captured CT’s, a follow-up would probably result. In both cases, they
would be faced with the more formidable kind of antiguerilla operation—jungle patrolling.

Whereas the ambush on information was a comparatively easy method of eliminating those CT’s such as District and Branch Committee members, who habitually worked near protected villages and estates, the hard core of the movement, such as the State Committees and Independent Platoons, seldom ventured out of their deep jungle hideouts. It was therefore necessary to go in and find them, and this required a sound knowledge by all ranks of the art of jungle patrolling.

I think I can best illustrate the various forms of patrolling we adopted by describing one operation in which I was involved that was long enough for us to try out most of our patrolling techniques.

In April, 1944, I was ordered to take a reinforced company of some four platoons into the Tasek Bera area of Pahang in central Malaya to search for and eliminate a well-known CT leader who was believed to have come up from Johore. The Tasek Bera is actually a series of lakes enclosed by vast tracts of swampy belukar jungle. Belukar was not a storybook forest with towering trees under a high canopy of vines and creepers, but a continuous wall of dense swampy undergrowth with cunningly concealed wait-a-bit thorns that seemed fiendishly human in their efforts to delay our progress.

Our main jungle base for this operation was a Malayan police fort established a few months before as part of the plan to wean aborigine people of this region away from the terrorists. These so-called forts were really a collection of bamboo huts surrounded by a barbed wire fence, but they had the priceless asset of an airstrip for light aircraft. On this occasion, I made use of this boon by ferrying in one platoon in Pioneer aircraft, each of which carried four fully equipped soldiers, while I took the remaining three platoons in by march route lasting two days.

We had little or no information except that our target was “somewhere in the Tasek Bera area.” This covered about 80 map squares, each about 1,000 yards square. Therefore I had to divide up the area among my platoons and start a systematic search of each map square. I kept one platoon under my hand at the fort
and dispatched the other three to look for the needle in the haystack.

The first task of each platoon was to move out to its allotted area and establish a jungle base camp. This would be the nodal point from which patrols would search the adjacent area.

A base camp was usually set up by a platoon, although on occasion, company bases would be formed for a large-scale operation. Whatever the size, the drill was the same. The platoon commander would select a likely area for his first base from the map before he set out on his mission. He would look for a spot that was easily identifiable on the map so that his patrols would have a good map fix for their starting point, and he would also prefer to be near a stream for his water supply. "Basing up," as we called it, was a jungle ritual that deserves description. First, the proposed base area was searched by small patrols to ensure that no CT's were in the vicinity. Then the men were dispersed in a rough circle facing outward with platoon headquarters in the center. Only then could everyone start to erect his improvised shelter. These were made from the poncho-type ground sheet, using available vines and branches as supports. Cutting was discouraged, for the sound of a machete on wood carries a long way in jungle. The men usually paired off for this job, and while one was improving the "house," the other would start preparing a meal. We always ate on a shelter basis. Concurrent with these preparations, we took turns going to the water point to bathe, always under the eye of a sentry. This was the time that I always felt particularly vulnerable, dressed in Mother Nature and jungle boots, and carrying a submachine gun!

To guide those within as well as to thwart the intruder, a vine was stretched around the perimeter; from this, other guide vines were run to the area of platoon headquarters, where the night sentry was always located. He relied entirely on his ears to give warning of suspicious movement in the vicinity of the base. Our invariable rule was no movement for any reason outside the perimeter between dusk and dawn.

Having established base camp to his satisfaction, the platoon commander sat in his shelter and planned his patrol program for the next day.
We made use of two basic patrolling techniques in this operation: the fan patrol and the stream patrol. Both these methods were founded on the old maxim of "Find, Fix, and Attack." Therefore, the primary function of these two types of patrol was to obtain information.

The fan patrol was so called because the separate patrols radiated out from the base like the ribs of a fan. A fan patrol normally consisted of three or four men carrying only their weapons and ammunition; they left all their heavy equipment in the base. Each patrol was directed on a definite compass-bearing from the base. The interval between the ribs depended largely on the standard of training. I usually operated at ten-degree spacings. The distance out from base was governed by the nature of the jungle. On the Tasek Bera operation, we could manage only about 1,000 yards due to the thick belukar. In primary jungle, with little or no undergrowth, this distance might be extended up to 2,000 yards. However, we seldom tried to lay down distances but
worked on a time basis. From experience, we learned that a patrol could not be expected to maintain the required high standard of alertness for more than about three hours. Therefore, our patrolling was usually geared to this time limit. Patrol movement had to be slow, each step made carefully, for a careless boot on a rotten branch could mean giving the alarm to a nearby terrorist camp. Eyes and ears were usually the best weapons, but a keen sense of smell was often instrumental in literally sniffing out CT's. Their presence was frequently betrayed by the odor of Chinese cooking, or of curry on the rare occasions when Malay or Indian terrorists were in camp.

Having reached its time or distance limit, the patrol might return in either of two ways. It could follow the back bearing of the outward course, thus retracing the original line back to base, or it could move a predetermined distance in paces to its right or left and return on a back bearing of plus or minus five degrees of its outward course. For obvious reasons, the method to be used and the amount of right or left movement had to be laid down by the platoon commander before the patrols left the base.

One of my platoons in the Tasek Bera was located in an area heavily interlaced with jungle streams. In this case, the platoon commander used the stream method of patrolling. As in the fan patrol, groups consisted of three to four men, but instead of following specific bearings, they worked their way up and down the banks of streams and creeks. Like us, the CT's preferred to position their camps near running water and this method of searching was often successful in finding them.

However, in my opinion, there is one serious drawback to stream patrolling. Occasionally, there were considerable variations between the actual direction of streams and their alignment as shown on the map. This resulted in the very real danger of patrols clashing with each other. Therefore, if this method is to be used, the accuracy of the map should be carefully checked beforehand and only the minimum number of patrols deployed in the area at one time.

When sending out his fan or stream patrols to cover a thousand-yard map square, the platoon commander would always keep a reserve in base so that he could quickly take advantage of any
information his patrols brought in. Furthermore, he had to maintain good radio communication with his company commander so that the latter could bring in extra troops if the task appeared beyond the capability of one platoon. The advent of the helicopter in Malaya greatly facilitated prompt exploitation by a large force of any information gained from reconnaissance patrolling.

If a patrol detected or even suspected the presence of a CT camp, the drill was for one or two men to move back along the bearing or stream to warn the base while the other two remained to watch the area. They would do their best to gain further information as to the extent of the layout, but uppermost in their minds was the fact that they must not prejudice the operation by premature movement at this stage.

When the platoon commander received warning of a suspected camp, he gathered up all available men in base—leaving only a small rear party—and moved out, guided by the men who had returned from the reconnaissance patrol. They advised him where to halt the main body so that its presence would not be discovered. The platoon commander then moved forward and contacted the rest of the patrol, getting up-to-date information from them. He had now to carry out the most delicate part of the operation—his own reconnaissance, which might take hours if he was to get a good idea of the strength of the CT’s and at the same time escape detection from their sentries. At the end of this reconnaissance, he had to make the decision as to whether he could manage the job alone or whether he should radio the company commander and ask him to come in and take over. Whatever course he took, the platoon commander would be the key man in the action since he had had the best look at the ground.

In the Tasek Bera, we had a chain of events similar to those I have described, and the platoon commander decided that the camp was small enough to take on without extra support. He therefore carried out the next part of the drill, which was to surround the camp area.

When a small force, such as a platoon, was surrounding a CT camp, it could not hope to form a continuous chain of bayonets
around the site. In this case, an assault force of some six men led by the platoon commander was detailed and the remainder were divided into "stop" groups of two to three men each. It was the task of the platoon sergeant to put these into position. He did this by moving around the area of the camp on a series of right-angle bearings, dropping off "stops" on all likely escape routes. This particular camp was near a small lake so the assault was to be made from the land side, with stops on either flank near the lake shore. Where there were no well-defined getaway trails, the procedure was to place stops about 300–400 yards out from the estimated perimeter of the camp.

The short jungle day seldom allowed the whole operation of finding a camp, carrying out the detailed reconnaissance, placing the stops, and finally attacking to be completed during the daylight hours—especially as an attack just before dusk precluded a follow-up of escaping CT's in daylight. Therefore, it was usually necessary for the stops and assault group to remain in position throughout the night. This placed a considerable strain on all concerned, but the troops always responded nobly as they realized that this might be the climax to months of hard "jungle bashing."

As soon as there was sufficient light, the platoon commander signaled the assault group to advance. Moving at the double, they charged directly into the camp, firing at all the visible enemy and at the jungle shelters constructed by the CT's. The terrorists invariably had a well-rehearsed escape plan, and those not hit by the initial bursts from the assault group would speedily fade into the surrounding jungle. It was the task of the stops to pick them off as they escaped. As soon as all firing finished—and it seldom lasted for more than a minute—the platoon commander organized a follow-up of any terrorists who were seen to have escaped the net. Usually he had a tracker dog or an Iban to assist him in this task. Ibans were specially enlisted trackers from North Borneo, skilled in following trails and distinguishing between human and animal signs.

If a company-sized force was involved in the attack, the tactics were similar except that the cordon of stops was tighter, with more men available for this task.
The camp we found in the Tasek Bera was, in fact, unoccupied when the assault moved in; it was discovered later that the inhabitants had left on a food-foraging expedition soon after the reconnaissance patrol heard their movements. One returned just as the platoon commander reached the clearing in the center of the terrorist shelters. Each saw the other simultaneously and the CT made off. He was chased and wounded, and although he escaped on this occasion, his wound was sufficiently serious to make him surrender a few days later. However, this incident was typical of the most common form of contact between Security Forces and CT's in the Malayan jungle—the chance encounter.

No matter how carefully plans are made, there will be many occasions when patrols stumble on guerrillas by chance. We found it necessary to have a simple drill for this occurrence, and it often worked well.

If a leading scout and a CT saw each other at the same time and there was no possibility of gaining surprise, the scout shouted "Bandits!" and charged, followed by the rest of the patrol. When there was a chance of bringing off an impromptu ambush, the patrol would slip quickly into the jungle on either side of the track and try to let the CT's get as close as possible. If ours was only a small reconnaissance patrol, the patrol leader might let a large gang of CT's go by and follow them to ascertain the whereabouts of their camp. I know of two occasions when this latter variation was carried out successfully by Gurkha troops. It does, however, demand a very high standard of junglecraft.

In these cases, quick reaction by the rest of the patrol to the leading scout's warning was essential and this depended on a thorough knowledge of silent signals by everyone. Silence is golden in antiguerrilla operations; therefore, a comprehensive list of silent hand signals was devised. These ranged from "Terrorists in front!" (fist clenched, with thumb pointing to the ground) to an improvised one in my own company that consisted of raising the jungle hat accompanied by a low bow. In our language this meant "Request the company commander to come to the front of the column!" After six months in the Malayan jungle, all soldiers found it second nature to converse by hand signals.

The chance encounter that took place in the lakeside camp was,
in fact, our only contact with CT's during a six-week stay in the Tasek Bera. It was discovered later that our information on the No. 1 target had been premature; while we were searching for him, he was still in Johore. However, it had given us all an invaluable opportunity to polish the rough surface of our earlier training.

In addition to these basic tactics in fighting the CT's in Malaya, there were, of course, many variations—some due to circumstances and terrain, others arising from the different fighting characteristics of the many nationalities involved. For instance, the fleet-footed Fijians often preferred to chase their opponents rather than wait in ambush for them; this unorthodox but extremely effective technique made them some of the most feared terrorist-hunters in Malaya. Whatever the tactics used and the interpretation put on them by different units, I think I can safely say that adherence to the following main principles was usually the foundation of successful operations against the CT's:

1. A spirit of initiative and aggression had to be instilled into everyone. At all times, junior leaders had to communicate to their men their determination to seek out and destroy the enemy no matter what the physical discomforts might be. This was not always easy to do in a country containing some of the most difficult going imaginable. Most failures to eliminate CT's in favorable conditions were attributable in some degree to a lack of "go" on the part of junior leaders.

2. A high standard of marksmanship at short ranges. The jungle contact, as we termed it, between friend and foe was fleeting in the extreme. By day, the enemy was usually moving quickly, and by night, he was difficult to see. Success, therefore, depended on being able to shoot fast and accurately. Constant practice is the only key to success here. Some purists say that every man must reach the same high standard of shooting. This is a very desirable aim but there is often insufficient time to achieve it. Therefore, I would counsel any unit that wants positive results in this kind of war to make certain that its best shots are up front!

3. Continual training in jungle navigation, using compass and
map. If fan- and stream-type patrolling are to be used, then every man must have an elementary knowledge of compass work. In my experience, the most surprising people emerge as skilled jungle navigators. One of the best in my company was a young cockney soldier who had never been out of London before he sailed for Malaya.

4. The development of junglecraft. This all-embracing term probably defies detailed analysis but I think it is best symbolized by Field Marshal Wavell's description of the ideal infantryman: "He must be a combination of cat burglar, gunman, and poacher." Certainly the good jungle warriors in Malaya needed all these antisocial characteristics and a surprisingly large number acquired them.

Our tactics in Malaya were by no means perfect. The gift of hindsight enables many of us to see where we went wrong and how we can improve in the future. But this was a new sort of war fought over some of the most formidable terrain in the world. In the beginning, we had to improvise and gain experience, and this took time. Nevertheless, in the final event, we were able to devise methods that enabled all the varied forces involved to inflict a decisive defeat on militant Communism. For this, many can take credit but none more so than the infantry private soldiers of many nationalities who sweated, fought, and won in the jungles of Malaya.
IV
LOSING IN THE JUNGLE—INDOCHINA

INSIDE THE VIETMINH
General Vo Nguyen Giap

STREET WITHOUT JOY
Bernard B. Fall

The fall of Dien Bien Phu marked the fall of an empire in Southeast Asia—and the demolition of much military dogma. Here a notably backward Oriental country triumphed smashingly over one of the most technically advanced Western countries, well supplied with airpower, tanks, artillery, and graduates of the Ecole de Guerre. The man who planned the North Vietnamese campaign was General Vo Nguyen Giap, now Minister of Defense. His commentary on this action has just become available. We think you will find the sections we have extracted extremely thought-provoking. His complete book has now been published: People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

Dr. Fall is also an authority on the Indochina debacle. He won his doctorate as a result of his research in the field with the French forces. Reprinted here is a chapter from his definitive book, Street Without Joy (The Stackpole Company, 1961). He is now at work on a forthcoming political history, The Two Vietnams (Frederick A. Praeger). From Phnompenh, he writes that Viet Cong Regiment Ninety-five is back at its old stamping grounds on the “Street”—“and nasty as ever.”
Inside the Vietminh

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP

I.

Vietnam is one of the oldest countries in Southeast Asia. Stretching like an immense S along the edge of the Pacific, it includes Bac Bo, or North Vietnam, which, with the Red River Delta, is a region rich in agricultural and industrial possibilities; Nam Bo, or South Vietnam, a vast alluvial plain furrowed by the arms of the Mekong and especially favorable to agriculture; and Trung Bo, or Central Vietnam, a long, narrow belt of land joining them. To describe the shape of their country, the Vietnamese like to recall an image familiar to them—that of a shoulder pole with a basket of paddy at each end.

Vietnam extends over nearly 128,000 square miles, on which lives a population of approximately 30 million. During their many thousands of years of history, the Vietnamese people have always been able to maintain a heroic tradition of struggle against foreign aggression. During the thirteenth century, in particular, they succeeded in thwarting attempts at invasion by the Mongols, who had extended their domination over the whole of feudal China.

The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was a just war. Its aim was to win back the independence and unity of the country, to bring land to the peasants, and to defend the achievements of the August Revolution. That is why it was, first and foremost, a people's war. To educate, mobilize, organize, and arm the whole people in order that they might take part in the resistance was the crucial task.

The enemy of the Vietnamese nation was aggressive imperialism, which had to be overthrown. But, as the imperialists had long
since joined with the feudal landlords, the anti-imperialist struggle definitely could not be separated from antifeudal action. On the other hand, in a backward colonial country such as ours, where the peasants make up the majority of the population, a people's war is essentially a peasants' war under the leadership of the working class. A general mobilization of the whole people is, therefore, neither more nor less than a mobilization of the rural masses. The problem of land is of decisive importance. The Vietnamese war of liberation was essentially a national democratic revolution carried out under military form. It had a twofold fundamental task: the overthrowing of imperialism and the defeat of the feudal landlord class. The anti-imperialist struggle was primary.

A backward colonial country which had only just risen up to proclaim its independence and install people's power, Vietnam had only recently developed armed forces. They were equipped with still mediocre arms and had no combat experience. The enemy, on the other hand, was an imperialist power which had retained a fairly considerable economic and military potential despite the recent German occupation. She had benefited, moreover, from the active support of the United States. The balance of forces decidedly showed up our weaknesses against the enemy's strength.

The Vietnamese people's war, therefore, had to be hard and long lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory. Conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to adopt a strategy of long-term resistance in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy. It was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into one great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.

At an early stage, our Party was able to discern the true characteristics of the war. By proceeding from this analysis, throughout the duration of hostilities and under particularly difficult conditions, the Party solved all the problems of the resistance. This judicious leadership led us to victory.
Our strategy was, as we have stressed, to wage a long-lasting battle. A war of this type, generally speaking, entails several phases. In principle, starting from a stage of contention, the war goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general counteroffensive. The way it is carried on can be subtle and complex, depending on the particular conditions obtaining on both sides during the course of operations. Only a long-term war could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards, to overcome our matériel handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength. To maintain and increase our forces was the principle to which we adhered. We contented ourselves with attacking when success was certain, refusing to give battle likely to incur losses to us, or to engage in hazardous actions. We had to build up our strength during the actual course of fighting.

The form of fighting had to be completely adapted to the situation. We had to raise our fighting spirit to the maximum and rely on the heroism of our troops to overcome the enemy’s material superiority. In the main, especially at the outset, we had to resort to guerrilla fighting. In the Vietnamese theater of operations, this method carried off great victories. It could be used in the mountains as well as in the delta; it could be waged with good or mediocre matériel, even without arms, and was to enable us eventually to equip ourselves at the cost of the enemy. Wherever the Expeditionary Corps went, the entire population took part in the fighting. Every commune had its fortified village. Every district had its regional troops fighting under command of local branches of the Party, in liaison with the regular forces, in order to wear down and annihilate the enemy.

Thereafter, with the development of our forces, guerrilla war changed into mobile warfare—though still strongly marked by guerrilla tactics—which afterward became the basic form of operations on the main front, the northern front. In this process of development, our army constantly grew and passed from the stage of engagements involving a section or company, to fairly large-scale campaigns bringing into action several divisions. Gradually, the army’s equipment improved, mainly through seizure of arms from the French and American imperialists.

From a military point of view, the war proved that an inade-
quately equipped army, fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strategy and tactics, conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism.

In the management of a war economy in an agriculturally backward country undertaking a long-term resistance, the problem of building bases in rear areas arises. The raising and defense of production, and the development of agriculture, were problems of great importance for supplying the front as well as for progressive improvement of the people's living conditions. The matter of manufacturing arms was not one which could be set aside.

In the building of rural bases and the reinforcement of rear areas to give impetus to the resistance, the agrarian policy of the Party played a determining role. Therein lay the antifeudal task of the revolution. In a colony where the national question is essentially the peasant question, consolidation of the resistance forces was possible only by solution of the agrarian problem.

The August Revolution overthrew the feudal state. Reduction of land rents and rates of interest, decreed by people's power, bestowed on the peasants their first material advantages. Land monopolized by the imperialists and traitors was confiscated and shared out. Communal land and rice fields were more equitably distributed. In 1953, deeming it necessary to promote the accomplishment of antifeudal tasks, the Party decided to achieve agrarian reform even during the course of the resistance war. Despite the errors that blemished accomplishment of the reform, it was a correct policy crowned with success. It resulted in real material advantages for the peasants and brought to the army and the people a new breath of enthusiasm.

Thanks to this new agrarian policy, the life of the people, during the most difficult conditions of the war, generally improved, not only in the vast free zones of the North, but even in the guerrilla bases in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese war brought out the importance of building resistance bases in the countryside and emphasized the close and indissoluble relationship between the anti-imperialist revolution and the antifeudal revolution.

From a political point of view, the question of unity among the
people and the mobilization of all their energies was of paramount importance. It was the National United Front against the imperialists and their lackeys, the Vietnamese traitors.

In Vietnam, our Party carried off a great success in its policy of Front. As early as World War II, the Party formed the League for the Independence of Vietnam. During the early years of the war of resistance, we postponed the application of agrarian revolution, limiting our program to the reduction of land rents and interest rates, which enabled us to neutralize part of the landlord class and to rally around us the most patriotic of them.

From the early days of the August Revolution, the policy of broad Front adopted by the Party neutralized the wavering elements among the landlord class and limited acts of sabotage by partisans of the Vietnam Quoc-Dan-Dang (Nationalist Party).

Thereafter, in the course of the war, when agrarian reform had become an urgent necessity, our Party made a differentiation within the landlord class by providing different treatment for each type of landlord according to his political attitude toward liquidation of feudal appropriation of land.

The policy of unity among nationalities adopted by the National United Front also achieved great success, and the program of unity with the various religious circles attained good results.

The National United Front was to be a vast assembly of all the forces capable of being united, neutralizing all those which could be neutralized, dividing all those it was possible to divide. The object of this was to direct the spearhead at the chief enemy of the revolution, invading imperialism. The Front was to be an alliance between workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. In Vietnam, an alliance between workers and peasants was backed by a dazzling history and firm traditions. The party of the working class had been the only political party to fight resolutely in all circumstances for national independence. It was the first to put forward the slogan “Land to the Tillers,” and to struggle determinedly for its realization. However, in the early years of the resistance, underestimation of the importance of the peasant question hindered us from giving all the necessary attention to the worker-peasant alliance. This error was subsequently set right, especially from the moment when the Party
decided, by means of accomplishing agrarian reform, to make the peasants the real masters of the countryside.

The war of liberation proved that, in the face of an enemy as powerful as he is cruel, victory is possible only by uniting the whole people under a firm and wide national front based on the worker-peasant alliance.

To bring victory, it was not enough to have a correct strategic guiding principle. An appropriate guiding principle of fighting was also necessary in order to carry out the strategy. In general, ours was a guerrilla war moving gradually to regular or mobile war combined with partial entrenched camp warfare. Basically, we had grasped that general law; hence, we were successful. However, we did not thoroughly grasp it from the beginning, but only after it had been tested and tempered in the practice of war.

In the resistance war, guerrilla activity played an extremely important role. Guerrilla war is the form of fighting by the masses of a weak and badly equipped country against an aggressive army with better equipment and techniques. This is the way of fighting a revolution. Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over modern weapons, avoiding the enemy when he is the stronger and attacking him when he is the weaker. Now scattering, now regrouping, now wearing out, now exterminating the enemy, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back at him, thus undermining his spirit and exhausting his forces. In addition to scattering in order to wear out the enemy, it is necessary to regroup big armed forces in favorable situations to achieve supremacy in attack at a given point and time to annihilate the enemy. Successes in many small fights added together gradually wear out the enemy manpower, while little by little strengthening our forces. The main goal of the fighting must be destruction of enemy manpower. Our own manpower should not be exhausted from trying to keep or occupy land.

Guerrilla war was obviously in full keeping with the characteristics of our resistance war. In the early period, regular war was not possible. When the war started in South Vietnam, our plan was to wage guerrilla warfare, and in practice, guerrilla war
took shape. But when the nationwide war broke out, the policy of mainly waging guerrilla warfare was not clearly set forth. At the beginning of autumn-winter 1947, the Party Central Committee decreed the launching and extending of guerrilla activities over all the occupied areas. One part of our main force was divided into independent companies, operating separately, which penetrated deep into the enemy's rear area to carry out propaganda assignments among the people, to defend our bases, and to intensify guerrilla activity. The policy of using independent companies concurrently with concentrated battalions was very successful. As guerrilla activities were intensified and widely extended, many enemy rear areas were turned into our front lines.

To cope with our expanding guerrilla activities, great efforts were made by the enemy to launch repeated mopping-up operations with ever bigger forces. The aim of these operations was to annihilate our guerrilla units, destroy our political bases and crops, and plunder our property. The enemy hoped to crush our resistance forces and "pacify" his rear. That is why mopping-up operations and counter-mopping-up operations became the chief form of guerrilla war in the enemy's rear. Through the counter-mopping-up operations, our people brought to the utmost their endurance of hardships and heroic fighting spirit, creating extremely rich forms of fighting. To maintain and extend guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear, our Party cleverly combined the coordination of political and economic struggle with armed struggle. The Party strove hard to avail itself of favorable opportunities to push the people into the armed struggle, develop our forces, annihilate and wear out the enemy forces, turn temporarily occupied zones into guerrilla zones or the latter into our bases. When meeting a difficult situation, our Party cleverly switched the movement in good time to preserve our forces and safeguard our bases. Guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear were the highest expression of the iron will and courageous spirit of our people, and at the same time were proof of the talented leadership of the Party.

From the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare causes many difficulties and losses to the enemy and wears him out. To annihilate enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has
to change gradually to mobile warfare. Through guerrilla activities, our troops were gradually formed, fighting first with small units, then with bigger ones, moving from scattered fighting to more concentrated fighting. Guerrilla warfare gradually developed to mobile warfare—a form of fighting in which principles of regular warfare gradually appear but still bear a guerrilla character. Mobile warfare is fighting with concentrated troops of the regular army. In this type of war, relatively big forces are grouped and operated on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed, advancing deeply, then withdrawing swiftly. Such fighting is characterized by extreme dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in face of new situations.

As the resistance war went on, the strategic role of mobile warfare became more important with every passing day. Its task was to annihilate a bigger and bigger number of the enemy in order to develop our own strength. The task of guerrilla warfare was to wear out and destroy the enemy’s reserves. Therefore, mobile war and guerrilla war went on side by side. Only by annihilating the enemy’s manpower could we smash his big offensives, safeguard our bases and rear areas, and win the initiative. By wiping out more and more of the enemy, by liberating larger and larger localities one after the other, we could eventually destroy the whole enemy force and liberate our country.

In 1947, with the plan of operating companies separately and massing battalions, we began to move to more concentrated fighting, then to mobile warfare. In 1948, we made relatively large ambush and surprise attacks with one or several battalions. In 1949, we launched small campaigns not only in the North but also on other battlefronts. From 1950 on, we began to launch campaigns on an ever larger scale, enabling mobile warfare to play the main part on the northern battlefield, while entrenched camp warfare was on the upgrade. This fact was clearly manifest in the great Dien Bien Phu campaign.

Once mobile warfare appears on the battlefront of guerrilla war, there must be close and correct coordination between the two. This is another general law in the conduct of war. On the one hand, guerrilla warfare has to be extended to make full use
of the new favorable conditions brought about by mobile warfare. On the other hand, mobile warfare has to be accelerated to annihilate large enemy forces and concurrently to create new favorable conditions for further extension of guerrilla war. In the course of the development of mobile warfare, because of the enemy’s situation and ours on the battlefields, entrenched camp warfare gradually came into being. It became part and parcel of mobile warfare, continued to develop, and occupied a more and more important position.

The conduct of the war had to maintain a correct ratio between the fighting forms. At the beginning, we had to stick to guerrilla warfare and extend it. Passing to a new stage, as mobile warfare made its appearance, we had to hold firm the coordination between the two forms, the chief one being guerrilla warfare. Mobile warfare was of lesser importance but was on the upgrade. Then came a new and higher stage. Mobile warfare moved to the main position, at first on only one battlefield, then on a widening scope. During this time, guerrilla warfare was extended, but after a while it fell back to a lesser but still important position.

On some battlefronts we met with difficulties because we were not determined to advance from guerrilla to mobile war. On others, rashness in speeding up mobile warfare had a bad influence on guerrilla activity, and therefore mobile warfare also had trouble. In general, however, the correct ratio of emphasis was maintained. The Hoa Binh campaign was typical of coordination between guerrilla and mobile warfare units on the northern battlefront. The Dien Bien Phu campaign and the winter-spring 1953-54 campaign were also successful models of coordination.

Because of the enemy’s situation and ours, there appeared a system of free zones interlaced with enemy-controlled areas, intersecting and encircling each other. In enemy-controlled areas, there were also guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases. These zones and bases expanded as the war progressed, while enemy-occupied areas narrowed.

The strategy of long-term war and the principle of expansion from guerrilla to regular war were successful. Such were the basic
strategy and tactics of the people's war in a small and backward agricultural country under the leadership of our Party.

II.

At the first shots of the imperialist invasion, General Leclerc, first commander of the French Expeditionary Corps, estimated that the reoccupation of Vietnam would be a military walk-over. When encountering resistance in the South, the French generals considered it as weak and temporary and stuck to their opinion that it would take ten weeks at the most to occupy and pacify the whole of South Vietnam.

Why did the French colonialists make such an estimate? Because they considered that to meet their aggression, there must be an army. The Vietnamese Army had just been created. It was still numerically weak, badly organized, led by inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers, and provided with old and insufficient equipment. It had a limited stock of ammunition and no tanks, airplanes, or artillery. With such an army how could serious resistance be undertaken and the attacks of a powerful armored division repelled? All it could do was to use up its stock of munitions before laying down its arms. In fact, the Vietnamese Army was then weak in all respects and was destitute of everything. The French colonialists were right in this respect. But it was not possible for them to understand a fundamental and decisive fact: the Vietnamese Army, though weak materially, was a people's army. The war in Vietnam was not merely the opposition of two armies. In provoking hostilities, the colonialists had alienated a whole nation. And indeed, the whole Vietnamese nation, the entire Vietnamese people, rose against them. Unable to grasp this profound truth, the French generals, who believed in an easy victory, went instead to certain defeat.

Even to this day, bourgeois strategists have not overcome their surprise at the outcome of the war in Indochina. How could the Vietnamese nation have defeated an imperialist power such as France, which was backed by the U.S.?

The Vietnamese People's Army was born and grew up in the flames of the war of national liberation. Its embryo was the
self-defense units created by the Nghe An Soviets, which managed to hold power for a few months in the period of revolutionary upsurge in the years 1930-31. The creation of revolutionary armed forces, however, was positively considered only at the outset of World War II, when preparation for an armed insurrection came to the fore of our attention. Our military and paramilitary formations appeared at the Bac Son uprising and in the revolutionary bases in the Cao Bang region. Following the setting up of the first platoon of National Salvation, on December 22, 1944, another platoon-size unit was created: the Propaganda Unit of the Vietnam Liberation Army. Our war bases were at the time limited to a few districts in the provinces of Cao Bang, Bac Can, and Lang Son in the jungle of the North. As for the revolutionary armed forces, they still consisted of people's self-defense units and a few groups and platoons completely free from production work. Their number increased quickly. There were already several thousand guerrillas at the beginning of 1945, when the Japanese fascists delivered the coup de grâce to the French colonialists. At the time of the setting up of people's power in the rural regions of six provinces in Viet Bac, which were established as a free zone, the existing armed organizations merged to form the Vietnam Liberation Army.

During the August, 1945, insurrection, side by side with the people and the self-defense units, the Liberation Army took part in the conquest of power. By incorporating the paramilitary forces regrouped in the course of the glorious days of August, the army's strength increased rapidly. With heterogeneous matériel wrested from the Japanese and their Bao An troops (rifles alone consisted of sixteen different types, including old French models and even rifles of the Czarist forces taken by the Japanese), this young and poorly equipped army soon had to face the aggression of the French Expeditionary Corps which had modern armaments. Such antiquated equipment required from the Vietnamese Army and people complete self-sacrifice and superhuman heroism.

Should the enemy attack the regions where our troops were stationed, the latter would give battle. Should he ferret about in the large zones where there were no regular formations, the people would stay his advance with rudimentary weapons: sticks,
spears, scimitars, bows, flintlocks. From the first days, there appeared three types of armed forces: paramilitary organizations or guerrilla units, regional troops, and regular units. These formations were, in the field of organization, the expression of the general mobilization of the people in arms. They cooperated closely with one another to annihilate the enemy.

Peasants, workers, and intellectuals crowded into the ranks of the armed forces of the revolution. Leading cadres of the Party and the State apparatus became officers from the first moment. The greatest difficulty was that of equipment. Throughout Vietnam there was no factory manufacturing war matériel. For nearly a century, the possession and use of arms had been strictly forbidden by the colonial administration. Importation was impossible, the neighboring countries being hostile. The sole source of supply could only be the battlefront—take war matériel from the enemy and turn it against him. While carrying on the aggression against Vietnam, the French Expeditionary Corps fulfilled another task: It became, unwittingly, the supplier of the Vietnam People's Army with French, even U.S. arms. In spite of their enormous efforts, the arms factories set up later on with makeshift means were far from being able to meet all our needs. A great part of our military matériel came from war booty.

As I have stressed, the People's Army could at first bring into combat only small units such as platoons or companies. The regular forces were compelled to split up into companies operating separately to promote the extension of guerrilla activities, while mobile battalions were maintained for more important actions.

Tempered in combat and stimulated by victories, the guerrilla formations created conditions for the growth of the regional troops. And the latter, in turn, promoted development of the regular forces. For nine successive years, by following this heroic path bristling with difficulties, our army grew up with a determination to win at all costs. It became an army of hundreds of thousands, successively amalgamating into regiments and divisions, and directed toward progressive standardization in organization and equipment. This force, ever more politically conscious and better trained militarily, succeeded in fighting and defeating
the 500,000 men of the French Expeditionary Corps, equipped and supplied by the United States.

Political work is the work of propaganda among and education of the masses. It is, furthermore, the organizational work of the Party in the army. We have always given particular attention to strengthening the Party in our military units. From 35 to 40 per cent of the officers and enlisted men have joined it. Among the officers, the percentage even exceeds 90 per cent.

The People's Army has always been concerned with establishing and maintaining good relations with the people. This policy is based upon the identity of their aims. The people are to the army what water is to fish, as the saying goes. And this saying has profound significance. Our army fought on the front; it has also worked to educate the people and has helped them to the best of its ability. The Vietnamese fighter has always taken care to observe Point 9 of his Oath of Honor: "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people; to help the people; to defend the people... in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army."

Our army has always organized days of help for peasants in production work and in the struggle against flood and drought. It has always observed a correct attitude in its relations with the people. It has never done injury to their property—not even a needle or a bit of thread. During the resistance, especially in the enemy rear, the army brought everything into play to defend ordinary people's lives and property. In the newly liberated regions, it strictly carried out the orders of the Party and government, which enabled it to win the unreserved support of the broadest masses, even in the minority regions and Catholic villages. Since the return of peace, thousands of officers and men have participated in agrarian reform for agricultural collectivization and socialist transformation of handicrafts, industry, and private trade. The army has actively taken part in the economic recovery and in socialist work days. It has participated in the building of lines of communication; it has built its own barracks and cleared land to found State farms.
Losing in the Jungle—Indochina

The Vietnam People's Army always strives to establish and maintain good relations between officers and men as well as among the officers themselves. Originating from the working strata, officers and men also serve the people's interests and unstintingly devote themselves to the cause of the nation and the working class. Of course, every one of them has particular responsibilities. But relations of comradeship based on political equality and fraternity of classes have been established between them. The officer likes his men. He must not only guide them in their work and studies, but must take an interest in their desires and initiatives.

As for the soldier, he must respect his superiors and correctly fulfill all their orders. The officer of the People's Army must set a good example from all points of view. He must show himself to be resolute and brave, ensure discipline and internal democracy, and know how to achieve perfect unity among his men. He must behave like a chief, a leader, vis-à-vis the masses in his unit. The basis of these relations between enlisted men and officers, like those between officers or between soldiers, is solidarity in combat and the mutual affection of brothers-in-arms.

The army practices a strict discipline, allied to a wide internal democracy. As required by Point 2 of his Oath of Honor: "The fighter must rigorously carry out the orders of his superiors and throw himself body and soul into the immediate and strict fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to him." Can we say that guerrilla warfare did not require severe discipline? Of course not. It is true that commanders and leaders had a certain margin of initiative in order to undertake every positive action they thought opportune. But centralized leadership and unified command at a given degree always proved to be necessary. He who speaks of the army speaks of strict discipline.

Such discipline is not in contradiction to the internal democracy of our troops. In cells, in executive committees of the Party at various levels, and in plenary meetings of fighting units, the principle of democratic centralism is the rule. The facts have proved that the more democracy is respected within the units, the more unity will be strengthened, discipline raised, and orders carried out.
The restoration of peace has created in Vietnam a new situation. The North is entirely liberated, but the South is still under the yoke of American imperialists and their lackeys. North Vietnam has entered a stage of socialist revolution while the struggle is going on to free the South from colonial and feudal fetters. To safeguard peace and socialist construction, to help in making the North a strong rampart for the peaceful reunification of the country, the problem of forces of national defense should not be neglected. The People’s Army must face the bellicose aims of American imperialists and their lackeys and step by step become a regular and modern army.

It is essential actively and firmly to continue the progressive transformation of the People’s Army into a regular and modern army. Thanks to developments during the last years of the resistance war, our army, which was made up of infantrymen only, is now composed of various branches. If improvement of equipment and techniques is important, that of training cadres and soldiers capable of using them is more important. Our army has always been concerned with the training of officers and warrant officers of worker and peasant origin, or revolutionary intellectuals tested under fire. It helps raise their cultural and technical level to become competent officers and warrant officers of a regular and modern army.

To raise the fighting power of the army, to bring about a strong centralization of command and close cooperation between the different branches, it is necessary to enforce regulations fitted to a regular army. Not that nothing has been done in this field during the years of the resistance war: it is a matter of perfecting existing regulations. The main thing is not to lose sight of the principle that any new regulations must draw their inspiration from the popular character of the army and the absolute necessity of maintaining the leadership of the Party. Along with general regulations, officers’ statutes have been promulgated; a correct system of wages has taken the place of the former procedure of allowances in kind; the question of rewards and decorations has been regularized. All these measures strengthened discipline and solidarity within the army, and have instilled a greater
sense of responsibility among officers and warrant officers as well as among soldiers.

Military training and political education are key tasks in the building of the army in peacetime. Combat regulations and tactical concepts and principles gain particular importance. The objective is to synthesize past experiences and to analyze our army organization and equipment in relation to our economic structure and the terrain of the country—a land of forests and jungles, of plains and fields. The problem is to assimilate well the modern military science of the armies of our brother countries. Unceasing effort is indispensable in the training of troops and the development of cadres.

For many years, the Vietnam People's Army was based on voluntary service: All officers and soldiers voluntarily enlisted for an indefinite period. Its ranks swelled with youth always ready to answer the appeal of the Fatherland. Since the return of peace, it has become necessary to replace voluntary service by compulsory military service. This substitution has met with warm response from the population. A great number of volunteers, after demobilization, returned to fields and factories; others are working in units assigned to production work, thus making an active contribution to the building of socialism. Conscription is enforced on the basis of the strengthening and development of the self-defense organizations in the communes, factories, and schools. The members of these paramilitary organizations are ready not only to rejoin the permanent army, of which they constitute a particularly important reserve, but also to ensure the security and defense of their localities.

The People's Army was closely linked with the national liberation war, in the fire of which it was born and grew up. At present, its development should be disassociated neither from the building of socialism in the North, nor from the people's struggle for a reunified, independent, and democratic Vietnam. Confident of the people's affection and support, in these days of peace as during the war, the army will achieve its tasks to defend peace and the Fatherland.

Right at the founding of our army, the first armed groups and platoons had their Party groups and branches. The platoons had
their political commissars. As soon as they were formed, the regiments had political commissars. The method of Party committee taking the lead and the commander allotting the work also took shape from the very first days. Officers were provided with handbooks, *The Political Commissar's Book* or *Political Work in the Army*.

After the August Revolution, the traditional method of Party leadership and political work was basically kept up. In the first years, however, there appeared a tendency not to take into due account the part played by political work, and the political workers did not yet grasp that the main task was political education and ideological leadership. Sometimes, the Party's political agitation in the army was not closely coordinated with Party work. After the Second Party Congress, the Party's leadership was strengthened in the army as in all other branches of activity. Ideological remolding courses in the Party and the army brought about increased education in political and military policies.

In contrast with armies of the exploiting class, our army put into practice a regime of internal democracy from its inception. Internal relations between officers and men as well as relations between the army and the people express complete unity of mind. Because of the demand of revolutionary work, there are in our army differences in ranks and offices, but these differences have not and cannot influence the relations of political equality in the army. For this reason, internal democracy should and could be carried out in the army. To practice democracy is also to apply the mass line of the Party in leading the army.

During the resistance war, democracy was exercised in three ways and brought about good results:

1. *Political democracy*. At grass-root level, democratic meetings and army congresses were held regularly so that men as well as officers had the opportunity to speak their views on fighting, work, study, and living questions. In our army, not only have the officers the right to criticize the soldiers but the latter also have the right to criticize the former.

2. *Military democracy*. In fighting as well as in training, democratic meetings were called whenever circumstances permitted,
to expound plans, promote initiative, and overcome difficulties.

3. Economic democracy. In our army, officers and soldiers have the right to take part in the management and improvement of material life. Finance is public. Thanks to the carrying out of democracy in an extensive way, we succeeded in promoting the activity and creativeness of the masses of officers and men, and concentrating their wisdom to solve the most difficult and complicated problems; also thanks to it, internal unity was strengthened and the effectiveness of our army increased.

Under the democratic regime, our army still has very strict, conscious discipline. Conscious discipline is built up on the political consciousness of officers and men. The most important method for maintaining discipline is education and persuasion, thus making the soldiers, of their own accord, respect and remind each other to observe discipline. When we speak of strict discipline, we mean that everyone in the army, regardless of rank or office must observe discipline. No infringements are allowed.

Our army has always thought highly of discipline because it has been educated by the Party and knows that discipline is one of the factors that improve combat effectiveness. Therefore, absolute obedience to orders and strict observance of discipline were written down clearly in the ten pledges of honor. Thanks to that, the tasks set by the Party were fulfilled and all fighting orders were thoroughly carried out in extremely hard and arduous circumstances. Now that our army is building itself into a regular and modern one, the demand for discipline, centralization, and unification is all the greater.

Modernization of the army is virtually a technical revolution. The more advanced our arms and techniques, the more do we need men who are able to master them. Otherwise, modern technical equipment cannot develop its effectiveness and the army's efficiency will not be increased. This is a great responsibility in training.

Training of officers is central. The officers have been tested and tempered in actual fighting and have experience in building the army and leading the fighting. However, because they have grown up in the circumstances of guerrilla war, our officers are
The situation has now changed and the revolution has shifted to a new stage. Our People's Army is becoming a regular and modern army. If a new war breaks out, it will be a modern war. But on our side, war will always be a people's war. Consequently, instead of playing a minor part, the militia will be more important. The militia will always be a strategic force, and the guerrilla war a strategic problem. In the future, as formerly, our armed forces will include not only the regular army, but also the people's
armed and semiarmed forces which coordinate with the army in military operations.

At present, in peacetime, North Vietnam is advancing to socialism. The struggle between two paths, socialism or capitalism, is being waged in town and countryside. We must consolidate and intensify proletarian dictatorship; thus, the strengthening of the self-defense units in the countryside, cities, offices, and enterprises has all the more significance.

Parallel with the building of a permanent army, a great reserve must be built, aimed at organizing and educating the masses militarily. The base of the reserve is the self-defense units. Their tasks are: to replenish the permanent army; to maintain security and protect production; to serve the front line and carry out guerrilla activities in wartime.

To consolidate and develop the self-defense units, to build a strong reserve, is a most important task, especially in peacetime, when a substantial reduction has been made in the strength of the permanent army in order to divert manpower to economic reconstruction. To perform this task satisfactorily, it is necessary to grasp thoroughly the theory of people's war. We must stick to the class line in organization and education, develop the militia's fine tradition and precious experience, and strengthen the close relation between the permanent army, the militia, and the reserve. At the same time, the leadership of Party committees in the local military organs, the militia, and the reserve must be improved.

III.

Dien Bien Phu was the greatest victory scored by the Vietnam People's army. It marked an important turn in the military and political situation in Indochina. The solidarity of our army and people in the struggle was the decisive factor in our success. And this is the greatest lesson we have drawn from our experiences. Dien Bien Phu taught us that:

A weak and small nation and a people's army, once resolved to stand up, to unite together, and to fight for independence and peace, will have the full power to defeat all aggressive forces,
even those of an imperialist power such as imperialist France aided by the United States.

At the start of the winter of 1953, the patriotic war of our people entered its eighth year.

Since the frontier campaign [the counteroffensive in the Vietnam-China border region in 1950], our army had scored successive victories in many campaigns and kept the initiative on all battlefronts in North Vietnam. After the liberation of Hoa Binh, the guerrilla bases in the Red River Delta were extended, and vast areas in the northwest were won back one after the other. The enemy found that to save the situation they had to bring in reinforcements, reshuffle generals, and map out a new plan. At that time, the war in Korea had just come to an end. It was in these circumstances that [the Franco-American imperialists] worked out the Navarre Plan.

In a word, the Navarre Plan was a large-scale strategic plan aimed at wiping out the greater part of our main forces within eighteen months, and occupying our whole territory.

On the one hand, they decided to concentrate their forces in the Red River Delta in the autumn and winter of 1953 to mop up our guerrilla bases; on the other hand, they planned to launch attacks on our free zone in order to attract and exhaust our main forces. Simultaneously, they intended to create new battalions of puppet soldiers and regroup new units.

In accordance with this plan, in the first stage fairly strong mobile forces would be regrouped in the Red River Delta to attack and wear out our main forces, at the same time occupying Dien Bien Phu—thus turning the temporarily occupied area in the northwest into a strong springboard.

Then, during the rainy season, when our main forces might be expected to be worn out, the enemy would rush forces to the South to occupy all our free zones and guerrilla bases in the Fifth Zone [one of the zones into which Vietnam was divided during the war] and Nam Bo.

During the autumn and winter of 1955, after the “pacification” of the South, very strong mobile forces would be regrouped on the battlefront of the North to launch a big offensive against our
Defeat of the Navarre Plan

Areas Controlled By Vietminh

Areas Controlled By French

Attacks By Vietminh

Attacks By Pathet Lao & Vietnamese Volunteers
rear. Starting simultaneously from the Delta and Dien Bien Phu, the powerful mobile mass of the French Army would annihilate our main forces, occupy our free zone, and bring the war to a successful end.

In the autumn of 1953, General Navarre launched this strategic plan. With the slogans "Always keep the initiative," and "Always on the offensive," the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps concentrated in the Red River Delta forty-four mobile battalions, launched fierce mopping-up operations in its rear, attacked Ninh Binh and Nho Quan, threatened Thanhhoa, parachuted troops on Lang Son, and threatened Phu Tho. At the same time, they armed local bandits to sow confusion in the northwest. Then, on January 20, 1954, Navarre dropped parachute troops to occupy Dien Bien Phu. His plan was to reoccupy Na San, consolidate Lai Chau, and extend the occupied zone in the northwest.

About November, after wiping out a part of the enemy's forces on the Ninh Binh battlefront, our army opened the winter-spring campaign to smash the Navarre Plan of the American and French imperialists.

In December, 1953, our troops marched on the northwest, annihilated an important part of the enemy's manpower, liberated Lai Chau, and encircled Dien Bien Phu.

Also in December, the Pathet Lao forces and the Vietnam People's Volunteers launched an offensive in Middle Laos, wiped out important enemy forces, liberated Thakhek, and reached the Mekong River.

In January, 1954, in the Fifth Zone, our troops launched an offensive on the Western Highlands, annihilated considerable enemy manpower, liberated the town of Kontum, and came into contact with the newly liberated Boloven Highlands, in Lower Laos.

Also in January of that year, the Pathet Lao forces and the Vietnam People's Volunteers launched an offensive in Upper Laos, swept away important enemy forces, liberated the Nam Hu basin, and threatened Luang Prabang.

Throughout this period, in the areas behind the enemy lines in North and Central Vietnam, as well as in the southernmost
part of Trung Bo, and in Nam Bo, guerrilla warfare was greatly intensified.

In the second week of March, thinking that our offensive was over, the enemy regrouped a part of their forces to resume the "Atlanta" campaign in the south of Trung Bo and to occupy Quy Nhon on March 12.

On the next day, March 13, our troops launched the big offensive against the camp entrenched at Dien Bien Phu.

Our troops fought on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield for fifty-five days and nights until the complete destruction of the entrenched camp was brought about on May 7, 1954.

The winter-spring campaign of our army ended with a historic victory.

The strategic direction of the Dien Bien Phu campaign and of the winter 1953–spring 1954 campaign in general was a typical success of the revolutionary military line of Marxism-Leninism applied to the actual conditions of the revolutionary war in Vietnam.

Our strategy started from thorough analysis of the enemy's contradictions. It aimed at concentrating our forces in the enemy's relatively exposed sectors, annihilating their manpower, liberating a part of the territory, and compelling them to scatter their forces, thus creating favorable conditions for a decisive victory.

For the French Expeditionary Corps, the war was a continuous process of dispersal of forces. The enemy divisions were split into regiments, then into battalions, companies, and platoons, to be stationed at thousands of points and posts on the various battle fronts of the Indochina theater of operations. The enemy found himself face to face with a contradiction: Without scattering his forces, it would be impossible for him to occupy the invaded territory; in scattering his forces, he put himself in difficulties. The scattered units would fall easy prey to our troops, their mobile forces would be more and more reduced, and the shortage of troops would be all the more acute. On the other hand, if they concentrated their forces to move from the defensive position and cope with us with more initiative, the occupation forces would be weakened and it would be difficult for them to
hold the invaded territory. Now, if the enemy gives up occupied territory, the very aim of the war of reconquest is defeated.

Our strategic line was to extend guerrilla warfare everywhere. And in each theater of operations, we chose the positions where the enemy was relatively weak to concentrate our forces there and annihilate his manpower. As a result, the more we fought, the stronger we became; our forces grew with every passing day. And parallel with the process of the enemy's dispersal of forces, our armed forces unceasingly intensified and extended guerrilla activities, while building up regular units. We went gradually from independent companies operating separately to mobile battalions, then from battalions to regiments and divisions.

In 1953, when the Navarre Plan was being worked out, the French imperialists found themselves faced with a dilemma: lack of forces to win back the initiative, to attack and annihilate our main forces. They set to building up their fighting forces again at all costs, and, in fact, they did concentrate big forces in the Red River Delta. With these forces, they hoped to wear out our main forces, and compel us to scatter our army between the Delta and the mountainous regions, with a view to carrying out their plan gradually and preparing for a big decisive offensive.

We were determined to break the Navarre Plan. But how to do it? Faced with the new difficulties, it was necessary to analyze the situation to determine a correct line of action which would ensure success.

The concrete problem was: The enemy was concentrating forces in the Red River Delta, and launching attacks on our free zones. Now, should we concentrate our forces to face the enemy, or mobilize them for attacks in other directions? The problem was difficult. In concentrating our forces to fight the enemy in the Delta, we could defend our free zone; but here the enemy was still strong and we could easily be decimated. On the other hand, in attacking in other directions with our main forces, we could exploit the vulnerable points of the enemy to annihilate the bulk of their forces; but our free zone would thus be threatened.

After a careful study of the situation, the Party's Central Committee issued the following slogan to break the Navarre Plan: "Dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in face
of new situations." Keeping the initiative, we should concentrate our forces to attack strategic points which were relatively vulnerable. If we succeeded in keeping the initiative, we could achieve successes and compel the enemy to scatter their forces, and finally, their plan to threaten our free zone could not be realized. On the other hand, if we were driven on the defensive, not only could we not annihilate many enemy forces, but our own force could easily suffer losses, and it would be difficult for us to break the enemy threat.

Always convinced that the essential thing was to destroy the enemy’s manpower, the Central Committee worked out its plan of action by scientific analysis: to concentrate our offensive against important strategic points where the enemy were relatively weak in order to wipe out a part of their manpower, at the same time compelling them to scatter their forces to cope with us at vital points which they had to defend at all costs.

This strategy proved correct. While the enemy was concentrating big forces in the Delta to threaten our free zone, instead of leaving our main forces in the Delta or scattering our forces in the free zone to defend it by a defensive action, we regrouped our forces and boldly attacked in the direction of the northwest. Indeed, our divisions marched on the northwest with an irresistible impetus, swept away thousands of local bandits at Son La and Thuan Chau, and liberated Lai Chau, cutting to pieces the greater part of the enemy’s column, which fled from Lai Chau. Simultaneously, we encircled Dien Bien Phu, thus compelling the enemy to carry out in haste a reinforcement movement to save it from being wiped out. In addition to the Red River Delta, Dien Bien Phu became a second point of concentration of enemy forces.

Concurrently with our offensive in the northwest, the Laotian-Vietnamese joint forces launched a second offensive in an important direction where the enemy was relatively exposed, the Middle Laos front.

Several enemy mobile units were annihilated and the town of Thakhek was liberated. The joint forces pushed on in the direction of Seno, an important enemy air base in Savannakhet. The enemy had to rush forces in haste from the Red River Delta and
from all other battlefields to reinforce Seno, thus turning it into a third point of concentration of their forces.

In spite of defeats at various points, the enemy remained subjective in making estimates. Because of the case with which they occupied Dien Bien Phu, the enemy thought we were incapable of attacking it. According to their thinking, the entrenched camp was too strong for our troops. Moreover, they thought that the distance which separated it from our rear created insuperable supply obstacles for us. They thought we had passed to the attack at other points because we did not know how to deal with Dien Bien Phu; they thought that shortly we should be obliged to evacuate the northwest because of supply difficulties; then they would find the means to destroy a part of our main forces and would continue execution of their plan: the occupation of Tuan Giao and Son La, and the return to Na San.

It was this same subjective estimation which made them launch the Atlanta operation against the south of Phu Yen in the Fifth Zone. This well-prepared attack was the first step in the occupation of our whole free zone in the south of Central Vietnam, as foreseen by the Navarre Plan.

Early in 1954, while the enemy were feverishly making preparations for their offensive against our free territory in the Fifth Zone, our plan was to leave only a small part of our forces to protect our rear and to concentrate big forces to attack the Western Highlands, which were an important strategic position where the enemy were relatively exposed. Our advance to the Western Highlands was accompanied by resounding victories. Important enemy units were wiped out, and the town and whole province of Kontum were liberated. Our troops made a raid on Pleiku, compelling the enemy to dispatch more troops there in reinforcement, and turning Pleiku and various bases on the Western Highlands into a fourth point of concentration of French forces.

During the same period, to create a diversion that would let our troops step up preparations at Dien Bien Phu, the Laotian-Vietnamese joint forces had launched an offensive in Upper Laos from Dien Bien Phu. Several enemy units were wiped out and the vast Nam Hu basin was liberated. The enemy was compelled to
rush additional forces to Luang Prabang, which became the fifth point of concentration of French forces.

In the first phase of the winter-spring campaign, after three months of activity by our army, the enemy had suffered great losses on all battlefields. Many vast areas of strategic importance had been liberated, and the Navarre Plan of regroupment of forces was foiled. The enemy, who had made great efforts to regroup fairly strong mobile forces on a single battlefield—the Red River Delta—were compelled to change their plan by concentrating forces on a smaller scale at many different points. In other words, the Navarre Plan of active regroupment of forces had in fact been turned into a compulsory dispersal of these same forces. The much-vaunted "Navarre mobile corps" in the Delta had been reduced from forty-four to twenty battalions, and a great part of this force was no longer mobile. It had to be scattered in order to protect the communication lines. It was the beginning of the end of the Navarre Plan.

For us, the first phase of the winter-spring campaign was a series of offensives launched simultaneously on various important sectors where the enemy were relatively exposed, in which we annihilated part of the enemy's forces and liberated occupied areas, at the same time compelling the enemy to scatter their forces in many directions. We continually kept the initiative in the operations and drove the enemy on the defensive. Also in this period, on the main battlefront, we pinned down the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, thus creating favorable conditions for our troops on other battlefields. In the national theater of operations, there was large-scale coordination between the main battlefields and the theaters of operation in the enemy's rear. In each theater, there was also close coordination between the main battlefield and the fronts in the enemy's rear. On the Indochinese battle front, Dien Bien Phu became the strongest base of regroupment of the enemy forces and therefore the most important battlefield. As Dien Bien Phu had been encircled for a long time, there were new favorable conditions for intensifying guerrilla activities and winning major successes in the Red River Delta, and in the southern part of Trung Bo, as well as in Nam Bo. The enemy lacked the forces to launch mopping-up operations on any considerable
scale. During this time, our free zones were no longer threatened. Moreover, our compatriots in the free zones could go to work even in the daytime without being molested by enemy aircraft.

It was also in the course of the first phase of the winter-spring campaign that we completed our preparations for the assault on Dien Bien Phu. During this period, the dispositions of the fortified entrenched camp had also undergone great changes. On the one hand, the enemy’s forces had been increased and their defenses strengthened; on the other hand, after the successive liberation of Lai Chau, Phong Saly, and the Nam Hu river valley, Dien Bien Phu was completely isolated, some hundreds of miles from its nearest supply bases, Hanoi and the Plaine des Jarres.

From March 13, 1954, there began the second period of the winter-spring campaign. We launched the big offensive against the fortified entrenched camp at Dien Bien Phu. This was a new step in the progress of the hostilities. Sticking firmly to our strategic principles—dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in the face of new situations—and having the conditions for victory well in hand, we directed our main attack on the most powerful entrenched camp of the enemy. The task of our regular forces on the main battlefield was no longer to encircle and immobilize the enemy in their barracks, but to go over to the attack and to concentrate forces to annihilate Dien Bien Phu. The task of the other battlefronts in the north, center, and south of Vietnam was to intensify activities continuously in coordination with Dien Bien Phu, in order to annihilate more enemy manpower, and scatter and pin down enemy forces, thus hampering the enemy in their efforts to reinforce Dien Bien Phu. On the Dien Bien Phu battlefield, our combatants fought with remarkable heroism and stubbornness. On all the coordinated battlefronts our troops did their utmost to overcome very great difficulties. They reorganized their forces while fighting, and carried out the order of coordination with admirable determination and heroism.

Such was the essence of the strategic direction of the Dien Bien Phu campaign and of the winter-spring campaign as a whole. Its main object was the destruction of enemy manpower.
It took full advantage of the contradictions in which the enemy was involved and developed to the utmost the spirit of active offensive of the revolutionary army. This correct, clear-sighted, and bold strategy enabled us to deprive the enemy of all possibility of retrieving the initiative, and to create favorable conditions to fight a decisive battle on a battlefield chosen and prepared for by us. This strategic direction ensured the success of the whole winter-spring campaign which was crowned by the great victory of Dien Bien Phu.
For years, communications along the central Annam coast had been plagued by Communist attacks against Road 1, the main north-south artery along the coast. The principal source of trouble was a string of heavily fortified villages along a line of sand dunes and salt marshes stretching from Hué to Quangtri. By 1953, the French High Command had assembled sufficient reserves in the area to attempt to clear up the threat once and for all. In the meantime, losses had been heavy; one French convoy after another passing on the road had been either shelled or ambushed by the black-clad infantry of Vietminh Regiment Ninety-five, a battle-hardened, regular Communist unit infiltrated behind French lines. This inspired the French soldiers, with that kind of black humor proper to all soldiers, to christen that stretch of Road 1 "la rue sans joie," in English, "Street Without Joy."

In July, 1953, the French High Command decided to clean up the Street Without Joy. Called "Operation Camargue," the action involved a simultaneous landing of troops along the sandy coast of central Annam, coupled with two coordinated thrusts by armored units, with air-borne forces remaining in reserve to seal off attempts at escape by the Communist forces in the trap. With the elements of 10 infantry regiments, 2 air-borne battalions, the bulk of 3 armored regiments, 1 squadron of armored launches and 1 armored train, 4 artillery battalions, 34 transport aircraft, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, and 22 fighter-bombers, and about 12 navy ships, including 3 LST's—this force was not very inferior

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in size to some of those used in landing operations in World War
II in the Pacific. Communist Regiment Ninety-five and the few
guerrilla forces around it obviously had very little chance of
escaping the encirclement.

The attack was to be carried out by two amphibious forces,
three land-borne groupments, and one air-borne force, under the
over-all command of General Leblanc, with each of the task
forces under command of a colonel.

Groupment A was to land on the coast on July 28, at dawn.
Groupment B was to advance overland in the north about two
hours later and veer south behind the line of advance of Group-
ment A. Groupment C was to participate in the attack at about
the same time as Groupment B at 0715, advance directly on the
Van Trinh Canal, and push all enemy elements west of the canal
against the canal or across it. Groupment C was to pay particular
attention to the coordination of its movements with Groupment
D, which was to land south of Groupment A on the northern
peninsula of the lagoon.

Groupment D, in turn, was to land as early as possible, at 0300
for its amphibious elements and at 0500 for its infantry, and push
northward across the peninsula in order to form a common front
with Groupment C as soon as possible. The two air-borne batt-
alions were held in reserve at the disposal of the High Command
and were to be committed only upon its express permission. This
was to have serious consequences when they were finally thrown
into the battle.

At first view, the forces assigned to this operation appeared
impressive. Using a force of more than thirty battalions and two
artillery regiments, the operation against the Street Without Joy
was certainly one of the most formidable ever carried out in the
Indochinese theater of operations. Yet the enemy, on the other
side, amounted to a maximum of one weak infantry regiment.
What made the operation so difficult for the French was, as usual
in Indochina, the terrain.

From the coast, looking inland, the zone of operations divided
itself into seven distinct natural strips of land. The first was the
coastline itself, fairly straight, covered with hard sand, and offer-
ing no difficulties. However, a bare 110 yards beyond began the
dunes, varying in height from 15 to 60 feet, very hard to climb, and ending on the land side in veritable ditches or precipices. A few fishing villages were precariously perched in the dune zone, which in certain places had a depth of more than a mile. Then came a zone about 75 yards deep, entirely covered with small pagodas, or tombs and temples, which offered excellent protection to any defenders. This zone was followed by the Street Without Joy itself, fringed by a rather curious system of interlocking small villages separated one from the other, often by less than 200 to 300 yards. Each village formed a veritable little labyrinth, which measured barely more than 200 feet by 300 feet and was surrounded by bushes, hedges, or bamboo trees, and small fences which made ground as well as aerial surveillance almost impossible. Regiment Ninety-five had spent more than two years fortifying the villages with an interlocking system of trenches and tunnels, underground arms depots, and first-aid stations, which no single brutal thrust by large mobile forces could uncover or destroy. Close to 20 miles long and more than 300 yards wide, this zone of villages constituted the heart of the Communist resistance zone along the central Annam coast.

On the land side, the Street Without Joy was preceded by another, less well-defined line of villages, the center of which was Van Trinh. This was protected in turn by a vast zone of swamps, sand holes, and quicksand bogs, extending all the way to Road 1. With an average width of about five miles, it constituted an almost impassable barrier to tanks and other motorized vehicles of the French Army, except on the few roads crossing it, which were, of course, heavily mined and sabotaged. This, in short, was the fortress known as the Street Without Joy, which the French were now determined to crack in a combined air, sea, and land assault.

What further complicated the situation for the French was that the villages had retained their civilian population of small farmers and fishermen. Since this population was, theoretically at least, to be considered “friendly,” the French High Command distributed directives to all its units on the day before the operation began that they had to show a “humane attitude” and treat civilians respectfully. Above all, they were not to bombard vil-
GROUPMENT A
Mobile Group 11
3d Amphibious Group
2d Marine Commando
2d Battalion, 1st Colonial Parachute Regiment
3d Vietnamese Parachute Battalion

FRENCH NAVY
1 LST Group
1 LCT Group
2 Commando Tenders
6 Marine Commandos

GROUPMENT B
Mobile Gp Central Vietnam
6th Moroccan Spahi
2d Amphibious Group
Tank Plt, 1st Foreign Legion
2 Infantry Companies, Quangtri Mil Post

SUPPORT UNITS
Tonkinese Arty Group
1 Gp, 60th African Arty
2 A. N. Batteries
1 155mm How Battery
1 Armored Train
2 Engineer Companies

GROUPMENT C
9th Moroccan Labor
27th V.N. Inf Bn
2d Bn, 8th Moroccan Rif Reg
1 Commando
Tank Plt, Moroccan Colonials
Armored Patrol Boat Platoon
LCM Platoon

GROUPMENT D
3d Bn, 4d Algerian Rifles
7th Amphibious Group
Commando Group
lages or set fire to them. It is certain that the limitations placed upon the employment of their weapons reduced the effectiveness of the French assault, particularly when it came into direct contact with major Vietminh resistance areas.

H hour was at dawn on July 28, 1953. The lumbering LST’s had left their assembly areas the evening before, and had steamed throughout the night toward their landing zone in the center of the coast facing the Street Without Joy. Disembarkment of the amphibious landing craft began at 0400 in a clanking of metal and a howling of engines, as the Crabs and Alligators of the Third Amphibious Group took to the water.

The Crabs and Alligators were French nicknames for two American-built amphibious vehicles. The Crab was an amphibious cargo carrier 29-C and the Alligator an LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) 4 or 4A. As their names indicated, the Crabs were never destined to become a combat vehicle, but the French in Indochina soon found that the whole squadron of Crabs could render immense service as carriers of amphibious task forces operating in the roadless swamps and rice paddies of Vietnamese lowlands and coastal areas.

At first, these unarmored vehicles, lightly armed with a few machine guns and mortars, became the victims of enemy bazookas. This led to a change in tactics, and by 1953 the amphibious group and amphibious subgroup had become regular units of the French Armored Forces in Indochina. They were regularly composed of two squadrons of thirty-three Crabs each, which were used as reconnaissance and pursuit elements; three squadrons of Alligators, which formed the breakthrough force, since they were both armed and armored; and, finally, one platoon of six LVT’s armed with howitzers providing the group with its own mobile artillery.

On the negative side, both types of vehicle were considered fragile and required a great deal of maintenance, which was often hard to come by in the swamps of Indochina. The Crab—initially built for carrying cargo in Alaska—lacked floatability in water and towered too high on land, thus offering an easy target to enemy gunners, who soon found out that it was not armored. On the other hand, it was small enough to be transported on an army truck when not in use, or could be embarked in light land-
ing craft or barges. The Alligator, much heavier and armored, took well to the water but was too heavy on land for its fragile tracks and relatively weak engine. Also, it could not travel great distances on land but had to be transported on special tank carriers, since it was too big and too heavy to be transported on trucks.

Yet, it was an impressive sight as the 160 vehicles of the Third Amphibious Group approached the Annam coast, each leaving a wide wake in the leaden-colored water, with the bright recognition streamers of the various groups flapping in the morning breeze on the tips of the radio aerials. At 0600 the first landing wave of the amphibious group hit the beaches, immediately fanning out through the coastal villages and occupying the first hillcrest line overlooking the coastal dunes. The French assault against the Street Without Joy had begun.

The regular infantry elements of the Tonkinese Mobile Group had a tougher time of it. Of the three battalions, only one—the Third Battalion of the Thirteenth Foreign Legion Half-Brigade—had had any experience in sea-borne operations; the other two battalions, the First Muong Mountaineers and the Twenty-sixth Senegalese Rifle Battalion, had had no such experience. Unfamiliar with the landing ship’s cargo nets and the rocking landing craft, and plagued with seasickness, it took them close to four hours to get ashore instead of the two hours assigned to that part of the operation. In the meantime, the men of the Third Amphibious Group were struggling with their vehicles atop the dune line. Many of the heavily loaded Alligators had bogged down in the sand as soon as they had left the coastal strip and had to be unloaded on the spot. In many other cases, the lighter Crabs had pushed on atop the dunes only to find themselves face to face with a deep precipice. However, they finally found a break between the fishing villages of Tan An and My Thuy, and soon began pushing inland on their own. Communist resistance was almost nonexistent. A few men were seen fleeing the first line of fishing villages near My Thuy, and farther to the north, two enemy platoons were seen pulling out.

In the meantime, Groupment B, under the command of Colonel du Corail, had not remained inactive. By 0630, two battalions
of the Central Vietnamese Mobile Group reached and crossed the Van Trinh Canal, and by 0745, the lead elements of Groupment B saw the squatish shapes of the Third Amphibious Group's Crabs crawling over the hill line; the Street Without Joy was sealed off to the north.

To the right of the Central Vietnamese Mobile Group, the Sixth Moroccan Spahis were not so lucky. They ran head on into the bottomless swamps and sand holes east of Road 1, where most of their vehicles, with the exception of M-24 light tanks, soon bogged down. They succeeded in reaching the canal—which was to be the line of departure for the mopping-up operation on the land side—at about 0830. In their sector, also, there was no sign of enemy opposition. In fact, the whole countryside seemed absolutely dead. No farmers were to be seen on the roads, and in the small villages the population stayed in their houses. Throughout the whole desolate landscape, the only moving objects were the French armored columns and truck-borne infantry, as they staggered through sand dunes and morasses to the Van Trinh Canal.

Only at the extreme right flank of Groupment B was there any shooting. There, an Algerian rifle company ran into unexpected fire from what appeared to be no more than twenty or thirty Vietminh. Private Mohammed Abd-el-Kader of Second Company fell forward as a burst of fire from a Browning Automatic Rifle caught him directly in the chest. Warily, his comrades fanned out in skirmish formation and shot back at the invisible enemy hidden behind clumps of bushes and in sand holes. Abd-el-Kader was the first French casualty in the assault.

To the right of Groupment B, Groupment C, under Lieutenant Colonel Gauthier, had to execute the most complicated maneuver of the operation. The bulk of its troops crossed Road 1 in the direction of the canal to the north of My Chanh. A second column started along a path running parallel to Road 1, then veered sharply to the right to reach the canal between the village of Van Trinh and the lagoon. Lastly, the Ninth Moroccan Tabor (Battalion), embarked on landing craft, went ashore at Lai-Ha at 0630, secured a beachhead, and then swung southeast along the inland coast of the lagoon in order to complete the sealing-off of the Street Without Joy on the land side. By 0830, it had reached
Tay-Hoang and completed its part of the operation's first phase.

Groupment D, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Le Hagre, was to seal off the long peninsula reaching down along the lagoon almost to the city of Hué. Composed of experienced troops, it encountered little of the difficulties which had faced Groupment A. The landing began at 0430, with the Seventh Amphibious Group in the lead, followed in rapid succession by Marine commandos and the Third Battalion of the Third Algerian Rifle Regiment. The commandos and the amphibious group hit the beach almost without stopping; the amphibious group immediately headed north in the direction of the head of the lagoon, while the commandos secured the little city of Thé Chi Dong and, cutting straight across the peninsula, reached the north side of the lagoon at 0530. For all practical purposes, Vietminh Regiment Ninety-five was trapped.

Now began the hardest phase of the whole operation—the mopping up. General Leblanc ordered the navy ships standing offshore to move four miles to the north of the villages of Băi-Lang and An-Hoi in order to seal off any attempt of the rebels to flee by sea. On the northern end of the Street Without Joy, Groupment B began a methodical sweep of every village, a painstaking operation which had to be carried out with the greatest of care, regardless of results. Each village was first surrounded and sealed off by troops. Then, heavily armored infantry moved in and searched the houses, while mine-detector and bloodhound teams probed in bamboo bushes and palm-tree stands for hidden entrances to underground caches in the midst of the sullen and silent population. As a matter of routine, most of the young men from the villages were arrested and detained pending a screening by intelligence officers, but even this had become a sort of rite in which everyone participated without any great conviction.

By 1100 in the morning Groupment B had worked its way about four miles south through the labyrinth of tiny villages, without having encountered any resistance, when it reached the village of Dong-Quê, located almost in the center of the Street Without Joy, at the intersection of several paths leading across the dunes toward the Van Trinh Canal. In the old days it had
contained a customs post whose brick structure was still standing, 
and this also gave it a certain importance.

Dong-Qué lay in the hot midday sun, snugly nestled in its 
swaying bamboo hedge, the very image of rural peacefulness in 
the monsoon season, when there is little left for the farmer to do 
but to pray for rain and watch the rice grow from a tender green 
to a rich brownish yellow. But now, Dong-Qué was the target 
of the M-24 light tanks of the Sixth Moroccan Spahis. In fact, the 
whole northern thrust seemed to be a Moroccan show, what with 
the Spahis being screened by the First Battalion, Moroccan Rifles, 
and the whole force being covered by the howitzers of Colonel 
Piroth's Sixty-ninth African Artillery Regiment which, in normal 
times, hailed from Fez, in northern Morocco. These were battle-
hardened troops; they had fought Rommel in Tunisia, waded 
through the Rapido and clambered up the Petrella in Italy, 
knocked out the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest, 
and raced the Americans to Berchtesgaden. They were the elite 
of France's North African troops, and more Moroccans had risen 
to senior ranks—even to generals—in the French Army than any 
other nationality. Here again, they were doing a workmanlike 
job clearing their sectors.

Keeping their intervals carefully, the M-24 tanks had worked 
their way toward Dong-Qué at a pace which permitted the 
infantry to keep up with them. With the innate sixth sense which 
the Moroccans seem to have for detecting mines and booby traps, 
they had come to within 1,500 yards of the village without losing 
a man or a tank, but that same sixth sense told them that some-
thing was wrong with Dong-Qué. In silence, the infantrymen 
began to peel off the dike on either side of the tanks.

Atop the vehicles, the tank commanders had so far remained 
sitting on their open hatches, as much to see more of the country-
side around them as to catch a breath of breeze. (At the First 
Foreign Legion Cavalry, one crew, which must have contained 
an ex-Nazi electronics engineer, actually succeeded in mounting 
a regular air-conditioner into an armored car. The story came to 
light when the vehicle got caught in an ambush and its crew 
got to unusual lengths to defend it and, when it was disabled, 
to retrieve it. The men were duly decorated for their bravery and
then, in true Foreign Legion tradition, were sent to the stockade for "taking liberties with Government property."

Major Derrieu, commander of the leading squadron, looked straight ahead into the small town; the road appeared clear of any obstacles or the suspicious mounds of hastily dug mine emplacements. Nevertheless, the tank churned to a halt to let the mine-detector detail make one last sweep before rolling forward. Methodically, the tanned men with the long-handled, frying pans and the earphones worked their way toward Dong-Qué, still quiescent under the tropical sun. Later, it was impossible to decide who had fired first—the Moroccan sergeant at the head of the demining detail who saw a rifle barrel flash in the sun, or a nervous Vietminh who felt that the Moroccans were getting too close for comfort. In any case, the fire fight developed with incredible violence at very short range. It was only due to the hair-trigger reactions of the Moroccans atop the road, who simply dropped to the ground and rolled off into the saving mud of the adjoining rice paddies, that none of them was seriously wounded.

The tanks were equally lucky that the Viets had probably tipped their hand ahead of time, for the two bazookas of the defenders opened fire only as the lead tanks already had left the dikes in a clatter of tracks and a howl of engines for the comparative safety of the deeper-lying fields. Now "buttoned up," the turrets swung out in the direction of the suspected targets but still holding their fire. No point in wasting high-penetration shells against thatch huts when the machine guns could do a much more effective job. The infantrymen, in turn, had spread in an arc around Dong-Qué, but without moving closer. Behind one of the many grave mounds which always dot the Far Eastern countryside, the battalion commander had squatted down on his haunches in the mud, a map case on his knees and the combination earphone-microphone of his radio set in his hand. The set itself was affixed to the back of a Vietnamese who had also squatted down and who looked solidly ahead under his battered campaign hat at the heat haze shimmering over the rice fields.

The howitzers of the Sixty-ninth got the range of their target
within a few rounds, and, minutes after the first radio call for support, Dong-Qué began literally to disintegrate under the impact of their high-angle fire. One by one the rice thatch of the roofs began to catch fire with a deep crackling sound that could occasionally be heard even above the din of the shells. Still, nobody ran; save for the agitation in the bamboo bushes around the village and the occasional flashes (hardly visible at high noon) of gunfire, the village might as well have been deserted. Then, all of a sudden, a tremendous explosion shook the village and a pillar of dense, black smoke rose in its center.

"The shells must’ve hit an underground depot," said Derrieu to his crew as he watched the shelling over the tank’s scope. "Let’s saddle up." With a howl, the idling tank engine shifted into high gear, and the lumbering vehicle, followed by the other tanks of the squadron, began to roll forward in the direction of the inferno that had been Dong-Qué. "Follow in line," said Derrieu over the intercom, and, no doubt as an afterthought due to his farmer ancestry, “and watch where you’re going. No sense in ruining their whole rice crop.”

Now, small black figures began to appear, seemingly out of nowhere: from the windows of the houses, the roof frames, and from dugouts on the side of the road, a veritable flood of human beings, completely blocking the advance of the tanks as they rolled into the village. This was phase two of the usual Vietminh defense pattern: Once the position has become untenable or breached, use the civilians as a shield for the withdrawal of the combatants. But this time, the ruse failed. The tanks were not alone and the black-clad figures which now began to leave the village ran straight into the machine-gun fire of the Moroccans. By 1100, it was all over for the Third Company, Battalion 340 of the Ninety-fifth Independent Regiment, “Vietnam People’s Army,” but its sacrifice had bought exactly what the commander had needed—two hours of time to have the bulk of the unit withdraw toward the southern end of the pocket, where the Van Trinh Canal ended in a sort of marshy, plant-covered delta which no one could effectively hope to seal off.

On the French side, General Leblanc also realized that the enemy, far from fighting to the death, was trying desperately to
buy time to last until the evening in order to withdraw into the nearby hills west of Road 1, and he ordered the dropping in of the first of the two paratroop battalions still held in reserve. At 1045, the Second Battalion, First Colonial Parachute Regiment, having flown in all the way from Hanoi, dropped into its assigned assembly area near the village of Dai-Loc, at the border of the dune zone close to Groupment D, and immediately began its drive toward the mouth of the Van Trinh Canal. The race for the closing of the net around Regiment Ninety-five had begun in earnest.

By midmorning of D day, there were still wide gaps to the south of the Van Trinh Canal near Phu-An and Lai-Ha as the Ninth Tabor struggled through the sand pits and marshes to reach its line of departure. Apparently, the Communists had correctly surmised that this was indeed the weakest point in the French perimeter and had reacted accordingly. At 0845, just as the Moroccans were about to enter Phu-An, heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire began to smash into their ranks from the surrounding dikes. Silhouetted against the blue sky as they advanced over the dikes, and against the watery surface of the rice paddies as they plodded through them toward Phu-An, they offered perfect targets and immediately suffered heavy losses. Pinned down in the open, the Ninth now began to call for help. It is here that its subordination to the faraway Groupment C rather than to the nearby amphibious Groupment D began to backfire; radio liaison to the Group's field command post at My Chanh failed to function properly, and it was not until 0910 that Colonel Gauthier found out that things had gone sour on his extreme right wing.

But the Vietminh was not placing all its tactical eggs in a single basket. At 1100, smaller units of the Communist 227th Battalion also attacked the assault guns of the First Foreign Legion Cavalry with heavy mortar fire and followed up this attack with an equally heavy mortar shelling of the Second Battalion, Fourth Moroccan Infantry. By 0940, Gauthier had decided to commit his last reserves, two companies formed from trainees of a nearby Vietnamese NCO school and three Vietnamese infantry companies hastily brought up from Hué. Finally, two additional infantry
companies were ordered into the Lai-Ha beachhead via LCM but landed only at 1500. They then floundered in the marshes for almost three hours until they finally reached the Moroccans. When they got their wind back, and had been beefed up by the reinforcements, the Moroccans counterattacked vigorously and finally occupied Phu-An at 1730.

In view of the difficulties encountered by Groupment C, General Leblanc requested the dropping of the Third Vietnamese Paratroop Battalion still held in reserve at Tourane. The order to use this second paratroop battalion was given at 1145, to be carried out at 1400. What then happened has remained somewhat unclear, but according to the officers who participated in the operation, two separate errors had been made: One was in transmission of the order itself, which delayed take-off time until about 1500; the second was in the weather forecast for the drop area. During the monsoon period, the winds which prevail on the Annam coast reach gale force late in the afternoon. This is a fact which is generally known along the coastal area, but which may, from time to time, escape the weather observers placed several hundred miles away from Annam in Saigon or Hanoi. The result was that when the C-47's of Air Transport Group "Franche-Comté" appeared over the drop zone at Lang-Bao, the wind was blowing gusts up to thirty miles an hour—twice the maximum usually permissible in the case of air-borne drops. The French jump masters were looking down at the drop zone, with the trails of its smoke pots lying almost flat on the ground, and shook their heads.

"Hell, you can't have these guys jump into this mess!" said one of them incredulously as he looked down. "They're going to be blown all over the place, light as they are."

In fact, their lightness has always been one of the problems and jokes among the Vietnamese paratroops. Jumping with American parachutes calculated to carry a 200-pound man with close to 85 to 100 pounds of equipment, the chute has proved much too vast for the small Vietnamese 100-pounders, who, even when loaded down with all their paraphernalia, still weighed only one half of their American or European counterparts. Thus, a Vietnamese air-borne unit generally floated longer in the air
a better target to ground fire), and also spread over a far wider area when landing. To load the Vietnamese down with more equipment was no solution either, because once on the ground they could not possibly carry it around. This lightness, coupled with the high wind speed, was to have disastrous consequences.

By now, the insertion of an additional battalion had become absolutely necessary on the peninsula, in order to ensure sealing off the Vietminh forces from the lagoon and the seashore. Thus, an additional battalion had to be dropped regardless of the consequences to the men themselves. At 1650, the first “stick” of Vietnamese paratroopers left the lead aircraft, followed within a few seconds by those of the other planes, and the hundreds of parachutes began to float down in the deep blue sky like a vast school of Portuguese men-of-war. Everything seemed to have gone all right. Only one parachute failed to open, and the men of the ground party saw its human burden come down, feet first, held vertically by the drag of his unopened parachute, stirring up a small cloud of sand, like an artillery shell, as he smashed into the dune.

The strong wind caught the other paratroopers about 150 feet above the ground. It was as if an invisible fist had been driven through them; some of them left the vertical position and began to fly off almost horizontally. Others, closer to the ground, were slammed into it and dragged over the bushes, marshes, and dikes at the speed of a racing horse. Two paratroopers were strangled to death by the shroud lines of their own parachutes as they desperately tried to liberate themselves before being dragged away. The equipment parachuted with the battalion suffered an even worse fate. Since most of the packages were somewhat lighter than the paratroopers, they floated even farther away, some of them falling into the sea and many of them drifting into Communist-held territory. When the battalion finally was assembled at about 1730 (some of the men had been dragged more than a mile before they had been able to liberate themselves from their runaway parachutes), it was at best a weak rifle force. Close to 10 per cent of the men had suffered jump accidents, and most of the heavy equipment—mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and ammunition—had been lost in the drop. But it was in time
to take up its position in the southern tip of the pincer around
Regiment Ninety-five, between the Third Amphibious Group
and the Second Paratroop Battalion, which had landed in the
morning. By nightfall, with Phu-An and Van Trinh occupied,
the enemy had now been constricted into a pocket about nine
miles long and two miles wide. To all appearances, Operation
Camargue was a success.

However, this success was more one of appearance than of
reality. To be sure, one-half of the Street Without Joy already
had fallen into French hands—but without the expected booty of
enemy prisoners and equipment. This meant that the enemy forces
and equipment were still in the pocket. The pocket, if the French
were to succeed, had to become an airtight trap.

The trap, however, had not become airtight. Along the south-
ern sector of Groupment C, the last-ditch defense of Phu-An and
the counterattacks of Battalion 227 had kept the French from
reaching the natural boundary of the Van Trinh Canal. The
result was that four French battalions had to guard a front more
than seven miles long in order to prevent the escape of about
2,600 men. It was obvious that this pocket had several important
gaps, particularly the whole network of tiny rivulets and canals
cutting across the Van Trinh Canal toward Road 1.

To be sure, the amphibious Crabs and Alligators were sta-
tioned near, or even in, many of the canals; and hundreds of
infantrymen spent an uncomfortable night standing in the knee-
deep mud of the rice paddies, watching the black expanse ahead of
them, where the slightest noise could be that of a frog jumping,
or of a Communist infiltrator stumbling over a branch. There is
nothing that sounds more like a patrol seeking its way forward
in the mud than a stray buffalo plodding to its stable.

The night of D day plus one passed without major incident.
Whatever shooting occurred was at fleeting shadows. Here and
there, a French parachute flare lit up the pocket area in its
ghostly greenish light before it fizzed into the wet underbrush,
or the headlights of a French tank or amphibious vehicle probed
the night to search out the sources of suspect noises. But nothing
noteworthy was detected.
When dawn broke, the men resumed their march forward, this time on all fronts at once. The countryside appeared completely empty in the morning sun. The farmers again did not come out of the villages to till their fields; the little Vietnamese boys who are always riding the lumbering buffaloes out to pasture were nowhere to be seen with their charges. Again, the only things that seemed to be moving in the countryside were the French tanks, the amphibious vehicles with their long aerials dipping in the breeze, and long lines of grimy, weary, mud-caked infantrymen now plodding through the fields in an almost unbroken line from horizon to horizon.

By 1300, with the sun beating unmercifully on steel helmets and berets or campaign hats, Groupments A and D, along with parts of Groupment B, reached the Van Trinh Canal throughout its whole length on the side opposite to Colonel Gauthier's Groupment C. The trap had been sprung on the Street Without Joy. The steel jaws of a modern armed force, supported by naval ships, amphibious tanks, and aircraft, had slammed shut on a force of hurriedly trained farmers led by men who, in only a few cases, had received the training of corporals and sergeants. A trap ten times the size of the force to be trapped had shut—and had caught nothing.

To be sure, "suspects" were found: that is, men of military age who could not prove that they belonged to the village where they were arrested and who could, therefore, be assumed to have been members of Communist fighting units. A few weapons were also found, and at the northern end of the pocket, where the Viet-minh had made its stand at Dong-Quê, some prisoners were taken, arms in hand. But on the whole, as of D day plus thirty-six hours, Operation Camargue already was a failure. However, it was not entirely over.

Some of the low-flying Morane observation planes had detected suspect movements in the direction of An-Hoi—proof that some elements of Regiment Ninety-five had escaped toward the north. At 1300, therefore, General Leblanc ordered a marine commando unit and infantry from Groupment A to carry out a sea-borne raid on An-Hoi. The raid was carried out swiftly
enough; the troops landed at 1500, mopped up rapidly whatever suspects could be found, and returned to their ships by 1800, their mission accomplished.

There remained one more task to be accomplished in the now-occupied villages, the methodical house-to-house search for hidden entrances, camouflaged storage dumps, and the one-in-a-thousand chance of finding a really important Communist cadre, one of the unassuming black-clad can-ho who, often barely twenty years old, really ran the war for the enemy. Hundreds of infantrymen swarmed out with mine detectors or, simply, long metal rods, thumping their rifle butts on the ground to detect suspicious hollow areas; others would strip and, holding hands, form a chain and would slowly walk through the marshes and ponds in the hope of finding weapons and equipment dumped into the water at the last moment—a sort of gigantic human rake slowly moving up and down the countryside.

Here and there, one of the members of the human rake would scream in pain, and his friends would pull him up from the water, his foot pierced by a rude but effective caltrop—a small wooden plank studded with seven-inch-long barbed steel arrowheads, which could pierce a foot even through the thick soles of a jungle boot. What with the usual infection, the soldier would be disabled for three months or more. But the human chains and the mine detectors and bloodhound teams kept on with their monotonous and frustrating work, full of the knowledge of its futility.

Atop the sand dunes, the Crabs and Alligators of the Second and Third Amphibious Groups were still herding suspects toward the coastal village of Trung-An for combing out by Vietnamese and French intelligence and security teams. These were the real victims of the war, the hapless civilians caught in the bow wave of a French armored group plowing under in ten minutes a rice crop that had been the fruit of five months of backbreaking work; or caught in the ever-present clutches of a Vietminh "tax cadre" demanding his party's share of the crop's proceeds, after the farmer already had paid close to three-fourths of his crop to the landlord, the usurer, and the government tax collector. Too bad—there will be no shirt for little Hoang, who was to go to the
village school this year and there will be no pork to supplement
the diet of rice and fish for the lunar New Year, the Tết.

By the end of D day plus two, all organized resistance had ceased, and on the following day began the withdrawal of the first-line units—the paratroopers, amphibious groups, and Marine commandos. Now came the real job of permanently controlling the newly occupied area. Bridges that had been dynamited over the past years had to be rebuilt; roads cut into ribbons by Vietminh saboteurs had to be filled in; the whole artificial desert which the Communists had created around the Street Without Joy had to be eliminated. Vietnamese Government administrators made their timid appearance in the face of a hostile or frightened population which, after a week’s fighting and years of life in a state of siege, needed everything from rice to antimalaria tablets.

“Funny,” said Major Derrieu of the Sixth Spahis, watching some of the new administrators in the village of Dong-Qué, “they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we’ve just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals, which—let’s face it—they are in many cases.”

“That may be so,” said young Lieutenant Dujardin, standing on the shady side of his M-24, “but I wouldn’t care to be in his shoes tonight, when we pull out. He’s going to stay right here in the house which the Comminic commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with the other four guys of his administrative team, with the nearest post 300 yards away. Hell, I’ll bet he won’t even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway.”

“He probably will, and he’ll immediately lose face with the population and become useless.”

“And if he doesn’t, he’ll probably be dead by tomorrow, and be just as useless. In any case, there goes the whole psychological effect of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from now. What a hopeless mess.”

“Well, if the Vietnamese can’t lick that, we certainly can’t. After all, it’s their country. Let’s saddle up.” With a shrug, both men walked back to their tanks, climbing into the turrets with the litheness of long practice.
Below them, on the tiny square of ruined Dong-Quê, the young, earnest Vietnamese administrator, in his khaki shirt and slacks, was still talking to the villagers. They stood there impassively, like so many wooden statues.

On August 4, 1953, the High Command called off Operation Camargue. According to the newspapers, it had been a “total success, demonstrating once more the new aggressiveness and mobility” of the French and the value of great amounts of motorized equipment in swamp warfare. In their own reports, the French treated the operation with mixed feelings.

To be sure, Regiment Ninety-five had, for the time being, disappeared as a constant menace along the central Annam coast. Two dozen villages or more had been placed under at least partial influence of the national authorities. But this had been no operation “on the cheap.” Important numbers of troops and matériel had to be withdrawn from other vital sectors where they were sorely lacking, and where their absence began to create emergencies of their own.

And the results in actual loss of enemy combat potential had been frustrating. For French losses of 17 dead and 100 wounded, the enemy had lost 182 dead and 387 prisoners, along with 51 rifles, 8 submachine guns, 2 mortars, and 5 BAR’s—and how many of the dead and prisoners were regulars of the Ninety-fifth Regiment, and not merely local farmers or members of the always expendable Du-Kich (Communist village militia), remained open to question.

As regards swamp warfare tactics, Operation Camargue had once more proved that it was impossible to seal off a pocket in an airtight fashion as long as a battalion had to hold more than 1,500 yards of ground—and most of the battalions along the southern flank of the pocket had held more than 3,000 yards. Thus, the fact that the bulk of the Communist forces could slip through the “bouclage”—the ring of French infantry and armor—was a foregone conclusion as soon as the slow progress of the infantry on the first day eliminated all hopes of constricting the pocket to manageable size by nightfall.

For the progress of the infantry had been slow. In fact, it had
been a crawl of about 1,500 yards an hour, on the average. But
here again the tactical commander was caught in a dilemma. The
purpose of the operation was not the surface occupation of the
villages but the flushing-out of the enemy from his well-camou-
flaged hiding places and underground installations; hence any
speed-up of the advance would be at the expense of the thorough-
ness of the search for weapons, men, and secret administrative
organizations. This dilemma was one that posed itself time and
again in the course of mop-up operations and was never satisfac-
torily resolved.

But, basically, the major defect of Operation Camargue was one
which was shared by practically all similar operations in the Indo-
Chinese war: No sealing-off of an enemy force could be successful
unless the proportion of attackers to defenders was 15 to 1 or
even 20 to 1, for the enemy had in its favor an intimate knowl-
edge of the terrain, the advantages of defensive organization, and
the sympathy of the population.

Another definite advantage of the enemy was its edge in com-
batt intelligence. Very seldom did the French know exactly what
they were looking for in the case of such a mop-up. On the
other hand, the very size and mechanization of the units employed
against the Vietminh sooner or later gave away French intentions
and even their order of battle; for the positioning of large units
required the prior arrival of reconnaissance detachments and
liaison officers whose presence rarely remained undetected. Thus,
tactical surprise was, with the exception of air-borne raids, non-
existent, and the terrain itself precluded the use of high speed as
a compensating factor.

Vietminh Regiment Ninety-five had lived to fight another day.
In the spring of 1954, it again began to infiltrate back into its old
hunting grounds, where it ambushed several convoys on Road 1,
and even attacked a Vietnamese battalion stationed near Hué.
Communist forces had to evacuate the area in July, 1954, when
the Geneva cease-fire split Vietnam in two at the 17th Parallel,
which runs a bare ten miles to the north of Quangtri. Once more,
the men of Regiment Ninety-five emerged from their hide-outs,
picked up their weapons from the marshes and swamps, and now
marched north in broad daylight along that Road 1 for which they had fought so bitterly. Here and there along the road were stationed some of the tanks of the Sixth Spahis, guns elevated and turret hatches open.

Peace had come again to the Street Without Joy.
A point to remember about unconventional warfare is that it does not always follow the conventionally unconventional patterns of Greece, Malaya, and Indochina.

Guerrilla war is the form of war that the weak must choose. It develops maximum power when coupled with the support of regular forces. Such a situation occurred in Russia during World War II, and Ernst von Dohnanyi was there. Born of German émigré parents in Kiev, he was educated in Russia and Germany and won the Iron Cross, both first and second class. This prophetic article was written in 1955, three years after his release from an eight-year term in a Russian prison camp.

Mrs. Chapelle is a wide-ranging photographer-cum-correspondent for *Life*, *Reader's Digest*, and—we are proud to say—the *Gazette*. Her beats have included Castro, the FLN in Algeria, and the interior of a Hungarian prison cell. Meeting her in improbable locales, many military men have asked: "What's a woman doing here?" That is the title of her recent book (William Morrow and Company, 1962). We think there is a lesson in her account of how Castro won, but there is an even more significant one in why
Batista lost—cause to ponder the relation of politics to military power.

Lieutenant Colonel Gourlay, Royal Marines, describes still another pattern—that of sheer terrorism in a tiny area. One of Britain's most respected young professionals, he was picked to be the commander of the first Marines (41 Commando) aboard H.M.S. Bulwark.
Combating Soviet Guerrillas

ERNST VON DOHNANYI

1.

Guerrilla warfare has become an essential part of modern strategy, a factor which should not be overlooked by the military leaders. This was sufficiently proved by the guerrilla and resistance movements in almost every occupied European country during World War II, in Indonesia, Indochina, and Korea.

It seems, however, that the possibility of guerrilla warfare has been completely overlooked by the military planning staffs of the Western world. Consequently, the modern soldier is being trained to use every conceivable weapon to defend himself against the most terrible tools of destruction on land and in the air, but he still remains unprepared to cope with the equally dangerous and exacting work of combating guerrillas. This negligence on the part of general staffs may prove to be as disastrous in the future as it was for the German armed forces during World War II.

The dogmatic attitude of the German General Staff during the Soviet campaign was, undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for its failure, originally to prevent, and later, to suppress the Soviet guerrilla movement which inflicted so many losses upon the German fighting forces. Depending on the success of the blitzkrieg and the political weakness of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union, the Germans failed to make preparations for the severe Russian winter, and apparently completely excluded the idea of a possible guerrilla threat from their minds. The arrogant and foolish policy of the German civil government in regard to the Soviet people cannot be accepted as an excuse for the narrow-minded planning of the military authorities. Practically the identical shortsighted attitude as that of the German General Staff
during World War II was displayed by the U.S. military command during the Seminole Indian War in Florida under Jackson's and Van Buren's administrations. The government troops dispatched to pacify the Indians were certainly sufficiently trained for orthodox battle but, not being familiar with Indian fighting in the woods, they paid a terrible toll in blood for their eventual success.

In order to comprehend the amazingly swift development of guerrilla bands, it is necessary to review the events of 1941. Seeking to attain their main objective—the annihilation of major Soviet forces—German spearheads rushed eastward, broke through Soviet defenses, surrounded entire armies, and spread confusion in the Soviet rear; but unfortunately, they paid little attention to dispersed units and scattered personnel who remained in the occupied areas. Naturally, Soviet officers and enlisted men who did not care to surrender disappeared into the countryside. Some exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothing and sought refuge in villages; others hid in swamps and forests; the more active of them organized guerrilla bands.

The early winter, the unexpected setback at Moscow, the inadequate supply of winter clothing, and the breakdown of supply lines forced the German troops onto the defensive. Deep snow and severe cold compelled the poorly clothed and equipped troops to stay in settlements, which in turn permitted the still small guerrilla bands to remain undisturbed in the woods. By the spring of 1942, it was too late—numerous guerrilla groups had gained complete control over the territory not directly occupied by German forces. Innumerable assaults on communication and supply lines (and even on small German garrisons) forced the German units to concentrate solely on defending these vital arteries.

The organization of Soviet guerrilla bands was comparatively simple. Recruited from military personnel and fanatical Communists, the bands established their headquarters and camps deep in inaccessible woodlands and swamps. If no direct threat of a German attack was expected, they billeted themselves in villages and small towns from which, in case of emergency, they could fall back to their hiding places in the forests. The population,
who were given no protection by German forces, willingly accepted and supported them. The bands varied in number from approximately fifteen to 200, depending on the terrain, the availability of volunteers, and the attitude of the populace toward the German invaders. Smaller bands were led by a detachment commander and a political commissar. Leaders of task groups or sabotage squads—dispatched to intercept a German supply truck, to destroy a railroad bridge, or to procure food—were appointed from among the most efficient members of the group.

Later, large guerrilla bands were subdivided into platoons and squads. Two or three bands were loosely organized into brigades. In time, communications were established between bands and brigades and the Soviet Supreme Command across the front lines. Procurement of arms and ammunition was easily accomplished from equipment thrown away by the soldiers of the routed Soviet armies. Food supply was available in villages and collective farms which, in most cases, had not been dissolved by the Germans and were frequently still managed by the same Soviet functionaries—an error which proved to be of great assistance to the guerrillas. On the other hand, the lack of clothing and medical supplies appeared to be a considerable handicap to the guerrilla bands.

Their operations were chiefly limited to sabotage, cutting of German supply lines, mining of railroad tracks and roads, and occasional assaults upon small German units. These missions were usually executed by small groups at night. In comparatively few cases did the guerrillas attack larger German units, and then only under the most advantageous circumstances. Thus, in the winter of 1941–42, a German engineer battalion was annihilated, while embarked on a train moving west of Bryansk. Having stopped the train by removing the rails in a cleared area, the guerrillas opened fire with four or five heavy machine guns and succeeded in killing most of the Germans before they managed to evacuate the train and reach a snow-covered embankment. However, it offered no better protection than had the train against the murderous fire. The above incident was an isolated case; generally the guerrillas disappeared into the woods as soon as the approach of a German unit was reported by their sentries.

Greatly alarmed by the new threat, the German command
initiated intensive study of appropriate methods of suppressing the guerrilla activities. To accomplish this, each commanding officer was authorized to do what he deemed best. Certain of them tried to hunt down the guerrilla bands by dispatching combat units into the woods. This method proved to be unsuccessful. If not confronted by superior guerrilla forces, or decimated in a trap, the companies or battalions returned after an abortive search with empty hands. The great advantage of guerrilla bands in woodlands lay in their mobility and their ability to disperse and disappear among the population, their excellent communication with the local inhabitants, and in the clumsiness of regular army units inexperienced in backwoods fighting.

Efforts to eliminate the guerrilla movement through retaliatory measures against the population were even more disastrous. The endangered population fled into the same inaccessible areas and joined the guerrillas. It was often like an endless chain. Small German units or supply trains were attacked in a village and routed. German reinforcements arriving later found no trace of guerrillas. The population was reluctant to give any information regarding the attackers, as they knew that after the departure of the Germans, they would have to account for their “treason” to the guerrillas who were the actual masters of the unprotected farmer. Their reluctance to speak seemed to the Germans to be a manifestation of loyalty to the bandits. Enraged by the sight of their dead comrades, the German soldiers frequently took revenge by shooting some innocent peasants or by burning down a part, or all, of a village. These unjust acts merely increased the hatred of the native for the Germans and either led him to join the guerrilla bands, or made him a willing spy for them.

Large-scale operations conducted by several regular divisions did little harm to the guerrilla movement. These thoroughly planned and expertly executed offensives might have guaranteed victory over a regular army unit operating in an orthodox manner, but they were not effective against a foe who had no permanent bases, who acted as an organized armed force one day, and became a group of peaceful farmers the next. Having surrounded a large guerrilla-controlled area, the battalions would spread out in a line, create a tight circle around the objective, and advance
slowly through the brush and swamp in a combing operation. Whenever such a unit met opposition, reserves, reinforced by tanks and artillery, would be dispatched to break the opposition and to annihilate the band. In spite of clever planning, the majority of the guerrilla bands usually managed to escape from the endangered area before the operation started, simply because they had been forewarned by the increase of troops in the region, or by local informants.

In addition to the active measures described above, the German command was forced to employ many divisions for the static defense of roads, railroads, and other means of communication. These vital lines had been fortified—thousands of bunkers, palisades, and entrenched posts had been built along the railroads and roads; patrols walked from post to post in order to prevent sabotage on the tracks and to detect hidden mines. This task was performed chiefly by German guard regiments, Hungarian and Romanian units, and indigenous volunteer units. None of them were very reliable: the German units because of age and quality of personnel (either too old or physically disqualified for service in combat units), the allies because of their unwillingness to fight for the German cause, the indigenous volunteers because they had no real reason to fight.

It was a dangerous situation for the Germans. All of these efforts had failed to eliminate the danger of guerrilla raids which, in fact, were growing in frequency and ferocity.

In spite of this apparently hopeless situation, some German generals and commanders did find appropriate means to meet this threat. Their flexible plans enabled them to adopt unorthodox tactics and, in doing so, finally to succeed in forcing the guerrilla bands to withdraw or to reduce their activities.

The most outstanding example was conceived by the commanding general of the German Second Panzer Army, General-oberst (Colonel General) Schmidt. In early December, 1941, this army had been stopped south of Moscow and had fallen back to the stabilized line Zhizdra–Orel–Kursk. It was discovered that almost the entire rear, with the exception of larger towns like Bryansk, Bezhitisa, Karachev, Dmitrovsk, Dmitriev, and Sevsk, was under guerrilla control. The supply lines for the whole army
consisted of a single railroad—Orel-Karachev-Bryansk-Unetscha-
Orsha-Minsk—and the highway Orel-Bryansk-Roslavl-Smolensk.
The areas south of Bryansk, including Lokot and Trubchevsk,
and north of this city, including Dyat'kovo and Lyudinovo, were
controlled by strong guerrilla bands which were a constant threat
to these supply lines. In the spring of 1942, the towns of Dyat'-
kovo and Lyudinovo had been cleared of guerrillas by German
troops. However, their garrisons were connected with one an-
other by means of only one road and a branch railroad line which
were also subjected to frequent guerrilla attacks.

The area south of Bryansk was divided by the Bryansk-L'gov
railroad into a wooded section west of the railroad and plains
east of it. The eastern section was soon brought under control
by the Germans. Garrisons were stationed in Karachev, Brassovo,
Navlya, and Lokot. The district enclosed by these towns, with
the exception of its northern part, offered no protection to guer-
riilla bands and was quickly abandoned by them. On the other hand,
the area between the railroad and the Desna River was covered
with woods and swamps which formed perfect terrain for guer-
riilla hiding places and camps. An estimated 6,000 guerrillas and
an equal number of farmers and their families populated this area.
The available German reserves—some Hungarian regiments—
were ordered to guard the Bryansk-L'gov railroad line. The com-
manding general of the Second Panzer Army assigned only a
small number of other troops to check the guerrilla assaults.

The tactics formulated by Generaloberst Schmidt to suppress
guerrilla operations south of Bryansk deserve a special study
which, unfortunately, cannot be made at this time. However, a
brief description of the events may suffice to demonstrate the in-
genuity of his plan.

In March, 1942, a horse-drawn sled from Karachev arrived at
Navlya and Lokot, bringing a small group of Russian civilians.
The chief, one Kaminski, a slender, energetic, middle-aged man,
presented to the German garrison commanders “to-whom-it-may-
concern” orders signed by Generaloberst Schmidt, which re-
quested German units to render every possible assistance to the
bearer of the order. Furthermore, the order appointed Kaminski
as governor of the area including the towns of Navlya, Lokot,
Dmitrovlisk, Dmitriet, and Sevsk. He was authorized to act independently, to appoint local officials, to organize the economy of the area, and, what is more important, he was responsible only to Generaloberst Schmidt. No German officer in this area was to interfere with Kaminski's activities.

The new governor immediately appointed Bürgermeister (mayors), proclaimed the abolishment of the collective-farm system, supervised the distribution of the remaining implements and stock among farmers, and started the organization of local militia for the protection of this area against guerrilla raids. This reorganization changed the situation entirely. From then on, every cow, horse, pig, and loaf of bread were the private property of the farmer Ivanov or Petrov. The population went to work with great eagerness. At last, it seemed, the Germans were acting as they had been expected to: At last they began to abolish the hated collective farms, to give the population self-government, and to limit their own influence merely to military needs. At the same time, the newly created property owners turned their wrath against guerrillas who still visited their villages at night seeking food. Prior to Kaminski's time, the farmer had watched apathetically while the foraging bands confiscated collective-farm stock; however, now he was directly affected, he was going to lose his own property—his cow, or pig. Many young men enlisted in the local militia and were treated by the population with the greatest respect. By the summer of 1942, the marauding guerrilla bands were met with fierce resistance. Every step outside of the protecting woods became dangerous; for every bit of food seized in a village during a night raid they had to pay with blood. Both parties were at home in this territory; both fought for their livelihood; both fought without mercy. Gradually, the antagonism between guerrillas and farmers began to overshadow the events of the war, politics, and even their dislike of the Germans. The militia, unassisted by the Germans, equipped itself with what could be found in the woods—left there by the retreating Soviet Army. Efforts were made to repair and employ the abandoned Soviet heavy equipment—tanks, antitank guns, howitzers, mortars, machine guns, etc. Finally, Kaminski's force became a formidable brigade, consisting of five or six battalions of 500 to 600
War, Revolution, and Terror

men each, a tank unit with ten to twelve light tanks, and an artillery battalion with some twenty guns. This number was not only sufficient to stop the guerrilla raids on the villages and towns of the area, but also to launch counter-attacks, and, with the assistance of some German units, even a counteroffensive in the spring of 1943. During this offensive, Kaminski's militia drove the guerrillas from practically the entire area between Dmitrovsk, Dmitriev, Sevsk, and Lokot, and pushed the borders of the "liberated area" six to nine miles northwest of Lokot and about four miles west of the Bryansk-L'gov railroad line. Considering the fact that he received neither arms nor supply from the Germans, Kaminski's success exceeded all expectations. No doubt, had not the German retreat interrupted this development, Kaminski would have succeeded in his task of pacifying the entire area entrusted to him. Events, however, forced the indigenous militia to join the German forces in their retreat west. A few weeks later, Kaminski's militia, having lost their primary reason for fighting, deprived of their property, and knowing that there would be no pardon by Soviet authorities, became a mere gang of bandits who plundered the population, indulged in drinking, quarreled with the Germans and among themselves, refused to fight, and at last were disbanded by the German command.

Sound ideas were sometimes also born among field personnel of the German Army. Some battalion, company, and platoon leaders formulated methods for effective small-scale antiguerrilla warfare. If properly developed, these ideas could serve as a basis for the organization of special antiguerrilla units in the armed forces of the Western world.

After the retreat from Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, a German communications battalion was ordered to occupy Bezhitsa. As has been mentioned, this surrounded town and its outskirts were repeatedly raided by guerrilla bands, which were hiding in the woodlands north and northwest of the town. In order to keep these unpleasant neighbors away from Bezhitsa, the battalion commander established several outposts on the periphery of the city. The most advanced post was stationed in the village of Chaikovitchi, about two miles north of Bezhitsa. Fortunately, the commander of this post was a German who had
spent many years in the Soviet Union and was familiar with Russian customs, the Russian mind, and the Russian language. Having no definite orders, this officer was at liberty to wage war in his own way. The post garrison consisted of fifteen German soldiers and about as many native volunteers (sons of kulaks, persons persecuted by the Soviets for political or criminal reasons, and some adventurers). It required no special intelligence to discover that guerrilla scouts were watching this post from a very short distance, that some of the villagers were guerrilla spies, and that every German move was immediately reported to the headquarters of the guerrilla band. With insulting impudence, the guerrillas constantly mined the road from Bezhitsa to Dyat’kovo just outside of Chaikovichi. Almost every day, trucks proceeding in convoy to Dyat’kovo were destroyed on this unpaved road. The commanding officer of the Chaikovichi post decided that some action must be taken. Having picked out a group of twelve reliable Germans and natives, he undertook to reconnoiter the surrounding area. For several days, this squad crisscrossed the entire region, avoiding deliberately the woods and ravines until everyone became familiar with the terrain. Then, paying attention to utmost secrecy, the patrols were shifted to nighttime. At irregular times, without confiding his plans even to the German personnel, the post commander summoned his squad and left the village, using a covered route in order to avoid observation. Having reached the extensive woods north or west of the village, the squad waited until dawn. This precaution was necessary in order to deceive the guerrilla sentries watching the German post from various points during the day, and perhaps from the village itself at night. An encounter with guerrillas in the forest was not to be feared. The squad was equipped with automatic weapons and hand grenades, and was thoroughly indoctrinated for such a fight. If worst came to worst, a retreat would present no difficulties: The tree trunks offered sufficient protection against rifle fire; an envelopment by the enemy would be extremely difficult to perform; the firepower of automatic rifles and submachine guns was sufficient to create a gap in a comparatively thin guerrilla line. Moreover, it was unlikely that a guerrilla band would stand and fight a German unit whose strength was unknown to them.
After a period of approximately four weeks, during which time scouting was carried on almost daily, the squad had sufficiently explored the area to determine the approximate location of the guerrilla camp. Scouts discovered fresh paths and guerrilla messages or warnings written on the bark of trees. Most of the paths led from the margin of the woods to a swampy district some two and a half miles inside the forest. The first important work had been accomplished. The commander realized that his unit was too small for an attack on the hide-out. Consequently, reinforcements were requested. The request was approved and the reinforcements promised for a date in the near future. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance squad in Chaikovichi shifted from scouting to ambush tactics. Leaving the village with the same caution, the squad marched after sunset across the country to places from which they could watch the Bezhitsa—Dyat'kovo road, which frequently was mined by guerrilla saboteurs. The patience of the squad was put to a considerable strain; having spent a night at one place, the ambush party learned that mines had been laid at another site. However, one night, while lying in the grass on a flat knoll dominating the road, the scouts saw three or four figures moving on the road. At a signal from the leader, the squad opened fire. The surprised guerrillas ran into the dark without firing a single shot, but left one of their party, a boy of about seventeen who had been killed by a burst of machine-gun fire. This rather small victory would not be worth while mentioning, had it not caused the discontinuance of mine-laying on this road. The guerrillas seemed to be greatly surprised and apparently frightened, since they did not know how many such ambushes were laid, from whence the enemy came, and how strong he was.

Some days later, returning from a reconnaissance trip into the woods, the squad surprised a man lying under a tree about 110 yards in front of the woods. In a semicircle, concealed by the high grass, the scouts approached the man. Startled by a crack of a dry branch or some other sound, the stranger jumped to his feet, and seeing several Germans, took to flight. A few bursts brought him down. A second man, unnoticed so far, jumped down from the tree with raised hands. It appeared that this was a sentry post watching the traffic on the road to Dyat'kovo. In
addition, this post was to notify the guerrilla camp back in the
woods of approaching danger.

At last, the promised reinforcements arrived in Bezhitza. It was
important not to arouse the suspicions of the guerrillas in Chaikov-
ichi. Therefore, both the infantry company and the reconnaiss-
sance squad were embarked in tarpaulin-covered trucks in
Bezhitza and, together with the usual convoy, departed as if for
Dyat'kovo. The assault force dismounted from trucks deep in
the woods above Chaikovichi and northeast of the suspected
guerrilla camp. The captured guerrilla sentry was to be the guide.
With his hands tied, and led on a rope, the prisoner was made to
understand that disobedience or treachery would mean certain
death to him. After about a two-hour march, the unit arrived
without incident at the swamp. Disclosures by the guerrilla
indicated that the camp was pitched about 550 yards farther
southwest on a hill in the middle of this area. The swamp ap-
peared to be only waist deep. The company spread out and the
soldiers advanced at intervals of five or six paces in order not to
lose sight of one another. In spite of this, the left wing of the
company advanced too quickly, and three or four men popped
up in the guerrilla camp long before the rest of the company had
arrived. The surprise was complete. The band had just started
their breakfast, which was served in primitive pots on rough-
hewn tables. Terrified by the sudden appearance of the Germans,
the guerrillas, among whom there were several women, fled in
panic in all directions, leaving everything behind. Those who ran
toward the approaching German line were either killed or cap-
tured; others managed to escape into the protection of the brush
and high grass. In all probability, the major part of the routed
band found other guerrilla groups and continued their activities
in another district. At any rate, the area between Bezhitza and
Dyat'kovo seemed to be taboo for guerrillas from this time on.
Not a single assault, not a single mine, was reported or discovered
until the retreat of the German troops in August, 1943.

Neither of the two examples—Kaminski and the Chaikovichi
squad—was a decisive victory over the guerrilla movement. But,
and this cannot be sufficiently stressed, they demonstrated one
very essential thing, namely that guerrillas cannot survive in an
area where they are deprived of a food supply and freedom of movement. To achieve this objective, methods other than those prescribed for normal combat must be adopted.

II.

The effectiveness of a regular military unit depends chiefly upon its combined firepower and coordinated action. If control is lost so that each small unit must operate without this over-all coordination, it loses a great deal of its strength. Consequently, when a unit is forced to fight in a strange country over unfamiliar terrain, this unit will prefer to fight in the open, where control is easier and firepower can be fully utilized.

On the other hand, the very nature of guerrilla bands accounts for their preference for close country and woodlands, areas where they can easily retreat and hide themselves. Since there is no central authority such as the state to enforce discipline, it is almost impossible to forge a guerrilla band into a unit that would be the equal of a regular command and that could offer battle in the open.

But in their native mountains, forests, or swamps, guerrillas are far superior to regular forces, since they can attack their enemy whenever they hold the advantages of time and terrain and are assured of a safe retreat. From their hidden camps, they can easily watch the enemy, maintain communications with their agents in occupied settlements, and between their own bands. It requires no special intelligence work for them to find out the location of enemy troops as well as their vulnerable supply and communication lines. Knowing these things, a guerrilla can live and move about in his area without great danger. He can even enter the villages and towns that are under the control of the invading forces.

Apart from the purely political and psychological means of preventing or suppressing a guerrilla movement, it remains to be considered what can or cannot be done from a strictly military point of view. The answer does not seem to be very complicated: Guerrillas must be fought with guerrilla methods by specially trained units that can be trained and equipped without great cost.
and without detriment to the major force. However, it is necessary that serious consideration be given to this problem by the responsible command.

As soon as an army penetrates into foreign territory, it must assign a certain number of units to guard its supply and communication lines, as well as for garrison duty. The employment of some of these units for active suppression of guerrilla bands would tend to decrease their number rather than require additional personnel. But these antiguerrilla units must be previously organized and trained in order to achieve success.

German experiences during World War II proved that:

Units assigned to guerrilla warfare must operate directly under a corps or army staff.

They must be completely mobile in summer and winter.

They must consist of appropriately equipped, independently operating companies or battalions.

The personnel must be carefully chosen and thoroughly trained for this special task.

A suggested organization for such an antiguerrilla battalion is as follows:

1. Personnel. If possible, volunteers to be chosen from such professions as rangers, woodsmen, and professional and amateur hunters, as well as from the rural population of wooded and mountainous areas. People who are acquainted with the terrain and language of the presumed enemy country are to be preferred. Volunteers from urban areas may also become proficient. Age: between eighteen and forty. Special requirements: well-developed ability to find one's bearings, be a good marksman with several weapons, maturity, and good physical condition.

2. Training. Basic military training: have a thorough knowledge of and be expert in use of all organic weapons and, if possible, those of the enemy. Operational training in woods, swamps, and mountains: operating alone (the fear of fighting when alone against guerrillas must be taken from the fighter), or within a squad or in platoon formation; training in the systematic procedures must be taught with guerrilla methods by specially trained units that can be trained and equipped without great cost.
operations in the winter; use of snow as shelter, and woodsman-
ship. In addition, lectures should be delivered regarding the way
of life and the customs of the presumed enemy people; the best
ways to treat them in order to win their friendship and support;
rules of land warfare and how they are to be applied in case of
guerrilla warfare (justly but severely), and economic conditions
of the occupied country.

3. Organization and Equipment. The organization of a Marine
Corps battalion with its squads subdivided into fire teams and its
great firepower would roughly meet with the requirements of an
antiguerrilla battalion. Its equipment may generally be the same.
However, keeping in mind the fact that companies, platoons,
and even squads may be forced to operate independently, some
additional equipment must be supplied to these units. squads dis-
patched into woods or mountains must be provided with means
of communication, that is to say light, portable radios with suffi-
cient range (at least three miles); platoons need more powerful
sets in order to maintain communications with the company head-
quarters which may be located at a greater distance. The battalion
must be equipped with a sufficient number of trucks to guarantee
the mobility of the unit and its subdivisions. The availability of
one or two armored cars would greatly facilitate the mobility of
battalion and company commanders, as well as being a valuable
asset where greater fire support is needed. Since in some places
guerrillas use fortifications (dugouts and bunkers), the assign-
ment of two or three recoilless guns, and perhaps a flame-thrower
team, would prevent unnecessary casualties. Mine detectors should
be available to every platoon.

4. Operations. The antiguerrilla battalion, being directly at-
tached to the army or corps headquarters, may be used for guard
duty, search of towns, etc., until the receipt of information on
the presence of guerrilla bands in a certain area. Then, depending
on the supposed number of guerrillas, a platoon or company is
dispatched to the endangered sector. Company headquarters may
be set up in the town which is the nearest to the area of opera-
tions. A platoon of this company may be sent into a village in the
immediate neighborhood of the supposed guerrilla hiding place.
This comparatively small unit will not unduly alarm the guer-
rillas and will leave them unprepared for a possible round-up. Squads will reconnoiter the nearby woods and swamps, to intercept guerrilla runners and sentries and lay ambushes for guerrilla mining teams, until positive information on the location and strength of the guerrilla band is obtained. Then the company, and if necessary the battalion, may be called in and can be skillfully directed to assault and to annihilate or, at least, disperse the band. During these preparations, the members of antiguerrilla units must establish contact with the population and support their fight by psychological treatment of the natives. They must be always ready to help the farmer, to protect him, and, if possible, to win him as an associate and cofighter. Members of these units must always be on their guard against treachery. Patience and caution are the first and most important rules for a successful operation and for the prevention of unnecessary casualties.

If the military antiguerrilla activities are assisted by a resourceful and flexible policy, perhaps as displayed by Generaloberst Schmidt during World War II in the Bryansk-Lokot area, the task of suppressing a guerrilla movement, or at least of reducing it to insignificance, will be greatly facilitated.

It must be emphasized that in order to wage an effective antiguerrilla campaign, not only must the responsible leaders be well acquainted with the physical aspects of the enemy force, but also they must fully understand the psychology of the indigenous population. This knowledge will enable them to establish a policy that the population will recognize not only for its effectiveness but, what is more important, for its humane and just consideration of the welfare of the local inhabitants. Guerrillas starve without the support of the people.
How Castro Won

Dickey Chapelle

Just west of Guantánamo City lies a bend in the Central Highway which is a textbook ambush site—a horseshoe of asphalt almost a mile from end to end, lined every yard on both sides by steep ridges thick with jungle growth. One hot morning early in December, 1958, the curve was ready for its fate. At each end, several 200-pound mines lay under the road surface, and near them a hidden rebelde rested with sweaty hands close to the plunger. Seven light machine guns were emplaced in the greenery of the rocky slope, the nearest forty yards from the road and the most distant almost on top of the ridge. More than 200 riflemen, many with automatic weapons, were dug in, two and three to a hole, along the rise.

But the bearded officer, Capitán José Valle, who before the war had been a traffic clerk in an import firm, was not satisfied.

His people had been manning this ambush site now for thirteen days, and in that time they had eaten thirteen meals. So he did not think they were alert any more. As he walked his lines, he told them they could expect to be hit at any hour now by a column of Batista's troops many hundred strong. Other rebel forces were besieging one of the government's fortresses, that in the town of Lá Maya ten miles farther west, and he predicted a relief column would be dispatched to them from the army garrison at Guantánamo City.

But the captain was increasingly aware that he had given these same troops this same word every other morning on the site, too.

So today he decided to change the disposition of his forces.

He sent forty riflemen and a light machine gun with its crew two miles up the road. There was an ambush spot there too, a bush-covered slope lining the left of the road for a thousand
yards. His orders to this advance guard he repeated twice. They were to hide in the jungle grass, fire on the relief column when it was at the point nearest them, then leapfrog in threes and fours back through the cane fields to the main ambush area, keeping the convoy under fire only as long as they could do it without exposing themselves.

"That will do no harm and make enough noise so everyone will be wide awake before we're really hit," he finished.

Just before noon, the enemy column did appear. There was a lead jeep, an armored car, a tank, three buses heavily loaded with troops, a rear-guard jeep—and one element the captain had not thought about—air cover. Two Cuban Air Force B-26's were flying wide figure eights along the road at an altitude of about 1,000 feet.

The rebels of the advance guard, well concealed behind chunky bushes and wide-bladed grass, opened fire. The machine gunner accounted for the driver and the officer in the lead jeep and a burst from a BAR killed three soldiers in the front seat of the first bus. The convoy halted dead in the road. A handful of soldiers in the crowded buses wrestled their weapons into firing position but they could not see a target. Neither could the tank crew, slowly traversing their 75 mm.

Nor could the men in the B-26's. But they knew the fire had come from the green hillside, and they began to strafe it from end to end. They so persistently stitched back and forth that the rebels one by one looked quickly up, hesitated, and then fell back behind their concealment. A half-dozen began to empty their weapons at the planes. One B-26 gunner opened fire with his 20 mm. He hit downslope from the rebels, and most of them continued to empty clip after clip at the stalled convoy.

The men in the driverless bus panicked and fled back through the ditches to the cover of nearby cane fields; a score dropped their rifles as they ran, and three fell wounded or dying. The drivers of the other two buses backed them for perhaps fifty yards, loaded the men who had been hit, then U-turned and jinked back. The tank and armored-car drivers U-turned where they were to cover the buses. Then the whole column, leaving
only the two wrecked vehicles, was grinding out, faster and faster, to the east.

It was all over in a matter of minutes—all over, that is, but for the verbal pyrotechnics of the rebel captain, when the leader of his advance guard reported. The captain pulled him behind the deserted building of a cantina near the main ambush site.

“My orders were that you should fire and withdraw, fire and withdraw!” he shouted over and over at his red-faced junior.

“We would have, we would have, my Captain, but that we had no cover from the B-26 and . . .” the lieutenant began.

“Your excuse shames our dead!” the captain interrupted. “If you had done what I told you to do, we would have captured the whole convoy,” he went on, rocking on his toes. “This way, what do we have? Two wrecks and some blood on the Central Highway! And that is all there is to show—for thirteen days of waiting!”

He opened his hands and put them over his bearded face. The lieutenant turned and walked slowly out of the yard of the deserted cantina.

Captain Valle probably stated the net tactical gain to the rebel campaign correctly. But to an onlooker and possibly to the historians, the action was more significant. It was almost a vignette of the Cuban revolution, an answer to the question: How did Castro’s riflemen time and again turn back Batista’s tanks and planes?

My own conclusion was that they earned all the real estate by making every mistake in the book—but one. They consistently delivered a high volume of fire. After they started shooting, they rarely let anything—the enemy’s reaction or their own commander’s orders—stop them from continuing to fire until there was nothing left to fire on.

They barely aimed and they did not conserve ammunition. But they unmistakably communicated their will to fight to an enemy whose superior equipment was unmatched by the will to use it.

Here is a report from the Cuban fighting:

The forces of Castro at the time I knew them moved and fired as an army, not a band or mob. Fidel estimated there were 7,300 in uniform (blue or green cotton drill-fatigues) by the third week.
of December. They were directly supported by an equal number of personnel under military orders, whose duties included work in towns still policed by Batista, and who wore civilian clothing. One in ten of the fighters was a non-Cuban—Dominican, Mexican, Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, Argentinian. About one in twenty was a woman; except for one sniper platoon, the women in uniform were noncombatants who did housekeeping and supply assignments.

The basic unit of the rebel army was a forty-man platoon commanded by a second lieutenant. The rebels insisted there were no differences in rate among the nonofficer personnel; in practice, I noticed many "natural NCO’s" with their own following of from six to a dozen men. The officer ranks were the same as U.S. ranks up to major, or comandante, still the highest rank in the Cuban military forces. (The single star on the Cuban Prime Minister’s epaulets today signifies this rank, as it did during the fighting.) In the field, I worked with the command groups of three majors beside the Castros. Each led about 500 men and twenty-odd officers.

This simplified table of organization was reflected in the division of responsibilities. What we consider S-1 functions were almost entirely carried out by the senior officer or his top aides personally. The S-2 and S-4 work was done by men in multi. This left the uniformed forces the single primary concern of operations.

The staffs had no problems of pay—no pay, hence no problem—or of recruitment, since there were more would-be Fidelistas than rifles with which to arm them. The sure method by which a volunteer became a barbudo was to disarm one of Batista’s soldiers (by force or purchase) and hike into a Castro command post with his rifle, ammo, and canteen. One boy of fifteen had to be accepted when he reported with a BAR which he insisted he had gotten the hard way.

More than half the rebeldes fighters I knew had been field hands in the cane fields or coffee plantations of Oriente Province. But a high proportion of the others had city backgrounds and white-collar experience, so the over-all literacy rate was very high for Cuba. Probably the most capable battalion officer (now G-3 of
the Cuban Rebel Army) was Comandante Antonio Lusson, whose family owned a large cane plantation near the Castro family's own fields.

Most of the enlisted men I knew had undergone a basic training stint of from two to four months in the most remote reaches of the Sierra Maestre Mountains. They had learned scouting and patrolling there (one had a copy of FM 21-75 in his pack), but the primary purpose of the training obviously was to condition the men to extended periods of hunger and fatigue, to find out who would literally rather fight than eat. Not many had learned to use their weapons effectively, nor to maintain them in the field; those who had became prized men. But the barbudos almost without exception had developed a genuine esprit de corps.

The wide dissimilarity of military capability among them was probably less significant than the one common motivation. All of Castro's fighting men were terror victims to the extent that they believed they would be killed if they went back to their homes while Batista remained in power. I knew dozens who showed me what they said were marks of torture on their bodies, or who told me how they had buried the bullet-riddled bodies of their fathers, sons, or brothers.

"I always knew Latins could hate that much, but not that they could hate that long" is a comment I have heard about them. One explanation is the conviction most of them expressed that they as individuals could not expect to live if they did not destroy the Batistianos who were then still policing their home communities.

The other side of the coin—the personal motivation of government forces—was a particular target of psychological assault from the first.

Before I left the U.S., the Castro underground in New York briefed me on the tactics this way: "We return prisoners without even intimating them. We do not exchange them, you understand; not one of ours has ever been returned in the field. But we just disarm our enemies when we capture them and send them back through the Cuban Red Cross."

I was cynical about this claim and once in Cuba I remarked to a rebel officer that I would be much surprised to see unintimi-
dated, unwounded prisoners being returned, not exchanged, in
the middle of a shooting war. This remark was a mistake.
That same evening, I watched the surrender of hundreds of
Batistanos from a small-town garrison. They were gathered
within a hollow square of rebel Tommy-gunners and harangued
by Raúl Castro:
"We hope that you will stay with us and fight against the
master who so ill-used you. If you decide to refuse this invitation—and I am not going to repeat it—you will be delivered to
the custody of the Cuban Red Cross tomorrow. Once you are
under Batista's orders again, we hope that you will not take up
arms against us. But, if you do, remember this:
"We took you this time. We can take you again. And when
we do, we will not frighten or torture or kill you, any more than
we are doing to you at this moment. If you are captured a sec-
ond time or even a third by us, we will again return you exactly
as we are doing now."
This expression of utter contempt for the fighting potential
of the defeated had an almost physical impact on them. Some
actually flinched as they listened.
The following day, I could not question that these men were
returned unharmed. I counted 242 across a border check point
marked by two burned-out car wrecks overlooking Santiago de
Cuba.
On the matter of casualty figures over-all for the two years of
active fighting, I came to accept Castro's estimate of 1,000 rebel
dead because I was able to verify personally that the rebel dead
announced for the actions I saw were correct. (But an even more
important and still controversial casualty figure is the rebel total
loss from terrorism in the cities rather than military operations
in the country. This is believed to be more than 10,000 over a
five-year period.)
The Fidelista combat intelligence was superb. The Batista
commanders could not go to the head without a perspiring run-
ner arriving a few minutes later to tell Castro about it. Most of
the informants were volunteers—farmers or villagers.
While the bulk of such reports was hardly marked by accu-
ricy, Fidel himself placed the greatest reliance on them. The
night we met for the first time, he and his command group were standing within 600 yards of where a huge enemy patrol was searching for him. I assumed he was there to command an action to hit the patrol or cut it off.

"Oh, no," he explained. "It's too big. They are coming through the woods in a body, with men in pairs on either side. When the nearest pair is a few hundred yards away, people will tell me and we will leave."

Enemy scouts did in fact come in ten minutes after his departure. In their asperity, they burned to the ground the farmer's house beside which he had been conferring. The farmer became a fighting Fidelista before the ashes of his house had cooled, bringing a Springfield rifle he had kept buried, apparently for just this eventuality.

One tradition of the Castro forces had a special usefulness to their intelligence—the matter of the beards. The nucleus of the Castro forces grew them because there were no razors on Pico Turquino, where they hid. But in time, the beards served as an identification device. When you saw a man with a six-month growth of hair and whiskers, you could be sure he had not been in contact with the Batista soldiery for a long time, since to them a beard was cause for summary arrest.

During the early months of the fighting, the only military tactic used by the rebels was to ambush small government patrols for their weapons. As the patrols grew larger, the rebelde underground furnished mines, and the Fidelistas were able to turn back several punitive thrusts made at them in the mountains by ringing their strongholds with the mines.

Their experience in stopping movement along roads and trails led to the tactic by which they won much of Oriente Province. Its general objective was to isolate the government garrisons by halting all surface traffic. The rebels blew up the railroad bridges first, then mined the side roads, and finally the main artery across Cuba, the Central Highway. They halted and burned every bus, every car, and every truck. Noncombatants were walked at gun point back to wherever they came from—except for those abducted, including the U.S. servicemen and technicians held for twenty-seven days in July of 1958.
By early December, the roads and most of the countryside had come under rebel control after dark; by daylight, nothing moved but Batista’s forces, in not less than company strength and usually with tanks and air cover.

But most town and village cuartels were still fully garrisoned, and the government controlled the built-up areas.

Against them, Castro’s forces used three kinds of offensive action: combat patrols, assault, and encirclement. But each of these terms is only correct in the most limited sense.

The patrols were night marches, off the roads, of one or two platoons with the objective of shaking up a garrison behind its concrete walls. Weapons included rifles, BAR’s, Tommy-guns, and one or two LMG’s. On one patrol, the men brought an 81-mm. mortar with five rounds for it. On another, they carried a 20-mm. cannon recovered from a wrecked Cuban Air Force plane. For it they had only notoriously undependable homemade ammo.

The patrols crept close to the cuartel walls (at Maffo, within forty yards) and opened fire. They sustained it no matter what came back at them until their ammo ran low or, as happened twice, the garrison set fire to their little fortress and ran the rebel garrisons in their trucks. At San Luis, the garrison resisted two such raids vigorously and, the day after the second, withdrew in jeeps and a truck into the nearest larger cuartel. Their column tore by a rebel ambush, which happened to be facing the wrong way, and not a shot was fired.

The tactic that the rebels called an assault was not an assault at all as we use the word. It meant the rebel commanders would infiltrate their troops by dark to positions as close to an objective as possible without risking exposure. They would then keep it under uninterrupted small-arms fire twenty-four hours a day. But they would not advance nor would they use demolitions.

In the fortress at La Maya, they thus trapped 525 people, 125 of them the wives and children of government soldiers, for seventeen days. In Maffo, there were 150 Batistanos who held out for fourteen days and then surrendered. The artillery available on either side was negligible. The rebels used one 20-mm. cannon with comic effect because of poor homemade ammo, and the
garrison at Maffo one night expended nine mortar shells—presumably all it had—against a rebel sound truck that had been haranguing the troops to surrender. On this occasion, the accuracy was outstanding; four rebels were killed and thirteen wounded.

In spite of the fact that small-arms fire spattering concrete walls hardly sounds effective, these encirclements of the Batista cuartels were the decisive actions of the revolution. In the fight for Santa Clara, the final and largest action, it was a trainload of troops which the rebels encircled, not a fortress. And in this one case, those who could fire from buildings had better cover than the troops opposing them.

However, in the fighting that I saw, the rebels only sought out concealment, and did almost without dug-in or sandbagged positions. Often they exposed themselves deliberately for no logical military purpose. Once, when a whole platoon was disconsolate because their rifle grenades were misfiring, their battalion commander himself led a dozen men in a charge out of their concealment. An enemy blockhouse lay 150 yards away, and perhaps some of his men assumed that he planned to flank it. But without grenades, demolitions, or mortar fire, he charged out fifty yards, then disposed his men behind the foot-high cover of the foundation of a wrecked building, and from there emptied several BAR magazines into the concrete blockhouse walls. He then ran his people back through a crescendo of incoming fire from the blockhouse to their concealed positions. But for skinned knees and elbows, no casualties resulted. The effect on morale was excellent. But the blockhouse was no less lethal than before.

Why were the government garrisons unable to break out of their cuartels and blockhouses?

Surely they could have broken the ring of besiegers. But there would have been casualties, and the countryside was actively hostile.

Why were the cuartels not reinforced? Or better resupplied?

Until the last weeks of the fighting, the larger were, in effect, reinforced by the fleeing garrisons from the smaller.

But as to why these in turn did not hold out, purely tactical answers are not enough. When the 525 people from the La Maya
fortress surrendered, they still had food, water, and ammo. There were seven wounded, two of them dying, in the group. Nine people had been killed, and buried inside the walls (and seven of the rebels had been killed, two from the air). The Cuban Air Force had not been successful in its resupply efforts. But it had never tried drops directly within the cuartel walls, presumably because of the risk of hitting some of the people with falling packages.

Which raises what was to me a great mystery of the actions I observed: the astonishingly good performance of the B-26's. True, they bombed and strafed the town of La Maya twice a day at least and the roads around it at all hours. But they did this so badly that I was able to photograph them, sometimes twice, after they had begun their runs, and then, usually leisurely, to move to shelter.

The Cuban Air Force B-26's—in pairs flying in echelon—usually committed in the adjoining county and then strafed from an altitude of 300 to 500 feet. They proved they knew how to do better when they were covering an unarmed DC-3 making a resupply drop, then they came in at right angles to each other and went up the streets with wing tips at house-top level.

I came to two conclusions about the curious B-26 performances:

First, the claims of the pilots at their subsequent trials that they did everything short of incurring court-martial to avoid killing noncombatants are entirely valid. (You remember, Fidel set aside two trials acquitting flyers on this issue and ordered a third, after which came executions and prison sentences.)

Second, the psychological impact of the B-26 operations on the people of rural Cuba will be a major barrier to friendly U.S.-Cuban relations for a generation to come. It is no use to point out that we sent Batista these planes for another purpose, and stopped sending them at all in March of 1958. The planes, no matter how poorly flown, utterly terrorized the province, and, moral judgments entirely aside, the fact is that we are heartily hated because they caused such fear.

At the time, incidentally, the rebels, without aircraft or ack-
ack, did not ignore the planes but emptied rifles and BAR's up at them no matter what the range. I never saw a hit scored but the psychological effects were dramatic.

Supply was a controlling factor in the entire Castro offensive. On the matter of food alone, the rebels' survival as a cohesive fighting unit was frequently in doubt. Being both guest and woman, I always had more to eat than anyone else, but at one point I lived on raw sugar-cane for two days, and at another time I ate only one meal a day for five days in a row. The characteristic "hot chow" of the rebels in the field was a mush of rice with pieces of fresh-killed beef in it, served from a bucket hung on a pole which was carried by two runners from one fox-hole to another.

Personal equipment was severely limited. Cotton drill shirts and pants were issued, but good footwear, canteens, and blankets were not, and the rebelde's armbands, shoulder patches, and insignia of rank were sewn and embroidered by his wife or one of the village women.

How Castro received his arms and ammunition was a subject of acrimonious international debate for a long time.

Before I went to Cuba, I was told that most weapons and ammo were smuggled in by air from the U.S., Mexico, and Venezuela. Dictator Batista's Secretary of State once gave me a personal interview on a holiday to complain bitterly that American laxity in arresting the smugglers was the reason the government could not defeat the rebels.

But there is little evidence for this thesis. Recently I met a Cuban flier who had flown arms from the U.S. to Cuba for months during the revolution. He said he had been told in Miami that U.S. law-enforcement agencies were alerted in early 1958 to look for a fleet of heavily loaded station wagons and several DC-3's.

"So what we did was to fly the stuff in a pair of Cessna 182's. We got it out to landing strips near Key West in an outboard fishing boat loaded on a trailer. Once I was driving the trailer and I had a flat. The police helped me change the tire at the side of the highway without ever looking under the tarp which cov-
ered my boat. If they folded it back, they would have found twelve Tommy-guns and the ammo for them."

After I had been with the Fidelistas for a few weeks, I no longer questioned their on-the-spot insistence that only about 15 per cent of their weapons were so "imported." All the rest, they said, were captured.

The weapons that I saw were not new, and the great majority were of the type that we furnished to Batista—Springfields, M-1's, BAR's and Tommy-guns. And Colt .45 automatics, many of the latter demonstrably captured weapons with butt plates still carrying the insignia of the Cuban Army.

In the case of .30-caliber ammo, I saw it being captured during the battle of La Maya. The action around the town involved more than 250 rebels, actually firing on the line day and night for two and a half weeks. Yet when the battle was over, the rebel ammo inventory was fatter than when it began. Four times during the siege, a government DC-3 had made an air drop (no parachute; they just pushed the packages out of the door) of ammo for the fortress, and four times the rebels had charged out under heavy fire and dragged the packages back behind their own lines. From these bundles the rebels also gained large quantities of medical supplies and some of the best cigarettes I ever smoked.

Two weapons widely used by the rebels were manufactured right in Cuba itself by the underground.

One was the 200-pound land mine, made at first from explosive salvaged out of unexploded aerial bombs that had been dropped by the Cuban Air Force. The mines usually were emplaced to be detonated electrically by a soldier on command.

The other homemade device was a rifle grenade which resembled no other grenade of which I've ever heard. It was a firecracker shape about eight inches long with a conical cap on one end. It was detonated by a fuse of cotton string. To fire it, you affixed it to the end of a rifle, lit the fuse, and pulled the trigger. In theory, the grenade exploded four seconds later. I watched more than a score of these fired. Each time something inhibited the clean getaway of the grenade from the rifle and it detonated within fifty yards of take-off.
A special logistic problem to the rebels was motor transport. Their few dozen vehicles were jeeps, either captured from the government or expropriated at gun point from oil and mining companies. (I remember there was a "duty ambulance" at the battle of Jiguani—a sky-blue enameled panel truck marked EAT STAR CANDIES.) Impulsive driving and no maintenance at all constantly reduced the availability of vehicles. But the limited mileage of roads and jeepable tracks in rural Cuba probably reduced the importance of motor transport to both sides in the fighting.

At the climax of the revolution, the personnel in the field under Fidel Castro's direct orders numbered about 15,000, half in uniform, including a high proportion of men mentally and physically superior. There was ultimate motivation throughout, and discipline within small units was good. The men were almost totally lacking in marksmanship ability, conventional military know-how, and experience in fighting as a cohesive force of any size. Their attitude toward their enemies was one of contempt leavened with compassion.

Their combat intelligence was unexcelled in quantity and of dependable accuracy. It was not organized on any military basis but originated in the civilian population, which felt itself a direct participant in every action, and generally welcomed the rebels as liberators from terrorism.

The Castro defensive operations depended largely on this intelligence and on foot mobility; the rebels simply did not remain where they were sought.

Their offensive operations rested on tactics involving the highest degree of surprise, the fewest men, the lowest risk, and the greatest freedom to disengage. These included road ambushes, raiding patrols, infiltration, and sustained siege by small-arms fire. No dependence on artillery or motor transport was developed.

Their logistics were primitive and in other than the near-ideal weather and terrain conditions of Cuba would have been disastrous. Their food supply was not adequate by any ordinary standard. Their primary source of arms and ammunition was the enemy, although perhaps 15 per cent were smuggled into Cuba.

Their conspicuous military virtue was their ability to maintain a high volume of fire under conditions that would have discour-
aged less motivated fighters. This virtue fully exploited the major weakness of the well-equipped government forces, which was a near-paralysis of the will to fire at all. If there is any military lesson from the Cuban revolution for all Americans, in and out of uniform, I think this is it:

Machinery does not win wars. Men do.
Terror in Cyprus

LIEUTENANT COLONEL B. I. S. GOURLAY

This article was written in 1959, just before the struggle Colonel (then Major) Gourlay describes came to an end.

It was a very ordinary bicycle. Leaning there against the curved corrugated iron side of the canteen hut, the metal fastener on its old saddlebag glinting in the burning Cyprus sun, it looked as innocent as a child asleep, as much a natural part of the everyday scene as the trucks, jeeps, and staff cars that stood parked within the barbed-wire perimeter of the sprawling military camp.

It was lunchtime. A carefree group of British soldiers, chatting and laughing among themselves, moved across the parade toward the canteen in cheerful anticipation of the ice-cold beer which awaited them at the bar within. As they approached the hut, they may perhaps have glanced at the bicycle, but only in the most cursory way; they hurried on and, joking still, passed through the welcoming doors—and into immediate oblivion.

For at that precise moment the flimsy hut was rent by a sudden explosion which shattered the sleepy midday stillness with a deafening roar, and cast high up into the sky an ugly twisted assortment of timber and corrugated iron, newly painted furniture, and gaily colored curtains.

Piece by piece, the debris came wheeling back to earth and settled around the sorry tangled skeleton of the hut. With it all came the misshapen bits of what so recently had been a very ordinary bicycle. Of the saddlebag there was no trace.

Nor of the owner was there any sign. Could he have been one of the many builders' workmen in the camp? If so, he had, no doubt, long since passed unsuspected out of the exit gates under
the eyes of the red-capped military police and even now, as the echoes of his handiwork reached his waiting ears, sat celebrating in some distant bar, his mission well performed.

Incidents such as this have filled the files of British security forces ever since April 1, 1955, when EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) launched its campaign of intimidation, sabotage, and murder with a series of island-wide bomb explosions. Surprising though it may seem to those unaware of the background to the unrest, the chief sufferers have been the Cypriots themselves. They have been subjected to terrible outrages. The following few examples indicate the lengths to which the terrorists have been prepared to go: An abbot has been shot dead in his own monastery and a sick woman in her hospital bed; a man has been murdered in church, during a service, before the eyes of his own children; bombs have been thrown indiscriminately into bars and cafés. The tale of horror is long and of almost endless variety.

The purpose of this article is to outline the nature of the problem that such terrorism presents to the security forces in general and the military ground forces in particular, and to describe some of the measures taken to solve it.

It will be immediately obvious that if the problem were a simple one, a solution would have been reached long before now. In truth, it is far from simple. Terrorism the world over derives its impetus from political, racial, or religious factors. In Cyprus, all three are present. We cannot, therefore, undertake an examination of the problem without taking these factors into account.

The most important one is probably that of politics. It does not lie within the scope of this article, or the qualifications and province of the writer, to discuss the rights or wrongs of British political action in Cyprus, but it will be necessary to give a brief account of political events in the island over the last hundred years in so far as they can help us to understand the background to unrest. This account, and indeed the whole article, makes only the most superficial reference to the point of view of the Turkish Cypriot, his reactions to terrorism, and his relations with the Greek Cypriots. Unless it is appreciated that this is done deliberately in order to concentrate attention on terrorism itself, which
is not of Turkish inspiration, an unbalanced impression will be formed that the Cyprus problem concerns the Greek Cypriots and the British alone.

The source of the unrest is the agitation for enosis, or union with Greece. It is no new idea. Indeed, at the very outset of the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878, when Turkey ceded the island in return for British protection against Russia, the first High Commissioner was welcomed on his arrival by a local Bishop who is said to have expressed the hope that Great Britain would “help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece.”

You will notice the significant fact that it was a local churchman who expressed this political hope; significant because today it is still the churchman who seeks to assume political leadership in the struggle for union with Greece. To the Western mind, the open association of the Church with a political party or creed is, to say the least, unorthodox. But we have to remember that the Eastern churches have long been a nursery for those aspiring not only to ecclesiastical power but to positions of authority in national affairs, too.

In Ottoman times, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, led by its own Archbishop, was not permitted to play any part in politics, but it did enjoy a considerable say in the administration of the island. With the arrival of the British, it handed over its administrative powers. Anxious not to lose temporal influence, it directed its activities more and more into politics, and advocated in its pulpits, up and down the island, the cause of enosis.

The first major clash with British authority occurred in 1931, when the Bishop of Kition issued a seditious manifesto and led the resignation of all the Orthodox members of the Cyprus Legislative Council. Riots ensued and Government House was burned down. As a result, a number of leading politicians, including the Bishop, were deported. Thereafter things quieted down. The exiles were eventually allowed to return. But agitation for union with Greece had not been completely stifled; it lay dormant and remained so for nearly two decades.

And then, in 1950, there came upon the scene a leader of the Greek community whose part in the struggle was soon to make
his name world famous. That man was Makarios the Third, the present Archbishop and self-styled Ethnarch (National Leader). Youthful and intensely ambitious, a politician to his fingertips, he took up the leadership of the enosis movement with a vigor and aggressiveness not matched by his predecessors.

In 1951, he brought Colonel George Grivas, a former Greek Army officer and postwar guerrilla leader, over from Greece for a visit, to advise him on the formation of a militant youth organization (PEON). From that moment on, it could only be a matter of time before the decision was taken to use violence in furthering the campaign for enosis. And in 1954 that decision was taken. Grivas returned to Cyprus to lead EOKA. He immediately set about building up a terrorist organization based on PEON, which by now was an underground movement. On April 1, 1955, as we have seen, with full approval of the Ethnarch and his advisory council, the battle opened with coordinated bomb explosions all over the island, the Cyprus Broadcasting Station being one of the first government buildings to suffer. Leaflets streamed from EOKA’s secret duplicators in ever-increasing numbers. “British Soldiers,” they thundered, “choose: Peace or War—our friendships or our bullets!” They were signed, “EOKA—The Chief Dighenis.”

In those early days of terrorism, the real identity of the man who styled himself Dighenis was not positively known among the Cypriot people as a whole, or indeed in British official circles. The mystery surrounding the name undoubtedly added to its glamour. It soon came to exercise a powerful hold on the imagination of the Greek Cypriot community. By the time it was known to be the nom de guerre of Colonel Grivas, it commanded not only formidable respect throughout Cyprus but also the serious attention of politicians in London and Ankara. Dighenis is one of the names of the hero of a Byzantine epic, “Dighenis the Borderer.” This hero was endowed with supernatural powers. It is possible that Grivas chose this symbolic title to remind his followers of their Greek Byzantine heritage.

In Athens, Grivas could confidently look for help, for here the movement for enosis had been strongly supported by all political parties for some time before the outbreak of violence. The Greek
Government under Field Marshal Papagos had formally raised the matter in 1954 in the United Nations. There were Greek nationals in the ranks of EOKA and Greek arms and explosives were smuggled into the island. Last, but by no means least, the state-controlled Athens radio gave continuous backing to the movement by open incitement to violence. Dighenis clearly did not lack for support from Greece.

What manner of man is this Dighenis, this Grivas? Undoubtedly, his achievements to date mark him as an outstandingly able guerrilla leader. In his sixties, he is a strongly built man of medium height, dark haired, swarthy, and mustached, with a strong jaw and intense dark eyes. In character he is austere, self-disciplined, determined, energetic, and ruthless to a degree; he did not shrink from ordering the placing of a time bomb in a transport aircraft which was scheduled to take off with British service families on board. The bomb, in the event, exploded prematurely. He is an excellent administrator. He is a master of disguise. Over and above all this, he is a fanatical champion of enosis and, in the words of the former Governor of Cyprus, Field Marshal Harding, "pathologically anti-Communist."

Such is the man. What of the island he operates in? When he returned to Cyprus in 1954 with the task of organizing terrorism, he was returning to his homeland, for he was born in a small town in the northeast corner of the island. He therefore was well aware of the nature of the ground over which his gangs were to operate, and must have found it much to his liking. Indeed, the island is in many ways ideally suited to guerrilla activities. Its greatest length from east to west is 140 miles and from north to south, sixty miles. Its chief features are two mountain ranges and a large plain which lies between them. The Kyrenia Range in the north runs along the length of the coast, never more than a few miles wide, its sharp ridges rising to a height of about 3,000 feet. The Troodos Mountains to the south of the central plain are altogether more extensive, and at their highest rise to 6,000 feet; With their large forested areas (the Cyprus state forests cover 19 per cent of the whole island), their steep slopes, impressively rugged terrain, and isolated villages, they provide wonderful territory for guerrilla-type operations.
The main towns lying in the central plain and along the coastal fringes are in their own way equally suited to terrorist operations. The visitor to Nicosia, the island capital, will notice how the houses crowd upon each other and how the narrow side streets meander on and lose themselves in countless cross-connecting lanes. These closely built-up areas with their Greek and Turkish quarters, which all the main towns share, provide the bomb thrower and killer with excellent cover for terrorist operations and equally excellent escape routes.

So much then for the scene of Grivas' operations. Now for his aims and methods. As we have already seen, his ultimate desire is to see Cyprus united with Greece. To help achieve this, it might be thought that he is bent on seizing control in the island. This is not so: To be brief, it is impracticable for him to do so. Rather, he aims to make the British position untenable by working on public opinion inside and outside Cyprus. He intends to keep the struggle for enosis constantly before the world by violent action, and to build up a powerful body of opinion which will sympathize with EOKA in its struggle against an oppressive administration. As for the Greek Cypriots, they must help him. If they will not help actively, they must be terrified into silence. If they work against him, they must be liquidated as traitors.

Whatever impression EOKA's activities may have had on outside opinion, there is no doubting their effect on the 420,000 Greek Cypriots living in the island. Bombs are thrown; no one hears them. Murders are committed in the crowded daytime; no one sees them. The prevailing atmosphere is one of fear and suspicion.

Grivas has not found it difficult to bring his compatriots to this sorry pass. Among all Greek Cypriots, there is a strong sense of being tied to Greece; they are Greek in their way of life and thinking, Greek in what they eat and drink, Greek in their religion. Even their schoolteachers are, in many cases, Greek nationals trained in Greece. Admittedly, a strong case can be argued on political and racial grounds to show that the Greek Cypriot is not a true Greek. But the fact remains that he feels passionately that he is a Greek, and that is what matters. Certainly, it is enough to make him well disposed in principle toward
the movement of enosis, even though he may, for the most part, abhor EOKA's brutal methods.

With the Turkish Cypriots things are different. Outnumbered by four to one, they bitterly oppose enosis, which to them spells doom. They claim partition but accept partnership with the British. But if the British elect to leave Cyprus, they are prepared to go to extreme lengths to prevent the island, which Turkey ruled for hundreds of years and which is so close to the Turkish homeland, from falling into Greek hands. They are a proud and resolute people, more conscious today of their ties with Turkey than ever before. Their martial qualities command respect among Greek Cypriots, and to some extent offset their numerical inferiority. They will never bow to Grivas.

EOKA's active forces probably do not exceed a few hundred in number. They are organized into districts. These in turn comprise a number of mountain, village, and town groups or gangs.

The mountain gangs, each with an average strength of six men, comprise the hard-core terrorists. They live in the hilly regions where ideal training areas and hide-outs can be found. Charged with the more difficult military operations such as raids on police stations and military outposts, ambushes, and missions of destruction, they rely on quick movement and on their hide-outs to save them from the attention of the security forces.

The village gangs carry out tasks requiring less skill: supplying the mountain groups with food, arms, and ammunition, passing on information, simple sabotage, and the like. They may not remain formally constituted all the time, coming together occasionally in varying strengths for specific tasks. They receive their instructions through the district leader, and, unlike their more competent mountain partners who have precision weapons, are usually issued shotguns.

The town groups have a multiplicity of tasks. It is they who distribute the well-known leaflets which announce EOKA's reactions to events of the day, record its threats, and proclaim its truces. It is they who provoke the hysterics of demonstrating schoolchildren, who give asylum to members of the organization, and who deal in assassination.

All these groups---mountain, village, and town---come under
the strict control of Grivas himself. He concerns himself in their every activity and takes a personal interest in matters of the smallest detail. Vital to this control, which he exercises from a mobile command post, is an efficient and secure communications system. This he has built up with a chain of reliable couriers, both male and female.

So far we have painted a picture of Cyprus which is but half finished. It is, for the most part, one of terrorism set against the background of a rugged island landscape. To give the picture balance, we now have to fill in the foreground and depict the story of counterterrorism.

II.

In Cyprus, Britain bears very special responsibilities, not least of which is the maintenance of law and order. It is upon the security forces, so called, that this stern task lies.

The term "security forces" does not mean the fighting services only, but rather a partnership with the police and all the civil agencies whose task it is to keep the peace. If there is one great lesson that Britain has learned in dealing with security problems the world over, it is that they can only be solved when the civil, police, and military authorities work together in unison. In efficient security forces, there is no room for those who think that they can go it alone.

In the ensuing paragraphs we will chiefly be concerned with the military ground forces. Space does not allow us to do full justice to the part other sections of the security forces are playing. A brief account, therefore, must suffice.

Security operations in Cyprus are under the over-all control of a military Director of Operations who is responsible to the Governor. He works through a combined staff on which are represented the three services, the police, and the civil administration. This mixed staff is reflected in District Security committees dotted around the island and consisting of civil, military, and police representatives. They work in the closest accord and their decisions are invariably jointly taken.

The main tasks of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force
may be said briefly to consist in commanding the sea and air approaches to the island in order to prevent smuggling.

The police force, some 2,000 strong, is composed of Greek and Turkish Cypriots backed up by some 400 inspectors and sergeants from the United Kingdom police constabularies. The first contingent of the latter reached Cyprus in 1956 at the instigation of Field Marshal Harding. Their high standard of integrity and their calm performance of duty in difficult times did much to boost the shaken morale of the local force in the early days of terrorism, and continue to do so today.

The civil administration, it need hardly be said, provides all the essential experience in local affairs without which the efforts of the security forces are likely to be abortive or at best mis-directed. It is impossible to think of any type of operation in which their views will not be sought, on matters ranging from the protection of village water supplies to the problems of mass fingerprinting.

We can now turn to the ground forces. We have already gained a clear enough impression of the terrain in Cyprus to guess at the restrictions and difficulties which it might impose on the operation of ground troops. But there are other important restrictions to bear in mind. These are the legal ones. First, there is the basic principle of English law, which applies to all British territories overseas, that when troops operate in support of the civil power, they must not use any more force than is strictly necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

This is commonly known as the principle of minimum force and is one which is impressed upon the mind of every single British soldier. It carries special importance for the military because they go about their duties armed with lethal weapons. Because military commanders can be called to account if they do not observe this principle, those in command of troops facing serious disturbances may be caught in a dilemma. If they hesitate too long in using their firepower, they run a risk of being overwhelmed; if they shoot too early, they stand to be court-martialed for using excessive force. It is not only the commander who faces this dilemma. The individual soldier or Marine making an arrest, or surprising an intruder on military premises, to take two simple
examples, has also to keep the principle in mind. But neither commander nor individual soldier is likely to go far wrong if he acts with impartiality, with preventive and not punitive intent, and in good faith.

There are occasions when troops will have no hesitation in opening fire; to take one obvious example, when they themselves come under fire. Their actions in such cases are governed by the law or special emergency regulations issued from time to time by the Governor. Emergency legislation covers such points as powers of arrest, powers of search, power to remove obstructions on the roads (if made of stones, these can be used as missiles against the security forces), removal of national flags, banners, and slogans from buildings, interrogation of the public, action to be taken when civilian vehicles fail to stop, and a host of other matters.

Enough has been written to make it clear that the soldier has to know a great deal of the policeman’s job in addition to his own. In his daily dealings with the public, he is more policeman than soldier. He has to be cooperative and friendly; yet he knows that it is the public who shields the EOKA assassin. It is not easy for him to forget that many of his comrades have been killed on duty in the island. Taken all in all, his task is not straightforward. It cannot be learned in a day.

When all the components of the security forces are working together as a team at every level, and how much more easily this is said than done, there will still be two requirements vital to success in counterterrorist operations: The first is first-class communications, the second, information.

When violence broke out in April, 1955, in Cyprus, neither existed. For many months, while suitable equipment was being brought out from Britain and installed, operational messages had to be conveyed to all parts of the island by dispatch rider or courier and via the few insecure post-office lines that existed. It was well-nigh impossible to organize rapid counteraction against the terrorists in such circumstances, let alone to achieve security. The picture is now different. First-class communications do exist.

The acquisition of information has not been such an easy matter. No amount of propaganda or threats will drag determined terrorists from their lairs. They have to be sought out and de-
stroyed. But to be successful in this, we must have information; yet without success we get no information. This is a vicious circle and one that had to be broken during the second half of 1955 while the build-up of troops and equipment was going on. It was many months before useful information began to come into the hands of the security forces. In the early spring of 1956, the pattern of EOKA's organization gradually began to take shape, largely as a result of numerous small successes. Weeks of patient patrolling, road checks, brushes with the town groups and mountain gangs, and a lucky break from time to time, put the security forces in a position to launch large-scale offensive operations.

By July of the same year, several of the mountain gangs had been eliminated. Then the Suez crisis intervened and the formations most concerned with operations in the mountains, The Third Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, and Parachute Brigade, were diverted to other tasks. The story thereafter is one of hulls and truces, mostly occurring after major EOKA setbacks, and of renewed offensives culminating in the security forces' successes during the latter months of 1958.

In November of that year, Kyriakos Matsis, an ambush expert and the most sought-after EOKA leader after Grivas, was surprised in a village in the north of the island and killed.

The story of his discovery throws light on the problems attending searches of mountain villages. Such a story usually starts with the receipt of information as to the whereabouts of a gang or individual terrorist leader. More often than not, this will lead to the cordonning and searching of a house, a village, several villages, or even a large tract of countryside. An operation of this sort must achieve surprise to succeed. If the greatest care is not taken, the birds will have flown by the time the cordon is in position. As soon as troops leave their camps, their strength, composition, and direction of movement will reach unfriendly ears. The employment of helicopters can and does help to overcome this problem, but for large operations great numbers of them are required. Even in administrative matters, it will be necessary to resort to deception if operational intentions are not to be given away. For example, heavy demands on base stores before protracted operations may result in a noticeable increase of adminis-
trative traffic. This, in turn, may reveal that something big is afoot. Further, it may help EOKA to deduce what units are involved.

Once the cordon is in position (troops in the order of hundreds may be needed for this task), it is for other ground forces to conduct the search. In default of pin-point information, this process is likely to be a long one, measured in weeks or even months. The wanted men will clearly not be walking about openly in the hills and villages. They will be out of the way, in hide-outs. The location of these hide-outs will be determined by factors such as ease of concealment, accessibility, escape routes, and so on. A less obvious factor will be the need to be within reasonable distance of sources of food, water, and ammunition.

Most hide-outs are therefore found either in a village or a mile or two away from one. Matsis had elected to stay in the little village of Kato Dhiakomo when news reached him of the big security drive in the Kyrenia Range. His discovery, so typical of similar successes in previous operations, came about to some extent by chance. The house in which he lay hidden came under search for arms. The search seemed to be unsuccessful. As a soldier was having a last look around, he used his bayonet to prod the tiled floor of the back parlor. In testing the cement between two tiles, his bayonet went straight through and into what transpired to be the entrance to a ready-use or emergency hide-out.

Matsis and two others were crouched below the floor in a hole six feet long, four feet wide, and two feet deep. His companions chose to give themselves up. Matsis, resisting every persuasion to follow suit, eventually killed himself with an automatic weapon.

It must not be thought, though, that all mountain operations take the form of large-scale sweeps and searches. The infiltration of small patrols, the posting of observers, ambush parties, and the like have achieved striking successes. The particular advantages of the small party are that it can be introduced into an area surreptitiously and that, once established, it does not excite the attention which the mass movement of troops inevitably does. The apparent absence of troops in an area will tend to lull the resident gangs, their supply parties and couriers into a false sense of security, and may induce carelessness on their part. It is under
these conditions that the security patrol may surprise a gang on the move, capture couriers with important documents, or stumble across the cigarette packet which provides vital evidence of a nearby hide-out.

All hide-outs are not so modest as the one in which Matsis met his death. His was essentially of a type designed to provide temporary cover during surprise search operations. The more elaborate hide-out is built to house several men, and is stocked with every requirement for a long stay.

Before concluding these brief comments on mountain operations, mention must be made of informers. An integral part of any search is the screening of every man and woman within the cordon. This process involves their passing before a team of police interrogators furnished with the details of wanted persons. The work of these interrogators can be greatly enhanced if they are supported by an ex-terrorist who, in order to save his neck, is prepared to pick out EOKA members. This man is commonly hidden behind a screen as the villagers file past and so retains his incognito. Whole village gangs have been identified in this way.

We have now learned something of mountain operations. What goes on in the towns? The chief problems here are those of dealing with the gunman, dispersing unlawful assemblies, and suppressing riots.

Some indication of the advantages that gunmen enjoy in the crowded narrow streets has already been given. An effective counter to the ruthless killer is not easy to find. To fill the streets with armed soldiery is exorbitantly expensive in manpower and can only be maintained for short periods. Snap searches of male passers-by in the hope of catching the terrorist with a weapon on his person may have some deterrent effect. So also may the arming of British civilians, the use of decoys, and other methods of deception. But it will only be a matter of time before a patient killer will find a safe opportunity to shoot. Special EOKA surveillance parties keep a check on the movements of prospective victims, and when a daily or weekly pattern is established, choose the most propitious moment for the deed.

The dispersal of unlawful assemblies and the suppression of riots present the security forces with thoroughly unpleasant and
thankless tasks. A great many photographs have appeared since 1955, and especially in the anti-British press, of ugly riot scenes in Cyprus. It is well to remember that the quelling of disturbances is a difficult business; it requires from commanders nice judgment and a sense of timing, and from everyone at every level, a cool head and self-restraint in the face of severe provocation and personal danger.

How does the commander of troops go about the problem of crowd clearance? Standard British military doctrine lays down that it is the police who are responsible, in the first place, for dealing with unruly crowds; that when the police find the task too much for them they receive the aid of the military. In Cyprus it has been necessary to depart from this procedure, owing to the numerical inferiority of the police. As a result, troops are trained to use police methods in controlling crowds. They are no longer strangers to the baton and shield.

When a hostile crowd forms, then, it will probably first clash with the police or troops acting as policemen. It will also probably find across its path a thin concertina-barbed-wire barrier or other hastily erected barrier. Its more enterprising elements will then try to find the flanks of the police, who, in turn, will use reserve forces to seal off the crowd's movements. The police will try every nonviolent means to disperse the crowd: loudspeaker announcements, written exhortations on large banners, the reading of a proclamation and warning to disperse, even the production of cameras to photograph ringleaders, and colored-dye sprayers to assist subsequent identifications.

Assuming these measures fail, the throwing of bottles and stones by rowdies will start about now. These will be aimed as much from the tops of nearby houses as from ground level. They will hurt. Even a small bottle thrown from a height or hurled at short range can cause unpleasant damage to the unprotected face. After the bottles and the stones may come the first "bomb," usually made from water pipe of about three-inch diameter filled explosive, and sealed off at the ends. By the time this hap-

he stage is set for stern countermeasures.

e considering these measures, which culminate in the of fire by the military, it would be well to mention that
all crowds do not necessarily reach a really violent state. Many disperse before the bomb-throwing stage is reached. Schoolchildren, for example, stage many demonstrations which for the most part do not feature bomb-throwing. But, nonetheless, they can be awkward to handle. Provoked by EOKA leaflets, they will stream from school, girls as well as boys. In a leaflet addressed to schoolchildren, Grivas once told them that the cause of enosis was "more sacred than your teachers, your mother, or your father." A likely occasion on which they will appear is the funeral of an ex-terrorist. Turning up by the hundreds, chanting slogans, and becoming more unruly as they go, they can often be dispersed only by the use of tear gas and physical manhandling. The snatching of the leaders, often youths and girls in their teens (all of equal truculence), and locking them up out of harm's way for a few hours often has a salutary effect on these youthful gatherings.

But to return to the riotous crowd. The bomb has been thrown and we have on our hands a serious breach of the peace. The police, or troops acting as such, will now, if they have not already done so, embark on a series of baton charges. If the wind is right, they may employ tear gas delivered in hand-grenade form or shot from longer-range riot guns. If troops are handy, the bayonet may have been resorted to, though this weapon has its disadvantages in that the user may become too closely embroiled with the crowd. If all these measures fail, if more bombs are thrown or buildings are set on fire, and the crowd still will not disperse, the moment arrives to use the ultimate means of forcing the issue, the bullet. We have now, more than ever, to go carefully.

The first requirement before opening fire is for the military commander on the spot to be quite satisfied that no other course is open to him to achieve the immediate aim of restoring law and order. The next is to give the crowd a clear warning that they will be fired upon if they do not disperse. They must be then given the opportunity to move off. If and when fire is eventually opened, it is carefully controlled: Two bullets must not be used if one will suffice. Fire will be directed at those actually perpetrating the violence. Shots must not be placed over the heads of the crowd, as this serves only to panic the less hardy members
and an ugly scramble to escape may lead to casualties from trampling underfoot. Throughout, action must be aimed to prevent further trouble and not to hand out wholesale punishment.

When these stern and distasteful measures succeed, as succeed they will, immediately steps are taken to succor the wounded on both sides. Arrested men will be handed over to the police. The scene will return to normal, though it may be, as often happens on these occasions, that a curfew is now imposed to prevent further crowds from forming, and to allow tempers to cool.

The important thing to remember in this type of operation, as with all others in this troubled island, is that the armed forces act in support of the civil power in order to restore law and order. Military measures alone cannot solve the Cyprus problem. What is required urgently is a political settlement, but this will not be achieved so long as the Cypriot fears to open his mouth to express his true thoughts and aspirations.

The primary objectives of the security forces are to uphold the law, eliminate the terrorists, and put an end to intimidation: in sum, to create conditions for a political settlement.

The task is hard, sometimes dangerous, often distasteful. But it must not be thought that the British serviceman looks upon all Greek Cypriots as his enemies and vice versa: Witness the friendliness shown toward each other when an EOKA truce has seemingly brought operations to an end. He looks forward, as all fair-minded Britons and Cypriots must do, to the day when he can resume the old, long-established friendships.
VI

SMALL UNITS WIN SMALL WARS

Marines, Guerrillas, and Small Wars
Major Michael Spark, USMC

Combat Helicopters in Algeria
Major Hilaire Bethouart, French Army

Small-Unit Operations
Marine Corps Schools

If you are looking for a pat, complete, final solution to the guer-
ri lla problem, you will not find it here. What you will find is some
thought-provoking material.

Idea—The threat goes right to the root of military organiza-
tion, training, equipment, and doctrine. See what Major Spark,
a career Marine, has to suggest.

Idea—The helicopter, properly used, could be decisive tacti-
cally. Read how the French used their “choppers” in Major
Bethouart’s piece. As this is written—nearly two years later—
only in South Vietnam is more valid experience being gained
with the latest machines.

Idea—Small-unit actions—patrols, ambushes, searches, road-
blocks—are the key to tactical victory. Each of these depends
on specific, detailed know-how.

The “banana wars” of the 1920’s and 1930’s were guerrilla
wars. Marines came out of the jungles after chasing Sandino,
Charlemagne Peralte, and other cacos, insurrectos, and generally
bad actors. From their reports, the Marine Corps developed the
noted Small Wars Manual. From it, you could learn how to mount
a Phillips pack saddle; the differing psychology of horses, mules,
and burros; and to watch for male clothes in the wash while you
were flying over villages where only women were to be seen.
A "nuts-and-bolts manual," the professionals called it, and the Marine Corps Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, has now brought it up to date. The title of the new manual is *Fleet Marine Force Manual-21 (FMFM-21)—Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*. The first draft was printed early in 1962 for use at the schools. Refined by comment from the field, it will eventually become doctrine.

The *Gazette* was struck by the wealth of specific detail contained in the Appendixes. We have reprinted the first Appendix—"Small-Unit Operations"—which draws heavily on British doctrines used in Malaya. The entire manual is strongly recommended for the serious student.
Marines, Guerrillas, and Small Wars

MAJOR MICHAEL SPARK

No force in the world today is better equipped and organized for counterguerrilla operations than the U.S. Marine Corps. Some foreign armies have fought guerrillas well and hard in the past few years. None of them can match the Marine Corps' potential, once it is fully matured by a sound and intensive training program.

Our special assets are numerous, deriving both from long-held concepts and from recent refinements to meet the demands of our amphibious mission.

We are the only mobile ground force of combined arms (including combat planes) in the world. The Marine Corps has everything a modern counterguerrilla force must have: combat troops, support units, helicopters, and attack aircraft. In one service we combine every weapon that can be brought to bear against guerrillas.

The Corps has always held to the vital doctrine that all Marines must be qualified as infantrymen. Therefore, in guerrilla situations, our combat service and support units would be inherently capable of self-defense. If necessary, they could also undertake any antiguerilla tasks that did not demand a high level of infantry unit training. This would give tremendous tactical flexibility to the Marine commander. He could husband his infantry for the offensive blows which alone can crush guerrillas.

As a service, we are conditioned to austere logistics. Marines get most of their jobs done with less matériel than other military organizations find necessary. We do not cart around a large supporting structure, so the target offered by our logistic base is
smaller. Because guerrillas often strike at supply lines, this would be all to the good. More of our over-all strength could be devoted to offensive antiguerrilla tasks instead of being used to protect a complex network of installations.

Still, in any operation, troops must be moved, fed, and reamunitioned. Overland resupply is always vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Guerrillas cannot, however, effectively interdict air and sea routes of supply. Here we would benefit from our mobile, sea-based orientation. Because of our amphibious mission, we have long been accustomed to logistic support via ship and landing craft. With our modern amphibious doctrine, we have evolved effective methods of helicopter resupply. Trained to get by with very little, and able to move over the sea and through the air, we would rob the guerrilla of the very targets he prefers most.

Recent preparations for general war also improve our readiness to deal with guerrillas. Much of the doctrine developed to meet the now-waning threat of tactical atomics has almost equal application in the suppression of guerrilla outbreaks. For years now, we have been perfecting vertical envelopment, perimeter defense, coordination of physically separated units, and combat patrolling of unoccupied areas. In facing guerrillas, these skills would serve us to good advantage.

Our equipment for guerrilla war is good and getting better. Helicopters are the preferred vehicle for rapid concentration against guerrillas. The Marine Corps has been in the forefront of helicopter development and employment. The new Vertol HRB-1 will provide the Corps with a quantum increase in vertical lift capability. Its gas turbines will free us from the bugaboo of lift reduction in high-temperature areas.

New single-side-band and radio-relay equipment provides effective tactical communications for antiguerrilla operations. In the Mechanical Mule, we have a good rough-country vehicle. Our amphibious tractors are excellent for use in the swamps and deltas often favored by guerrillas.

The NATO series of small arms, the M79 grenade launcher, lighter packs, and dehydrated rations will improve the firepower and reduce the burden of antiguerrilla teams. The GV-1 Hercules will greatly increase our air-transport and delivery capabil-
ity. In the A2F, we are soon to get an attack aircraft with long endurance, able to carry a great weight in bombs, an almost ideal antiguerilla plane.

Because the guerrilla threat is growing, we must strive continuously to improve our readiness to meet it. The circumstances under which we may have to fight must be anticipated so our training and doctrine will develop logically.

One thing is clear. We are not going to be guerrillas. Much of our organization and equipment would be wasted in such a role. More important, we are unfit for it. Guerrillas have to blend with the local population. They must speak, look, act, and think like natives of the troubled area. Race, language, and lack of intimate knowledge of local terrain and customs all bar us from an effective guerrilla role as an organized force. Unless we plan to fight in Utah, we should train to refine our capability as a counterguerrilla force. This directly affects the path we should follow in training.

Significant differences exist between the needs of guerrillas and antiguerrilla troops. For example, guerrillas must be proficient in the use of demolitions and captured weapons. Counterguerrillas have more interest in air-ground cooperation, control of civilians, and defense of fixed installations.

Our training must also reflect the tactical circumstances in which we may meet guerrillas. It is very possible we may again find them working with a major enemy force, as they did in Korea. The Communists have a great deal of experience in such tactics. In this role, guerrillas can seriously threaten a Marine amphibious campaign.

Our offensive tactics stress deep, helicopter-borne penetrations. We accept the possibility of initial, wide unit separation. From by-passed areas, guerrillas can strike at our supporting elements. Their mission will be to dilute our attack. Each of our units must be trained to repel these attacks while accomplishing its principal task.

Because different missions must be discharged by various landing-force elements, there will be variations in their antiguerrilla problems. No unit’s normal role can be forgotten when planning antiguerrilla training. In general, for training purposes, a broad division into three categories can be made: infantry and troops
operating as or with infantry; combat service and support units, and aviation ground personnel; and aviation flight personnel.

Each of these groups needs a different order of antiguerrilla training priorities. There will never be enough time to train in everything. The objective of every training plan must be to teach in sequence the subjects that best prepare the particular unit for its probable role in guerrilla war.

Some antiguerrilla subjects, of course, are needed by Marines in all units. These include: intelligence briefings and psychological indoctrination; civilian control measures, counterintelligence, and security; small-unit defensive tactics, especially of installations; bivouacs and motor convoys; physical training; and escape and evasion.

In guerrilla war, the best tactics can be negated by failure to teach the troops the problems, hopes, and fears of the local population. Quoting Mao Tse-tung, "The people are the sea in which guerrillas swim." A prime guerrilla objective would be to turn all the people against the Marine force. Misunderstandings and random reprisals would excite the very situation the troops were sent to suppress. In Russia, the Germans learned to their sorrow that bad treatment of civilians multiplied guerrilla effectiveness.

Good indoctrination and strict discipline would greatly reduce our problems with civilians. However, some guerrilla sympathizers and provocateurs would always be present. They would try to create disturbances which all units must be trained to suppress. The strictest security to prevent leakage of military information must also be stressed, because guerrillas almost always have an excellent network of civilian informers.

Thorough grounding in defensive tactics is required by all units facing guerrillas. The Marine commander can select the troops for offensive tasks; the guerrilla strikes at targets of his own choosing. Most often these targets will be rear-area facilities, motor convoys, and the like. Every unit must be taught to defend itself against sudden and violent attack.

In guerrilla war, physical training has increased importance. Long distances often separate units. Motor movement is often difficult and dangerous. Combat security patrols are arduous, long
Marches are common. All troops need the ability to carry combat and survival loads over difficult terrain. They must learn to live and work on reduced rations, under primitive conditions, with little sleep. Unit integrity is a must. In guerrilla war nobody can be left behind.

Escape and evasion training is essential to all types of units. In future, Marines will be traveling more and more by helicopter. Occasionally, these aircraft may crash in a guerrilla-infested area. Both crew and passengers must have the know-how to make their way safely back to friendly positions. Foraging, first aid, dead reckoning, and map reading are basic skills in which all Marines must become proficient.

In addition to the subjects already mentioned, some aspects of counterguerrilla training are of particular importance to infantry troops. On them the burden of hunting down the guerrilla will fall. Much of the conventional training of infantry has antiguerrilla application. The problem is one of emphasis.

Proficiency in deep patrolling, ambushes, and counterambushes must be stressed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to support properly field exercises in these subjects. Deep patrols require large, varied training areas, often unavailable to infantry battalions. Both patrol and ambush exercises require highly skilled aggressors for maximum training benefit. In the past, aggressor tactics have often tended to reflect zeal in the role at the expense of realistic instruction.

One solution to these problems would be the creation of division patrol schools. If established, however, such schools should not be permitted to destroy tactical integrity. Best results will be obtained if infantry companies and platoons phase through them as units.

Centralized schools or not, an obstacle to consistent patrol and ambush training is found in our sometimes vague doctrine and lack of adequate references. Good Army Ranger manuals exist but are hard to come by. Up-to-date Marine Corps doctrine is lacking in some tactical areas. In 1940, for instance, the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual recommended an immediate assault by ambushed units. Is this still our policy? If so, at what ranges?
For infantry units, survival training and low-level air-ground cooperation need more attention. The guerrilla's refuges are mountains, swamps, jungles, and deserts. In such areas, small units, often operating independently, would have to hunt him down. Marine infantry must learn to fend for itself, survive, and fight in all types of adverse terrain. Concurrently, small units must also improve their ability to work with supporting aircraft. To the platoon operating independently, a single helicopter load could mean survival, a single attack aircraft, victory. Simple signals and procedures must be worked out and practiced. Patrol leaders, including NCO’s, must learn to benefit from air reconnaissance of their intended routes.

Other special training problems affect the infantry unit leader. For him, antiguerilla war would require a mental transition. His training has emphasized the rapid, violent, cohesive action required for the amphibious assault. Particularly when seeking guerrilla contact, he must learn to move deliberately, sometimes sacrificing speed for secrecy. On occasion, he must accept loss of contact with his squads and fire teams. In the covert, dispersed formations of the guerrilla hunt, officers cannot be everywhere, doing everything. From his personal experience, the writer can testify that these lessons need to and can be learned in field exercises.

Our service and support units have antiguerilla requirements that often differ from those of the infantry. In some ways, theirs is the most difficult training task of all. They must prepare to discharge their normal functions while simultaneously fighting off guerrillas.

They must work out detailed procedures for allocating men between work and security tasks. Flexible standard operating procedures, capable of adjusting to varying degrees of threat, must be set forth and tested. Because training time for service units is always meager, their tactical training should stress their probable defensive role. Security patrolling, outposting, roadblocks, and convoy defense rather than long-range combat patrols should be emphasized.

Service/support units also need to give more attention to pas-
sive defense. Mines, wire, field fortifications, and concealment can compensate for shortages of manpower. Service troops should be trained to fortify, mine, and wire in their installations quickly. Done properly, these measures can present an effective obstacle to surprise guerrilla attack.

The antiguerrilla skills required of aviation flight personnel are again different. Fortunately, most flight crews have been attending excellent escape and evasion courses for years. For helicopter crews, however, such training in the future should be held in conjunction with ground units. In a crash, troop passengers and pilots might both survive. The commissioned pilot, because of his rank, might become the leader of an impromptu combat formation. His training should give him confidence in his ability to lead it to safety.

Otherwise, flight-crew training for antiguerrilla tasks should complement that of the infantry. Techniques involving single aircraft in support of platoon and squad patrols must be practiced. Experience must be gained in responding to the single communications such small units can carry. A great deal of work is necessary as well in the difficult problem of air detection of guerrillas.

For all units, the capstone of antiguerrilla training should be a major combined arms exercise. Ideally, it should feature civilian control problems and guerrillas in their most dangerous role—as auxiliaries to regular enemy forces. Such an exercise should last at least seven days. In some previous maneuvers, we have exhausted the troops in a brief period and ended the exercise as our realistic combat capability dropped toward zero. We could pay a heavy price for neglect of this sort if it becomes a habit.

Concurrent with intensified training, we should review all other possible avenues for improvement of our antiguerrilla capability. One obviously essential step is to update and reissue the Small Wars Manual. As a parallel, we might well increase the number of Marine officers sent as observers to friendly armies engaged against guerrillas.

If we do not already have one, we also need a complete catalogue of individual skills useful in combating guerrillas. It should
be prepared on a Marine-Corps-wide if not a national military basis. Such an inventory should include interpreters, former area residents, and men with special skills such as mountain climbing, desert survival, and animal packing. The personnel listed should be readily available on request by a Marine commander committed to an antiguerrilla operation.

Booklets containing language tips, basic area geography and sociology, survival hints, and the like could well be prepared in advance for potential trouble spots. On the squad level, they would fill the vital orientation function now provided staffs by formal area studies. Probably the total cost for coverage of all likely “hot spots” would be less than that of a single tank.

Another cheap but useful antiguerrilla tool would be gained by reactivating our war-dog platoons. Dogs have always proved their worth in security and tracking tasks. They are cheaper, more versatile, and break down less often than some new radars which are designed for similar purposes.

More expensive but essential is a removable radio in the VHF range for attack aircraft. In guerrilla war, the number of deep patrols at any one time may far exceed the number of available air-control parties. If air-ground communications are to be established, attack aircraft need a radio that will net with infantry PRC-10 radios. Such a radio would have a modest range and would present a space problem for the carrying aircraft. It would, however, provide a vital link from plane to small patrol that is now lacking.

Also useful would be time mines that could be preset to deactivate after a specified period. This would allow rear-area units to mine themselves in without creating an urgent need for mine clearance when the unit displaced.

The items discussed by no means constitute an exhaustive list. Only the imagination limits the number of new, desirable antiguerrilla tools. New gear itself, however, is not our most pressing problem. What we must do is critically examine our structure and policies in relation to the requirements of guerrilla war. Wherever opportunity for improvement exists, we should grasp it.

The Marine Corps has fought guerrillas in small wars during
most of its existence. Today, emphasis on offensive spirit, the
individual fighting Marine, air-ground teamwork, and austere
logistics make our Corps the nation's ideal counterguerrilla force.

Moderate refinements in training, techniques, and equipment
can make us even more effective in that role. These adjustments
can be made without detriment to other Marine Corps missions.
Combat Helicopters in Algeria

MAJOR HILAIRE BETHOUART

The best way to explain French use of helicopters in Algeria is to discuss some typical examples—where helicopters were a determining factor in the issue of the battle. In such a war, the need for fast, accurate information is vital. When a few troops are scattered in a very large country, it is necessary to know when and where to find the enemy. Helicopters can be, and are, used in securing this information. In a zone where finding rebel troops is highly probable, small helicopter-borne units often perform sallies to obtain or to confirm their location.

Having first-class information, the company commander can set up a plan of battle in which helicopters, when available, will always play the main role because they can reach almost any point quicker than the rebels. Here are four typical kinds of helicopter operations:

1. Enveloping and maneuvering by air.
2. A quick, unplanned change in the area of maneuver.
3. Speedy action when using helicopters.
4. Full air-borne action in a desert area.

1. *Enveloping and Maneuvering by Air.* On January 3, 1958, the commanding officer of the Twenty-second Infantry Regiment received information that a company-size rebel element was located in the Chantgouna Valley, living in caves. The CO decided to circle the suspicious area the next morning and to search the valley with all available means. The valley is about five miles long and two miles wide. The floor is at 4,000 feet. The top is 7,000 feet. The terrain is rocky and broken.
The commander had eight companies carefully comb the area. The action started at 0800 with the landing of three companies on the crest of the Djebel Farooun to block the enemy's northern escape route. At the same time, three companies started to climb the right side of the valley and one company began climbing the left side. Another company was in reserve with the helicopters, ready to join the battle when needed. At 1000, the elements on the right side located and opened fire on the rebels.

The rebels fled down the valley to the west. Immediately, the CO sent his helicopter reserves to the heights west of the valley. The rebels, surrounded in a shrinking area, tried to fight their way out of the net. Unfortunately, this was in January. The day was short, and the combat could not be called off before night fall. The companies tried to maintain contact during the night by using aerial flares. This was not completely successful, however, and the remainder of the enemy unit vanished during the night.

The success of the operation, though not complete, was due only to the helicopters, which allowed the commander to block quickly the road the enemy wanted to use.

2. Unplanned Change in the Area of Maneuver. Simultaneously, eighty miles east in an area near Tebessa, the CO of the sector received word that a rebel unit coming from Tunisia was resting for a while in the rough mountainous area called Hamimat Guerra. He immediately decided to undertake an operation to mop up this area. About nine companies, two armored squadrons, and an H-21 company were involved in the operation. The area is about six miles wide and ten miles long. After having circled the suspicious zone, using only land means, the Hamimat Guerra was completely combed without finding anything but small rebel elements flushed out five miles to the northwest by the incoming troops earlier in the morning.

At noon, after the search was over, the CO decided to make a company-size reconnaissance in the hills five miles southwest. Around 1500, this unit met head on with an important rebel element. Immediately, the commander jumped into his helicopter and flew toward the fight while he alerted helicopters and reserve troops. At 1700, four companies were already transported by
helicopter, circling the rebel position. The assault force was landed and the rebels destroyed before darkness.

What means, other than helicopters, could have permitted the commander to catch up with an adversary who was not found in the planned battle area?

3. Speedy Action When Using Helicopters. In a remote area on the very rim of the Sahara Desert, the commander of the Ain Beida sector received accurate and timely information that a transient rebel unit coming from Tunisia was due to rest in the Djebel Tarf during the second week of January. The information specified the exact valley where they were supposed to stop.

Tarf Mountain, standing like a mushroom in the desert, is isolated. It is ten miles from the nearest point where French elements are stationed, thirty miles from the first important French post. It is, moreover, a beautiful observation post.

The CO decided to set up a fast, combined helicopter and motorized infantry operation which was scheduled to start at 1500 on January 10. The unusual schedule was intended to take maximum advantage of the element of surprise. At 1430, the first echelon of a paratroop company was picked up by helicopter at La Meskiana, thirty miles southeast of the Tarf, and landed at 1500 on a prescribed spot.

At 1455, a two-company-size convoy left Canrobert, ten miles north, and rushed down toward its predesignated objective. The first paratroop elements were engaged, immediately after landing, in hard fighting against strong opposition. The second shuttle of helicopters could not land at the previous location, and was directed toward dominating heights one mile northeast. Two more companies were successfully landed in this area, while the first elements held the rebels on their position.

At 1600, all elements, air-borne and motorized, were on the spot and started crushing enemy positions. Three assaults were delivered during the next hour. At 1815, the fight was over. The rebels all were killed or taken prisoner. Various armaments, including thirteen machine guns, nineteen submachine guns, and a tremendous amount of supplies and equipment were captured.

Speed was the keynote of this operation. Only three hours and fifteen minutes were necessary to destroy a strong rebel unit
detected thirty-odd miles from the French main position. During the fight, air force and navy fighters gave the ground forces close and strong support.

4. Full Air-borne Action in a Desert Area. Now let us go farther south to a desert area where oil fields were found a few years ago.

One day during the winter of 1958, two teams of oil drillers and their light escort were slaughtered in an area which was supposed to be rather quiet. A few days after this action was reported, further information indicated a rebel unit of about 200 men was strolling along a desert sand area about 200 miles long and 150 miles wide.

There was no possibility of ground reconnaissance in this area. The mission was assigned to an aerial reconnaissance team. Meanwhile, a task force made up of a paratroop battle group, a helicopter company, various types of cargo planes, and a fighter squadron was set up and based on the main airfield of Timimoun.

The reconnaissance mission was rather difficult. To find several platoon-size units in an area covering 20,000 square miles was just about like finding a needle in a haystack. Navigation was a problem, too. Nothing is more like a sand dune than another sand dune.

L-19's were organized in teams of two, coupled with an air force twin-engine reconnaissance plane. The L-19's acted as hunting dogs, flying at low altitudes around the sand hills, trying to find clues of enemy activities. The air force plane was the big brother, doing all the navigating, and directing the L-19's as a hunter would direct his dogs. The aircraft acted as a radio relay, and was equipped with many rescue devices in case of emergency.

When one L-19 did find a clue, big brother called for the helicopters, which landed a two-platoon ground reconnaissance unit at a specified landing zone. At the same time, from the main base, air force cargo planes took off loaded with paratroopers, and were waiting over the area. If ground reconnaissance did find the enemy, then the paratroopers were to be dropped. As the battle developed, helicopters were used again to pick up ground forces and to land them on places better located. This allowed the commander to envelop the rebels tightly and to speed the fight.

Combat of this kind is long and hard for both men and ma-
Nearly five weeks were necessary to search carefully the 20,000 square miles. Two major fights occurred. Several helicopter-borne ground reconnaissances were conducted prior to each major fight. Two-thirds of the rebel force was destroyed; the remaining third vanished in the desert. Soldiers scattered individually, trying to join a rest camp in Moroccan territory at Figuig, some 130 miles north.

These few examples do not provide a complete picture of the missions assigned to helicopter units in Algeria. They are, however, typical of routine operations carried on daily. They illustrate some of the lessons we learned from previous operations.

Although any type of combat unit can be helicopter-lifted, the best use of transport helicopters will be achieved if they are used for the lift of specially trained and equipped troops. Very often, soldiers landed by helicopter close to the rebels are immediately involved in local, sometimes uncontrolled, fire fights of the guerrilla-warfare type.

In Algeria, transport helicopter units are very often coupled with an infantry unit that is well trained and adapted to this kind of fighting. These are usually air-borne troops. Paratroopers are familiar with shock action, well equipped with light, powerful armament and all sorts of radio sets. Officers and NCO's are numerous and their basic training is perfectly adapted to use of helicopters.

When the same helicopter company works frequently with the same battle groups, new and invisible bonds are cemented for the benefit of all. Mutual understanding, and a commander experienced in employing helicopters, are of utmost benefit when the battle reaches its climax. Achievement of the objective is facilitated because the commander can give his orders in a few simple words over the radio, with assurance that he will be understood.

Helicopter units in the kind of war fought in Algeria must not be tied down by a preplanned schedule. Nor must they be required to ask higher command echelons for authority to take off.

The best team for Algeria is a battle group of paratroopers coupled with a helicopter company. Helicopters give the battle group CO essentially the mobility and flexibility he needs to
cope with the varying situations he may have to face at any moment.

It was generally found that helicopters, except for particular reasons (such as blocking action in a broken terrain), should not be used at the beginning of an action when information about the enemy is still vague. Rather they should be kept in reserve for further decisive action. Before using his helicopters, the commander should try, via ground forces and aerial observation, to verify and augment information. When he knows the approximate position and number of the enemy, and after having studied the terrain carefully, he can then commit his helicopters according to the same basic principles that an armored infantry battalion commander would have used in 1944.

Using helicopters in a ground maneuver requires from the commander and his subordinates some indispensable qualities. These are: speed of decision; keen understanding of the situation; boldness; imagination.

Lack of one of these qualities will cause immediate disorder and loss of time, men, money, and efficiency.

In using helicopters in Algeria, many problems were encountered. The major ones were liaison and safety. In a relatively small area, there were L-19's carrying out observation missions or adjusting artillery fire: light helicopters for staff liaison or medic evacuations; H-21's carrying troops; H-19's carrying resupply; T-6's from the air force for light close support; Corsairs from the navy, and air force jets for heavy close support; sometimes B-26's for very heavy close support; and last, the Broussard from the air force for leading fighter strikes.

Though everybody is supposed to fly at a prescribed altitude, coordination is quite often difficult. The aircraft belong to three different services and therefore are not fitted and used the same way.

To solve the problem, the Alouette was equipped for use as a flying CP by the commander. This was successful to a degree. The Alouette is a little too small to hold everything and everybody needed. The Alouette III, however, should make a suitable command helicopter.

But the true solution is to have all the aircraft involved in the
ground fight belong to the same service, and therefore fitted the same way and having the same channel of command. The French Air Force, though, is very reluctant to give up aircraft. Army aviation was developed only as a result of the wars in Indochina and Algeria.

Safety in using helicopters in the battle area is a great concern. When landing behind the enemy line, you never know whether or not your landing zone will be clear of enemy forces. Your observation airplane may tell you that the area is clear when it is not. Arabs are very good at camouflage. When artillery and air force fighters are available, you may request some kind of neutralization fire prior to landing, but you do not always have these means. Sometimes speed is of primary importance and you do not have enough time for such preparation. Even if you can use all these means, a gap always remains between the end of neutralization fire and the first landing of the helicopters. This is enough to allow our adversaries to shoot down helicopters while they land.

The first solution thought about was to arm the first helicopter that landed. H-21's were fitted with four machine guns and thirty-eight 68-mm. rockets. During the final approach prior to landing, this helicopter was supposed to sweep the landing zone with machine-gun fire and rocket blasts and to unload his troops "in the smoke of the explosions." This was reliable, but when so equipped the H-21 could not carry anything but the pilots. Therefore, we were missing our goal and wasting a cargo helicopter. So we looked for something else.

The next solution was to arm the Alouette helicopter. It is a good, rugged, and powerful aircraft. It was armed with two containers, each one having eighteen or thirty-six rockets of 37 mm., according to the mission. The 37-mm. is a new kind of rocket—very reliable.

Another problem was safety for the plane itself and the crew. We tried to improve it. All the H-21's are now fitted with automatic-sealing tanks. They are often necessary. We adopted a regulation making it mandatory to have two qualified pilots even in the small helicopters. In case one is killed, the other can bring
back the aircraft. That has happened. Crews are required to wear flak suits and their seats are now armored. This particular feature saved many lives.

All these solutions (to which were added a few regulations concerning rules of flight) proved very successful. Despite a steady increase in hours of flight, our losses decreased regularly during the past three years:

In 1957, 56,000 hours were flown by helicopters in combat operations and 62 helicopters were hit. Nine crew members were killed and 4 wounded.

In 1958, 64,000 hours were flown by helicopters and 50 were hit, but only 5 crew members were killed.

In 1959, 66,000 hours were flown by helicopters, 35 were hit, 6 crew members were wounded, and none were killed.

It is interesting to compare losses that occurred during the same time to the fixed-wing observation airplanes:

In 1957, roughly 120,000 hours were flown by army fixed-wing over the battlefields and 158 were hit. Of the crew members, 8 were killed and 11 were wounded.

In 1958, 145,000 hours were flown and 201 airplanes were hit. There were 9 crew members killed and 17 wounded.

In 1959, 150,000 hours were flown; 106 airplanes were hit, 7 crew members were killed, and 9 wounded.

Analysis of these data shows that for the same number of hours of flight, two helicopters were hit as compared with three airplanes. The explanation is that helicopters in Algeria are highly vulnerable during the approach and landing. Compared to the length of flight, this is a very short period of time. The solution we worked out to improve security in this phase proved successful.

On the other hand, observation airplanes are often obliged to fly over enemy troops to control their movement and to give the commander the latest information available. Many planes are hit while marking targets with smoke devices. Therefore, it is true to say that light airplanes are more vulnerable than helicopters in warfare of the type fought in Algeria.

We have learned many things in Algeria as far as army avia-
tion is concerned. Part of this experience would not apply in another theater of operation. Much of what we learned, however, will be valid in any situation. One thing is clear: Helicopters used by a keen commander in an appropriate situation are a determining factor in the achievement of a mission.
Small-Unit Operations

MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS

1. GENERAL

a. Scope. Operations against guerrillas are characterized by aggressive small-unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This appendix contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. All small-unit leaders and their men should thoroughly understand the contents of this appendix. It includes establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambushing, counterambush action, and search procedures.

b. Example. To show the importance of small-unit operations, two examples are given: an operation conducted in August, 1954, in the Philippines and an operation in 1954–55 in Malaya.

(1) The Alert Platoon. Counterguerrilla operations were conducted by the Philippine Army during the period of 1946–60. Beginning in September, 1950, through personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

Typical of the small-unit response was the action of the alert platoon of the Seventeenth BCT (Battalion Combat Team) in the vicinity of Manila, August 16–17, 1954. About midnight, an intelligence agent reported the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for an attack. Immediately, the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With two civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. The terrain and a full moon favored their movement. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

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About 200 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions. At 0430, August 17, the first group advanced toward the objective while members of the second group positioned themselves along the guerrillas' avenue of withdrawal on the right flank of the objective. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they formed into skirmishers about sixty yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry opened fire, but was immediately knocked down. A fire fight with the guerrillas in the hut continued for about twenty minutes and then they broke contact. Attempting to withdraw, they were shot by members of the second group from their ambush positions.

(2) “Operation Nassau.” During the period 1948-60, the British conducted many difficult operations in Malaya. By 1951, the British forces established well-defined objectives and then began their counterguerrilla operation.

Victory in this counterguerrilla operation is primarily attributed to good intelligence work, effective communications, rapid deployment of troops, and food-control measures. Rapid deployment was achieved by deploying small units in battalion-controlled operations.

Operation Nassau, typical of the battalion-size operations in Malaya, began in December, 1954, and ended in September, 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about thirty yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about December 21, 1954. On January 9, 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were well prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them.
Plans were modified; harassing fires were reduced to night-time only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for three months without results. Finally on March 21, an ambush party, after forty-five hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map, and local morale rose a little.

Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to camp accounted for two more terrorists. The Number 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food.

On July 7, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four, including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, twenty-three terrorists remained in the swamp with no food or communications with the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population were lifted.

This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each one represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" was considered a success, for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.

2. ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE
   a. General. To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are
a. Deception. A patrol base is secretly occupied. Secrecy is maintained by practicing deception techniques that are carefully planned. Deception plans should include the following considerations:

1. If possible, the march to the base is conducted at night.
2. The route selected avoids centers of population.
3. If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol in remote areas are detained.
4. Inhabitants of areas that cannot be avoided are deceived by the marching of troops in a direction that indicates the patrol is going to some other area.
5. Scouts operate forward of the main body of the patrol.
6. Bases are located beyond areas that are patrolled daily.
7. If fires are necessary, smokeless fuel is burned.
8. Normally, not more than one trail should lead into the base and it should be camouflaged and guarded.
9. The base is occupied as quickly and quietly as possible. Security is established beyond sight and sound limits of the base.
10. The route to the base is selected by use of photos, maps, ground and aerial reconnaissance.
11. If practical, the patrol leader makes an aerial reconnaissance.
12. Terrain features that are easily identified are selected as check points and rest breaks.
13. Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued. If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

b. Establishing the Base.

1. Its site must be chosen so that the patrol can carry out its assigned mission.
2. It must be secret and secure. A patrol operating from a base unknown to the enemy increases the possibility of guerrilla contact. A secure base permits the troops to rest.
(3) The base must have facilities or terrain suited for the erection of adequate radio antennae.
(4) If it is anticipated that an air drop or a helicopter resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone or landing point should not be located too close to the base.
(5) The base must allow men to sleep in comfort. Wet areas and steep slopes are to be avoided. Flat and dry ground that drains quickly affords the best location.
(6) It should be close to water that can be used for drinking.

d. Layout of the Base. All units should have an SOP for quickly establishing a base. Once an SOP is clearly understood, laying out a base becomes simple routine. The patrol leader indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.

e. Sequence of Establishment. A suggested sequence for establishing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:

(1) Leaving the Road or Trail. The jungle and heavy woods provide the best security from surprise and the best conditions for defense. Generally, the best method to use in leaving the trail or road is:
   (a) Select the point at which to leave the trail or road.
   (b) Maintain security while the column moves off the trail.
   (c) Have men at the end of the column camouflage the area where the exit was made from the trail.
   (d) Continue movement until a suitable bivouac site is reached.
(2) Occupation of the Bivouac Site.
   (a) This occupation is based on a platoon of three squads, but the force may be larger or smaller. Using the clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.
   (b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader
stands in the center of the base, indicates 12 o’clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each squad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. The security is normally maintained by one fire team and the remaining two prepare their positions for defense.

(3) Digging In. The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to be occupied. Shelters are not erected until adequate individual protection is assured. The clearing of fields of fire will be accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) Sentries. Upon completion of their defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least one sentry, the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted forward of the squad position but closer to it than during daylight. Squads may have to post additional sentries on the trail and on key terrain features.

5. Water. A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point. A spot is selected for drinking and for bathing. Normally, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for twenty-four hours or less. Individuals should fill canteens for other members of their squad. Security is provided.

(6) Garbage. Each squad will dig a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat menace. It will be covered periodically.

(7) Perimeter Path and Marking Trails. Narrow paths are cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position and then around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may be strung waist high along each path as a guide.

f. Base Alert. The critical periods for defending the base are dawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:
(1) It enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the nature of the ground to his front and flanks.

(2) It allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

(3) It provides a definite cut-off period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the morning alert, the daily routine begins.

(4) It enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, equipment, ammunition, etc.

g. Alarm. The patrol must have a suitable alarm signal for the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This signal should not sound foreign to the jungle, but must be detected only by patrol members.

h. Administration of the Base.

1) Cooking Fires and Smoking. The smell of cooking and smoke can carry more than 200 yards in the woods or jungle. These fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy, or when guerrilla patrols are active. If cooking is permitted during daylight hours, smokeless fuel only is used.

2) Location of Heads. Heads are located in protected areas.

3) Disposal of Garbage. Garbage and trash must be disposed of as they occur. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and food are completely destroyed and camouflaged.

4) Water Purification. The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.

5) Cooking. When each man carries his own rations, cooking will be done on an individual basis. If 5-in-1 or 10-in-1 type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. Leaving a Base. Before leaving the base, all signs of occupation are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. The area is left to appear as though it has not been occupied.
3. PATROLLING

a. General. Successful operations against guerrillas will often be the result of successful small-unit patrols. To make contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops will be occupied primarily with patrol activity. Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results. Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics, modifications of normal techniques may be necessary. Patrons need to be all-purpose—prepared to fight, ambush, pursue, and reconnoiter. See FM 21-75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*, for detailed information.

b. Patrol Authority. The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although over-all patrolling policy, and certain special patrols, may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and rapid response usually make it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalion, company, or platoon level may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination problems, and troop availability. The actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority are improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion, which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. The assignment of operational areas will require considerable coordination to avoid patrol clashes, to permit the pursuit of guerrillas from one area to another, etc. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their parent command(s). Although patrol authority may be decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. To prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOP’s may be devised.

c. Planning and Preparation by the Command. The echelon that has the authority for conducting patrols has numerous responsibilities in connection with their planning and preparation. Depending on the echelon, it will be their responsibility to do all or most of the following:

(1) Notify the patrol leader well before the time of departure.
(2) Assign the patrol its mission in clear, concise terms.

(3) Provide the patrol leader with maps and photographs for study, and furnish special personnel and equipment as required.

(4) Carefully consider and select the best method of introducing the patrol into its operational area, to prevent loss of security. Such measures as movement by night, use of helicopters, and use of civilian vehicles must be considered.

(5) Issue a brief warning order to the patrol (see subparagraph e below).

(6) Make a reconnaissance, preferably aerial, in connection with a detailed map study.

(7) Formulate a detailed plan prescribing the route, security measures, immediate action techniques, etc.

(8) Make final coordination and administrative arrangements.

(9) Issue patrol order (see subparagraph f below).

(10) Conduct a rehearsal to check control, security, actions to be taken, etc.

(11) Inspect members of the patrol for physical fitness, equipment, uniforms, rations, water, etc.

(12) Brief the patrol leader, making available all possible information which may affect his missions. Previous patrol leaders familiar with the area may participate in the briefing.

D. Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader. From the time of receipt of the initial briefing until the departure of his patrol, the patrol leader accomplishes the following:

(1) He makes certain that the mission and all plans for support, communications, etc. are understood.

(2) Following a map study, he formulates a tentative patrol plan, considering support, food and water needs, weapons and equipment to be carried, etc.

(3) He makes a preliminary coordination concerning friendly units, fire support, etc.

(4) He selects the troops for the patrol, being mindful of physical condition, special skills needed, etc.

(5) He arranges for helicopter support of the patrol when feasible and as required.
(6) He determines the size and composition of the patrol.
(7) He arranges for patrol rehearsal when practicable.
(8) He provides reliable communications so guerrilla contact can be quickly reported and a rapid response can be made. Reliance cannot and should not be solely on electronic means.

(9) In addition to communications, he provides other means and methods of control and coordination, such as use of check points and establishment of patrol limits and boundaries.

(10) He prescribes time of departure and approximate time of return. Latitude must be given to the patrol leader concerning his time of return.

e. Sample Patrol Warning Order.
   (1) Composition of the patrol.
   (2) Designation of the second-in-command.
   (3) Statement of patrol mission.
   (4) Time of patrol departure.
   (5) Uniform.
   (6) Normal and special equipment to be carried by individuals.
   (8) Camouflage measures to be taken.
   (9) Directions to specific individuals as to when and where to draw ammunition, water, rations, and special equipment.
   (10) Directions for the removal of personal letters, etc.
   (11) Directions for the cleaning of weapons.
   (12) Directions for ensuring that all equipment taken on patrol is secured to prevent rattling.
   (13) Direct an individual to supervise preparations in the event you direct the second-in-command to accomplish other duties.
   (14) Set time and place for reassembly to receive your patrol order.

f. Sample Patrol Order.
   (1) Situation.
      (a) Enemy Forces (size, activity, location, unit, terrain, time, equipment).
(b) Friendly Forces (routes of friendly adjacent patrols, fire support).
(2) Mission (who, what, when, where).
(3) Execution.
(a) Concept of Operations (set forth in broad terms the manner in which you intend the patrol to be executed by outlining the general scheme of maneuver).
(b) Name of first tactical grouping or individual. (The next lettered subparagraphs, beginning with this subparagraph, assign specific tactical missions or tasks to each tactical grouping or individual of the patrol, on the route and at the objective.)
(c) Name of second tactical grouping or individual.
(d) Name of third tactical grouping or individual.
(e) Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure.
(2) Time of return.
(3) Passage of friendly position (where and how accomplished).
(4) Return to friendly position (where and how accomplished).
(5) Initial formation.
(6) Route to be followed (describe in detail each leg by distance, azimuth, terrain features, etc.).
(8) Check points (describe in detail).
(9) Fire support (concentration number or code, location).
(10) Description of objective (describe in detail relative to terrain, avenue of approach, cover, concealment, disposition of enemy and his automatic weapons).
(11) Action at objective (describe planned action in minute detail).
(12) Rally points (describe first rally point if pre-designated; describe action you want taken at rally points).
(13) Actions at danger areas.
(14) Actions upon enemy contact.
(15) Actions in event of ambush.
(16) Thrust line.
(17) Anticipated light conditions and moonrise.
(18) Reporting results (when and to whom).
(19) Rehearsal (time and place).

(4) Administration and Logistics.
   (a) Ordnance (by tactical grouping or individual).
   (b) Ammunition (by weapon).
   (c) Grenades and pyrotechnics (by tactical grouping or individual).
   (d) Uniform.
   (e) Individual equipment.
   (f) Special equipment (by tactical grouping or individual).
   (g) Camouflage.
   (h) Rations.
   (i) Casualty plan.
   (j) Prisoner plan.

(5) Command and Communications-Electronics.
   (a) Communications with Command Post.
      (1) Type.
      (2) When used.
      (3) Code words (code word and meaning).
      (4) Call signs (command post, patrol).
   (b) Communications with Supporting Arms.
   (c) Intrapatrol Communications.
      (1) Visual.
      (2) Audible.
      (3) Pyrotechnic.
      (4) Codes.
   (d) Challenge and password.
   (e) Chain of command.
   (f) Location of patrol leader.

(6) Are there any questions?
(7) Time check.

g. Administrative Help. A simple plan, or SOP, must be
understood by all patrol members and cover the following items:

1. Cleaning of weapons and equipment.
2. Turning in of special equipment drawn for the patrol.
3. Personal washing and hygiene, to include availability of small items of medical supplies.
4. Food and rest.
5. Use of exchange facilities, if available.
6. Discussion of mistakes among members of the patrol, if not covered at the debriefing.

h. Debriefing.

1. Return to Base. It is essential that there be an SOP for the reception of patrols upon returning to base. This can have considerable morale value in a campaign in which most patrols will be routine and contact the exception.

2. Debriefing. The use of a debriefing form greatly simplifies the job of the patrol leader in making his report. As the patrols return from the operational area, they are immediately debriefed by a qualified debriefing officer. The entire patrol may be brought into the building or tent being used. A terrain model or large-scale map is used to trace the patrol route and to correlate various bits and pieces of information. A relaxed, calm, informal, unhurried atmosphere must prevail. The debriefing officer fills in the debriefing form, as the debriefing progresses.


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<tr>
<th>Designation of patrol</th>
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<td>TO:</td>
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<td>MAPS:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Size and composition of patrol.</td>
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<td>(b) Task (mission).</td>
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<td>(c) Time of departure.</td>
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<td>(d) Time of return.</td>
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<td>(e) Routes out and back (show sketch or annotated overlay).</td>
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<td>(f) Terrain (information on roads and trails approach-</td>
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ing, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas. Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across water barriers. Location of all small settlements and farms in or near suspected guerrilla areas. Location and trace of streams that can provide a water supply. In the event that an outside agency is supplying the guerrillas—location of areas suitable for drop or landing zones; boat or submarine rendezvous; and roads and trails leading into enemy-held or neutral countries supporting the guerrillas.

(g) Enemy (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment).

(h) Any map corrections.

(i) Miscellaneous information.

(j) Results of encounters with the enemy (prisoners and disposition, identifications, enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment).

(k) Condition of patrol (include disposition of any dead or wounded).

(l) Conclusions and recommendations (including to what extent the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit of patrol leader

(m) Additional remarks by interrogator.

Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit/date of debriefing

4. ATTACKING GUERRILLA HOUSES AND CAMPS

a. Attacking Houses. It may be necessary to seize individuals or attack guerrillas known to be in certain houses. In planning an attack, observe the following:

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers, or intimidated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.
(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.
(4) The patrol is no larger than that required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.
(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.
(6) All available cover is used.
(7) All avenues of escape are covered, either physically or by fire.
(8) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is not expected, surround the house and approach it from all sides.
(9) If the mission is to attack the house, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. Attacking Camps. Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.

(1) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.
(2) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches. This can be traced on the ground.
(3) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction. When in the vicinity of the camp, approach slowly and cautiously.
(4) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of guerrilla withdrawal.
(5) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.
(6) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event they refuse, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

c. Destroying Captured Bivouacs. The value of a camp as a known enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites they have previously found satisfactory,
particularly if shelters have been constructed. The burning of
shelters rarely serves any useful purpose.

5. AMBUSHES

a. General. An ambush is a surprise attack from a hidden
position against a moving enemy. It does not attempt to capture
and hold ground permanently. There are two types:

(1) Immediate. An immediate ambush is one set with a
minimum of planning. Little time is available for reconnois-
sance and occupation, and the method employed depends
entirely upon the commander.

(2) Deliberate. A deliberate ambush is one planned and
executed as a separate operation. Generally, time will allow
planning, preparation, and rehearsal.

b. Characteristics. To achieve success, the following sponta-
naneous coordinated action is needed:

(1) Good firing positions (kneeling, sitting, standing,
lying, and firing from behind cover).

(2) Training in ambush techniques.

(3) Planning and briefing.

(4) Security in all stages of the ambush.

(5) Proper positioning of troops.

(6) Concealment.

(7) Battle discipline throughout the operation.

(8) A simple plan to begin firing.

c. The Positioning for Deliberate Ambushes.

(1) Principles. There are two fundamental principles for
positioning troops.

(a) All possible approaches should be covered.

(b) The ambush must have depth.

(2) Approaches. Information may frequently give the
destination of the guerrillas but will rarely give the exact
route they will take. No matter how good the information,
guerrillas have a flair for arriving from an unexpected direc-
tion. This factor causes a high failure rate in ambushes. It is
essential that all possible approaches be covered.

(3) Depth. At the first burst of fire, guerrillas scatter
rapidly, and the chances of getting a second burst from the
same position are small. Therefore, withdrawal routes must be covered to provide an opportunity for subsequent fire at the fleeing guerrillas.

(4) The Ambush Group. An ambush is made up of a series of small elements of troops. The rifle squad facilitates the organization of the ambush group. One or two men are positioned where they can listen and observe, while the others rest in the ambush position. In positioning the men of the squad, the squad leader must:

(a) Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area is kept to a minimum. Each man enters his position from the rear. The squad leader ensures that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.

(b) Ensure that the man detailed to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground. He begins firing when the guerrillas are positioned so that a maximum number can be killed.

(c) Ensure that other members of the squad have good firing positions.

(d) Position his men for all-round defense.

(e) Choose his own position for maximum control of his squad.

(5) Ambush Group Employment. Groups may be employed in two ways: the area ambush and the limited ambush.

(a) Area Ambush. All approaches are covered. They are covered in depth to catch scattering guerrillas. A series of groups, each with its own leader, is positioned as part of an over-all plan to encompass a particular guerrilla party that is expected.

(b) Limited Ambush. When there is only one likely approach, groups are positioned in depth with all-round defense. This type of ambush is used when the area ambush is impossible, or it may be used as one part of the area ambush.

d. Planning the Deliberate Ambush.

(1) Intelligence. Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents,
photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Numerous pieces of information, such as sightings of smoke, camps, patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks, are evaluated prior to selecting the area for the ambush. The commander obtains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and the manner in which the guerrilla will react when ambushed. Details of the enemy might include:

(a) Time of movement, strength, organization of the guerrilla patrol, type of supplies carried.

(b) Details of size, routes, habits as to time or location, frequency, and arms.

(c) Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties, and similar detachments.

(d) The guerrillas' technique of patrolling.

(e) Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between men.

(2) Clearance. The time of departure, route used, location of ambush, time of return, signs and countersigns, and friendly patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with those forces that need to know.

(3) Time Factor. The time for departure and establishing the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla patrol to be ambushed, the necessity for being undetected, and the route that the patrol will use.

(4) Security. Planning should ensure that every aspect of security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the operation. It provides a secure place for briefings and conduct of rehearsals. Secrecy is maintained in the coordination of other operations that are to take place in the vicinity of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconnaissances to the front, flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. The password, signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are included. A secure route over which the ambush party can move to the ambush site is selected. The plan will normally provide for the patrol to move to the ambush site during darkness. A cover plan is also considered.

(5) Ground. Terrain that affords the ambush group cover,
concealment, and command of the site is selected for the ambush. All possible approaches are considered.

e. Preparations for the Deliberate Ambush.

(1) The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:

(a) Weapons are zeroed and tested.
(b) Ammunition, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(2) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes:

(a) Thorough briefing.
(b) Rehearsal, when time allows.
(c) Final checking of weapons.

f. Briefing. All members of the ambush party are fully briefed. Briefing is divided into two parts:

(1) Preliminary briefing at the base camp. This briefing may include a five-paragraph order. The ambush commander briefs his command as thoroughly as possible to reduce the time spent on final orders, and as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation and rehearsal.

(2) Final briefing in the ambush area by the ambush commander. This may be limited but must include:

(a) General area of each group, including direction of fire.
(b) Order to begin firing.
(c) Order on completion of ambush.
(d) Variations from the rehearsal in regard to individual tasks.

g. Rehearsal. Rehearsals will increase chances for success. Rehearsals are not carried out at the ambush site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

h. Positioning the Deliberate Ambush.

(1) Area Ambushes.

(a) The ambush commander first chooses the killing ground and the general area and directions of fire for each
group. He then designates the assembly point and gives the administrative plan.

(b) The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups can move by selected routes to their positions. The ambush commander may be able to position only one group in detail, leaving the remainder to be positioned by group leaders.

(2) Limited Ambushes. On reaching the ambush area, the commander will:

(a) Make his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider the extent of his position, bearing in mind that guerrillas usually move with large intervals between one another. A killing ground of sixty-five to 110 yards is desirable. The ambush position should offer concealment.

(b) Ensure that the man designated to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground.

i. Occupation of the Ambush Position. The occupation position of an ambush party is carefully concealed. (Such minor items as smell of hair tonics and peculiar food odors may alert a guerrilla force.) Each individual should be able to see his sector of responsibility and be prepared to fire from any position once firing begins.

j. Lying in Ambush. Once a group is in position, there must be no sound or movement. This is a test of training and battle discipline. Men are trained to get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait, each man has his weapon ready for immediate action.

k. Begin Firing. The firing begins when all possible guerrillas are in the killing ground. There must be no premature action. All men must clearly understand the orders and methods for opening fire.

(1) Fire can be opened providing the guerrillas are moving toward someone in a better position to kill. A limited ambush can be commenced by the commander.

(2) Should any guerrilla spot the ambush, begin firing.

(3) Once firing begins, targets become difficult to engage; to cope with moving targets, men may have to stand up.

(4) A signal is arranged to stop firing, so immediate fol-
low-up action and search can start as soon as the guerrillas disengage.

(5) When the firing ceases, men previously detailed search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and by covering each other. These men will:
(a) Check guerrillas in the killing area.
(b) Search surrounding area for dead and wounded.
(c) Collect arms, ammunition, and equipment.

1. Assembly Point. An easily found assembly point is selected at which troops collect at the end of an action. Assembly begins following execution of a prearranged signal.

m. Long-Term Ambushes. When ambushes are set for periods of more than twelve hours, administrative arrangements for relief of groups for eating and sleeping are necessary. In long-term ambushes, an administrative area is set up. It should be located away from the ambush position. Trails may be cleared, and water should be available.

(1) Consideration is given to reliefs, particularly in the case of the area ambush. Normally, the relief will come from the administrative area along the communication lines. Although the whole party in the ambush is relieved, only one firing position is changed at a time. The reliefs take place when no guerrilla movement is expected.

(2) One method is to divide the ambush group into three parties, one in the ambush position, one in reserve, and one at rest. On relief, the party at rest takes over the ambush position; the men in the ambush position go to the reserve; and the reserve goes to the rest area. If the party has fewer than eight men and the duration of the ambush is long, the whole party should be withdrawn to rest during set periods. Such a party would be responsible for its own security while resting. When an ambush party is more than eight men but not large enough to carry out the three-group method, sufficient men for all-round observation carry out the ambush. The others move away from the ambush position, post sentries, and rest. The party at rest does not smoke and eats precooked rations.
n. Night Ambushes.

(1) General. The techniques applied in the day ambush also apply to the night ambush. In darkness, concealment is easy, but shooting is less accurate. It therefore becomes more important to have good positioning of weapons so that killing ground is covered by fire.

(2) Factors. The following factors apply to night ambushes:

(a) The shotgun can be the primary weapon. (These will have to be requested early.)

(b) Ambush should contain a high proportion of automatic weapons. The M14 with selector is a good weapon for this purpose.

(c) In darkness, all weapons, particularly machine guns firing down trails, may have their left and right limits of fire fixed to eliminate danger to the ambush party.

(d) The ambush party never moves about. Any movement is regarded as guerrilla movement.

(e) Clear orders, explicit fire-control instructions, and clear assembly points and signals are essential.

(f) Men and groups are positioned closer together than in day. Control at night is all-important.

(g) It is difficult to take up an ambush position at night; where practical, the position is occupied during last light.

(3) Illumination. The success of a night ambush may depend on artificial illumination. Only in open country, with a bright moon and no chance of clouds, is it possibly to rely on an unilluminated ambush. Infrared devices (Sniper Scopes) may be used to great advantage. As a general rule, all night ambushes are provided with artificial illumination in some form. Any illumination at ground level is placed to prevent the ambush party from receiving glare. There are a variety of night-illumination aids available (hand illumination grenades, trip flares, rifle grenades, hand-fired illuminants, parachute flares fired by mortars, artillery and naval gunfire, and parachutes dropped from aircraft). One possible method of employing illumination is to commence firing without illumination. Illumination is then fired behind
the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing area and to collect arms and equipment should have illumination. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

o. Obstacles. The objective of the ambush is to kill all of the guerrilla force. A useful ambush aid is an ambush obstacle. The ambush obstacle may consist of a series of antipersonnel mines, Claymore weapons, sharpened stakes, deep ditches, barbed wire, or any device that will either delay or inflict casualties upon the guerrillas. Possible places for obstacles are:

(1) On likely guerrilla lines of retreat from an ambush.

(2) In dead spaces difficult to cover by the weapons of the ambush group.

(3) In the likely halting place of the main body of guerrillas.

p. Immediate Ambush. Little time is available for reconnaissance and occupation, and the techniques used depend on the patrol leader.

(1) The immediate ambush is employed when the point or scout sees or hears a guerrilla group approaching.

(a) The scout decides that an immediate ambush is possible and gives the signal.

(b) On seeing the signal, the leading element immediately takes cover and remains still, even if it does not have a good firing position. The other men or units have time to choose good positions on the same side of the trail or road. The machine guns are carefully positioned.

(c) When the patrol leader estimates that the enemy is caught in the ambush, he opens fire himself. If the ambush is discovered before the patrol leader opens fire, fire will be opened by any member of the ambush party.

(2) There must be a prearranged signal to cease firing. An illumination rifle grenade or similar signal may be adequate.

q. Required Signals for the Deliberate Ambush. In rehearsing a deliberate ambush, the following signals are planned, rehearsed, and understood by all members of the ambush party:
(1) Enemy approaching.
(2) Commence firing.
(3) Cease firing.
(4) Check the killing zone.
(5) Withdraw from the killing zone.
(6) Withdraw from the ambush position.
(7) Abandon the position.

r. Checklist. The following are items that may cause failures in ambushes against guerrillas:

(1) Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
(2) Disclosure by footprints.
(3) Lack of fire control.
(4) Leaders badly positioned.
(5) Lack of all-round security.
(6) Misfires and stoppages through failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.
(7) Lack of a clearly defined procedure for opening fire.
(8) Firing prematurely.

6. COUNTERAMBUSH ACTION
a. General.

(1) Planning. In planning for defense against ambush, initially consider the available forces. The small-unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely, plans for the following:

(a) The formation to be used.
(b) March security.
(c) Communication and control.
(d) Special equipment.
(e) Action if ambushed.
(f) The reorganization.

(2) Formation. A dismounted unit employs a formation that provides for all-round security while en route. March interval is based on the type of terrain, limits of visibility, size of the patrol, and to a certain extent on the means of control available. The interval between individuals and units at night is closer than the interval used during daylight. The
interval is also great enough to allow each succeeding element to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. However, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol leader is located well forward in the formation but not so far as to restrict his moving throughout the formation as the situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they may distribute their firepower evenly throughout the formation. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.

(3) March Security. Regardless of whether the unit is on foot or motorized, security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until follow-up units can be deployed to assist in reducing the ambush. However, if the enemy is not detected, it may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The next best thing is moving adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled similarly to frontal security, and plans are for the rear guard to assist in reducing the ambush, either by envelopment or by furnishing supporting fire. Aircraft above the column flying reconnaissance and surveillance missions increase security. In an ambush, fighter and attack aircraft can provide support. Communication between these elements is a must.

(4) Communication and Control. All available means of communication consistent with security are used to assist in maintaining control of the small unit. March objectives and phase lines may be used to assist the commander in control-
ling his unit. Communication with security elements is mandatory. Detailed prior planning and briefing, and rehearsals for all units, will assist in control. Alternate plans are made to prevent confusion and chaos. If the unit is ambushed, higher headquarters is notified as soon as possible to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) Special Equipment. It is often necessary to provide the unit with additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineering tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always necessary, including panel sets or smoke grenades for identifying the ambush to aircraft.

(6) Action if Ambushed. If the unit is ambushed, the most important counteraction is for all available personnel to return fire as rapidly as possible. Troops riding in trucks remain alert at all times and are trained to disembark immediately and to return fire. When trucks are required to halt, drivers halt their trucks on the road. They do not pull off onto the shoulders because they may be mined. Trucks used as lead vehicles are reinforced with sandbags to reduce the effect of mines.

(7) Method of Attack. If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly on its actions and alternate plans necessary to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested. If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Alert Force. An alert force, prepared to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for employment by higher headquarters in the event a patrol is ambushed, or for em-
ployment for other purposes. The alert force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, check points, and designated helicopter landing sites, and through means of communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushed, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. He designates his position by reference to check points, designated helicopter landing sites, terrain features, smoke panels, etc. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to guide the reinforcements into position. A system for rapid employment of alert forces, ensuring defeat for the guerrilla ambushes, makes the ambush less likely to be employed by the guerrilla.

(9) Reorganization. The reorganization after an ambush involves the use of assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy’s pressing the attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization cannot be accomplished because of guerrilla action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

b. Dismounted Units.

(1) General. Immediate-action (IA) drills are taught and thoroughly practiced. The underlying principles of each drill must be simplicity, aggressiveness, and speed.

(2) Immediate-Action Drills. The IA drills to be practiced when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

(a) Where only the foremost elements of a unit (patrol) are caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling attack is carried out by the remainder of the unit (patrol).

(b) Where the entire patrol is ambushed in open ground, an immediate assault is carried out by the survivors.

(3) Encircling Attack. The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a guerrilla ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and maneuver taught in small-unit tactics.

(a) Formations are designed so that only part of a patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations are practiced and the distances correctly observed, the
whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opening burst of fire.

(b) As the unit advances, the patrol leader always has the terrain situation in mind. He takes control of the battle by signaling or shouting “Envelop Right (or Left).” This should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The troops will have practiced the drill and will know their positions in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of fire to cover the maneuvering element. If the leading element has smoke grenades, these are used to screen the elements caught in the killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault. If the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road, then a different tactic is called for. A small patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within the ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, requiring an immediate assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol (or unit) is in the killing zone. The patrol moves as quickly as possible to a position outside the killing zone, and then assaults the guerrilla position.

c. Mounted Units.

(1) General. The guerrilla will spring his ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and organized, from which he can kill by firing at point-blank range. The principle behind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area that the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone—unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when past the ambush area or before running into it, and to counterattack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) Immediate-Action Technique. When vehicles are fired upon:

(a) Drivers drive out of the danger zone.

(b) Vehicle sentries return fire immediately.
(c) When vehicles are clear of the danger zone, they stop to allow unloading and offensive action.

(d) Subsequent vehicles approaching the danger zone will halt short of the area and their occupants will take offensive action.

(e) When vehicles are forced to halt in the danger zone, troops will quickly unload under the covering fire of the sentries, which should include smoke if possible, and will make for cover from which to join the attack against the guerrilla force.

(3) Counterattack.

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can be carried out only by those troops who are clear of the danger zone. If there are no such troops, then a frontal attack under cover of smoke is made.

(b) In action when no troops have entered the danger zone, the convoy commander will launch an immediate flanking attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from such weapons as machine guns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops are ahead of the danger zone and others are halted short of it, confusion may arise as to which group should initiate the attack. The party which has not yet entered the ambush should make this attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counterambush action is by moving to the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire to our flanking attack, and afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the guerrilla killing ground.

(e) It is possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the guerrillas' initial burst of fire. It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counterattack. This is clearly stated in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing.

(f) The techniques outlined above are practiced repeat-
edly in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

(4) Vehicle Unloading Drill.

(a) General. In an ambush, the guerrilla first tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles and/or by firing at the tires and driver. He then tries to kill the troops in the vehicle load. It is essential that the troops unload instantly when a vehicle is brought to a halt in a danger zone. This must be taught and practiced as a drill.

(b) Vehicle Loading. To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and/or excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill. When the vehicle is forced to stop:

(1) The vehicle commander shouts “Unload Right (or Left)” to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

(2) Vehicle sentries throw smoke grenades and open fire immediately on the guerrilla positions.

(3) Troops unload over both sides and the rear of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

(4) As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, sentries follow and join in the attack.

(5) At this stage of the battle, the object is to collect the fit men for counteraction. Wounded troops are cared for after counteraction has been taken.

(d) Training. This drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads, e.g., infantry squads and platoons. Where miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a movement, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

7. SEARCH PROCEDURES

a. General. Misuse of police or military authority can adversely affect the ultimate outcome of operations against guerrillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material, during searches, must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal
value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies alone is not as damaging to
a guerrilla movement as the apprehension of the suppliers and
agents, along with the supplies or material. Proper use of police
powers will gain the respect and support of the people. Abus-
ive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily
suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time may
increase the civilian population’s sympathy toward and/or sup-
port of the guerrillas.

b. Authority. Authority for search operations must be care-
fully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform
searches and seizures in places and areas within military juris-
diction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their
police authority), for purposes of apprehending a suspect or
securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been
committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the
search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws
must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect.

(1) General. The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a
guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It is during
the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the
greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous
acts. During a search, one Marine must always cover the one
making the search. However, the searcher must be tactful to
avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be anti-
guerrilla.

(2) The Frisk Search. This method is a quick search of an
individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or contraband.
It is preferably conducted in the presence of an assistant and
a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the sus-
pect stand with his back to him. The searcher’s assistant
takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with
his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The
searcher then slides his hands over the individual’s entire
body, crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) The Wall Search. Based on the principle of rendering
the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward
position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of
safety. It is particularly useful when two Marines must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as follows:

(a) Position of Suspect. The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as parallel to and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) Position of Searcher's Assistant. The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher, and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes position. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) Position of Searcher. The searcher approaches the suspect from the side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. He places his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can be pushed back from under him. When searching from the left side of the suspect, the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect's left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(d) Searching Technique. In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's headgear. The searcher then checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs, and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If
the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completing the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(4) Search of More Than One Suspect. When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall but far enough apart so that they cannot reach one another. The searcher’s assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. Search each suspect as described in subparagraph (3) above. On completion of the search of a suspect, he is moved to the left of the line and resumes the position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.

(5) Strip Search. A strip search may be conducted within any type of shelter. This type of search is usually considered necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is preferably conducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depending on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. The suspect’s clothing, including his shoes, is removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(6) Searching Women. Marines must be reminded that the resistance movement will make maximum use of women for all types of tasks where search may be a threat. Discretion should be used in searching women; women searchers are available. Women should not be detained in male confinement facilities.

d. Searching of Vehicles.

(1) General. It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to prevent smuggling of contraband items. This requires the use of roadblocks. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civilian popu-
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lation understand that they are entirely a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(a) Types. Broadly speaking, there are two types of roadblocks: deliberate and hasty.

(1) Deliberate. This type of roadblock is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It will act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. This type of roadblock may not achieve spectacular results.

(2) Hasty. This type of roadblock is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty roadblock initially may achieve a quick success, but it eventually becomes a deliberate roadblock.

(b) Location. Concealment of a roadblock is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well-placed roadblock.

(c) Troop Dispositions. A roadblock must have adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise. An element of the roadblock should be positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred to several hundred yards) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn around and flee upon sighting the block. An element should search the vehicle and its passengers and drivers. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time, part of the troops are allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so that the troops can be turned out quickly.

(d) Special Equipment Required. For the roadblock to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs, in the native language and English, should be available. Signs denoting the vehicle search area, vehicle
parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point speed movement. Adequate lighting is needed for the search area if the roadblock is to function efficiently at night. Communication equipment between the various troop units must be supplied. Barbed-wire obstacles across the road and around the search area should be provided. Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to repulse a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method. The roadblock is best established by placing two parallel lines of concertina barbed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between these two parallel obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that will have to be held in the search area. The enclosure formed can then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the flow of other traffic, which can be dealt with quickly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained woman searcher. An officer or NCO must always be on duty or close to the search area. When a vehicle is searched, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The owner or driver should be made to watch the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. While the search is being made, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. Depending on the type and cargo of vehicles, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

e. Searching a Village or Built-Up Area.

(1) General. The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to
such an extent that they will be driven to collaborate with them as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a village or built-up area is normally a combined police and military operation. It is preplanned in detail and rehearsed. Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided and the information needed about the ground obtained from aerial photographs. Both vertical and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the case of large cities, the local police may have a detailed map showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops. As villages and built-up areas vary, a force is task-organized for each search. An organization consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accomplish the following:

(a) To surround the area to prevent escape.
(b) To establish roadblocks.
(c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces outside the area.
(d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to identify a suspect.
(e) To escort wanted persons to the place designated.

(3) Command and Control. Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. For a smaller search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native police, when feasible.

(4) Method.

(a) Approach. An area is approached and surrounded before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Sometimes it is best to drive into the area; on other occasions it is best to disembark at a distance. The decision depends on the available approaches, exits, and the local situation.

(b) Surrounding the Area. During darkness, troops should approach by as many different routes and as silently as possible. When close to their positions, they should
double-time. After daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it is impossible to surround an area completely for any length of time, due to the large number of troops required. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves. If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from joining the inhabitants of an area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large-scale movement outside the isolated area.

(d) Search Parties. The officer in command of the operation makes known that the area is to be searched, a house curfew is in force, and all inhabitants are to remain indoors or gather at a central point for searching.

(1) Each search party should consist of at least one native policeman, protective escort, and a woman searcher.

(2) When the search is in a building that has people in it, the first action required is to get everyone into one room. The police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for suspected persons.

(3) Buildings are best searched from bottom to top. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage.

(4) After a house is searched, it is marked. Persons awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched building.

(5) In the case of a vacant house, or in cases of resistance, it may be necessary to force entry. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, the search party can nail it up and place a sentry outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.
(6) When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house remains behind so that he can be present when the house itself is searched. If this is not done, the head of the house is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is found.

(7) A problem in searching is the accusation of theft and looting that can be made against troops. In small searches, it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been stolen, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.

(e) Escorts. Wanted persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally undertake this task; therefore, escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.
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